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Abstract 
The dissertation traces empirically certain prerequisites for effective local democratic politics 
as viewed in terms of the functioning of the local democratic chain of delegation and in terms 
of the functional organization of a local tier of government. Propositions from previous 
theoretical and empirical research is put to the test in statistical analyses using official data 
characterizing Norwegian municipal and county governments (1983-2003) and data collected 
in survey questionnaires going to Norwegian local council members (1995-2003). 
 
One broad motivation for the dissertation viewed as a whole is that much previous research 
that has sought specifically to assess the quality of Norwegian (and Nordic) local democratic 
politics has downplayed issues of delegation and electoral control with the representative 
political level. Still, apart from being motivated by questions concerning the quality of 
Norwegian local democracy, the present dissertation also explores the operation of some very 
general mechanisms of democratic politics. One major methodological advantage of the 
present dissertation’s overall design is that it allows for the comparison of several hundred 
units embedded within the same national regulatory framework. 
 
Taken together, the individual studies of the dissertation (chapters two through five) would 
seem to elicit the broad conclusion that Norwegian local democratic politics does show itself 
effective in some exceptional circumstances: voters may react sensibly to local policy and 
local parties may act as real disciplining organizations and they may take up positions as 
distinct local political alternatives. On the other hand, a general finding is also that there is 
vast potential for improvement, and that efforts in that direction would likely have to deal 
with issues to do with the strong national influence on Norwegian local politics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii
Abstracts of chapters two through five: 
 
Chapter two traces the electoral fates of Norwegian local parties from 1983 and up to the 
present. In broad terms, the findings corroborate the notion that Norwegian local party politics 
is very much a product of national influences: Local branches of the same nationwide parties 
face much the same electoral fate in elections – and, a finding in agreement with such a 
tendency, some evidence is also found that local party platforms are unable to adjust to local 
opinion shifts. Even so, voters do in some rare situations seem to react to local policy in ways 
that may be predicted from theory. Specifically, local mayoral parties heading strong 
coalitions may face great electoral losses in situations where local incumbents would 
reasonably abscond from much political effort (in times of local recession) and when voters 
are also accorded the opportunity to coordinate their votes on alternative coalitions (i.e. when 
the number of running lists is practicable). Moreover, these patterns of truly local electoral 
reactions apply to municipal elections - they do not transpire in county elections. Most likely 
this is due to the fact that counties, as compared to municipalities, have very few salient 
political instruments at their disposal. In addition, the cited preconditions for substantive voter 
reactions are seldom present even in Norwegian municipalities.          
 
Chapter three asks if there is an organizational role for local parties with respect to 
committee organization. While theory would predict that larger and presumably more 
responsible parties would select for functional committee work candidates that are good 
sectoral informants and are thus but moderately sectorally inclined (as measured by individual 
councilors’ spending preferences surveyed in 1995 and 1999), it is found that this is the case 
in only one out of four economically salient service sectors, namely in municipal care for the 
elderly and the disabled. Specifically, the interpretation is that even large and potentially 
responsible parties need not care much about organizing the local policy process when policy 
is anyway severely restricted: The municipal care sector in question is arguably the least 
centrally regulated of the four sectors under study – a view corroborated by councilors’ 
subjective responses to a survey question on sector regulation. As such, the study underscores 
a potential organizational role for local parties in the face of otherwise strict central regulation 
of local policies. 
 
Chapter four assesses the strength and direction of partisan effects in Norwegian and Danish 
local politics (2001). It is found that rises in socialist shares in Norwegian local assemblies is 
accompanied by rising local taxes and possibly rising user fees (income taxes, property taxes 
and fees in child care services). Three qualifications as to the generality of the findings in the 
Norwegian setting are nevertheless apparent when compared to findings in Danish local 
politics: First, substantive effects are by and large small in terms of substantive tax and fee 
rises from changes in assembly composition. Second, partisan effects are smaller and less 
pronounced in the Norwegian as compared to the Danish case. Third, Danish socialist parties 
seem to be in a better position to reap benefits from a mix of progressive and regressive tax 
instruments: While (progressive) tax rates climb as socialist shares in Danish municipalities 
rise, (regressive) user fees shrink, a pattern that does not transpire in the Norwegian case. 
Presumably, the lesser room for playing out traditional left-right motives of both public 
finance and redistribution in the Norwegian case has much to do with the more restrictive 
regulation of local tax instruments (income taxation) and the greater reliance on central 
redistribution in that country. 
 
 
 
Chapter five examines local opposition to municipal mergers. The study utilizes official 
political and economic municipal data combined with local politicians’ responses to a survey 
question gauging respondents’ willingness to merge one’s own municipality with neighboring 
jurisdictions (2002/2003). It is found that local politicians are quite sensitive to neighboring 
municipalities’ tax and fee policies: Prospects for increases in taxes and fees in the wake of a 
merger greatly reduces local councilors’ enthusiasm for potential amalgamations, the 
tendency seemingly unrelated to politicians’ different stances on the left-right continuum. 
Even so, policies in the taxes and fees area are to a large extent harmonized regionally, and 
the analysis further reveals that the greatest obstacle to widespread structural reform is 
disparities in local economic resources among neighboring municipalities. Moreover, account 
for policy and resource disparities reduces the substantiveness and significance of effects 
from small municipality size (population) in itself, the latter factor often assumed to heighten 
the quality of local democratic processes. Thus, structural non-reform seems to have little to 
do with the upholding of (allocatively) effective policy differences (or policy process 
differences) from the one municipality to the next. In stead, since the larger parts of municipal 
expenditures are financed through the central transfers scheme, the overall conclusion is that 
it has much to do with resource disparities that are intentionally set at the central government 
level.
 v
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1 Introduction: Motivations, theoretical and 
methodological approches and some broad 
conclusions 
1.1 General background and motivation 
The organization of local democratic politics is a recurrent theme in political science and 
related disciplines: Precisely how many levels of government should nations consist of? And 
how many local jurisdictions should there be at each level? What responsibilities should the 
different tiers be charged with? To which degree should local jurisdictions be able to fend for 
themselves financially? How much leeway should they have for acting out truly local 
policies? General answers to questions such as these are not easily arrived at. While different 
answers will typically hinge on expected economic, social and political consequences at both 
the national and local level, the focus of the present anthology is on local political 
consequences. Specifically, the focus is on consequences for local democratic politics in the 
context of Norwegian local government. These very rudimenatary inintial qualifications 
notwithstanding, there is indeed much general debate and awareness around such questions in 
Norway today. 
 
To give but a few examples: First of all, while in office (2001-2005), the Minister for Local 
Government and Regional Development, Erna Solberg (Conservative), had her ministry 
spearheading an appeal to local authorities to substantially reduce the number of smaller 
municipalities in Norway1, and, in close cooperation with the national government, the 
Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities (KS) has initiated a process of 
local evaluations of potential local border adjustments.2 The main attractions behind 
municipal amalgamations are prospects for reaping benefits from economies of scale and the 
attainment of enhanced professional bases for municipal services. The results, however, are 
meager. Since the last compulsory municipal mergers in the nineteen-nineties, the number of 
municipalities in Norway has basically remained unaltered - with a reduction of one from 435 
to 431 municipalities today. 
 
Second, the future of the regional level of local government has recently been discussed in 
two major research reports – the one commissioned by KS (Selstad 2004), the other the Green 
Paper from the Government Commission on Regional Policy (NOU 2004). Both reports 
envisage a reduction in the number of regional governments (from nineteen counties today), 
but have nevertheless been criticized on grounds that too little attention is paid to issues that 
could bolster the political clout, and, through it, the democratic legitimacy and vigor of 
regional government (see for instance Hervik and Rattsø 2005 for a recent critique). Voter 
turnout in Norwegian local elections has been falling stedily throughout the post-war period, 
with regional turnout dropping from 71.3 per cent to 55.1 cent from 1975 to 2003, a 
development that has prompted widespread concern. 
                                                 
1 See the ministry’s web site on municipal mergers and inter-municipal cooperation, 
http://odin.dep.no/krd/komsam/. 
2 See Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities’ web site on this issue, 
http://www.ks.no/templates/District.aspx?id=11574. 
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Third, the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development has launched a 
Commission on Local Democracy (Lokaldemokratikommisjonen) to look into inter alia “the 
development in the relationship between the central and local levels of government since 
1975”. Further, the Commission Mandate asks: “What are the implications for citizens and 
local politicians of central government limits to local freedom of action”.3 The implicit 
wariness behind such questions is that there could be very little business left for local 
democratic institutions in an era of ever increasing national government intervention in local 
affairs. 
 
There is at present, then, much public debate around questions of local democracy in Norway, 
and the official and semi-official contributions mentioned above certainly go into motivating 
the present thesis as it will elaborate on the general theme of Norwegian local democratic 
politics. Additional motivations may nevertheless be brought into play: As for the theoretical 
perspectives that are commonly applied in local government studies, there certainly are 
different views on what local democracy really is, or should be. Thus, theoretical choices 
must necessarily be made, and they will typically hinge on matters of fruitfulness and the 
relative novelty of their application within the research community. The present anthology 
will highlight certain general aspects of democratic politics that have been downplayed in 
previous research on Norwegian local politics. Specifically, the research presented here will 
give emphasis to various formulations of the competitive model of democracy. 
 
On a more general note still, one may argue that the analysis of local democracy is but a 
special case of democracy studies as such. Indeed, apart from being a study of Norwegian 
local democracy, one central aim of the present thesis is to say something about conditions for 
good democracy in general. To be sure, to the extent that this national-sub-national analogy is 
sound, the advantages of working with local political units is quite apparent: Analysis of local 
jurisdictions generously allows for the extensive study of numerous similar units embedded 
within a national unitary administrative system. The potential pitfalls and limitations are 
equally obvious, ranging from issues of complex analysis design to questions of 
generalizability across levels (from local to national democracy) or across national settings 
(from Western European to non-European systems, say). 
 
The intention behind the following outline is that it be a broad introductory guide to the 
substantive chapters that follow. In this, emphasis is given to the specific motivations that 
have stimulated work on the thesis viewed as a whole, to a broad and unifying understanding 
of the theoretical perspectives that underlie the separate studies, and to some very common 
features of methods and design. Obviously, such a brief outline will necessarily leave some 
loose ends, and we leave for the separate chapters the detailed discussions of specific 
problematics in local democracy. Still, some overarching conclusions as to the implications of 
findings is nevertheless offered, and the outline concludes with a few remarks along these 
lines. 
 
The remainder of the outline is organized as follows: The following section presents the 
general theoretical perspective of the thesis and contrasts it to that found in much current 
research in the field. The argument is that previous research on Norwegian local politics is 
very much slanted towards certain conceptions of local democracy, and that this leaves quite 
unexplored inquiry into other conceptions that are conceivably just as important in the very 
                                                 
3 My translation. See the Ministry’s web site http://odin.dep.no/krd/lokaldemokrati/mandat/016051-991126/dok-
bn.html for the Commission Mandate. 
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least. Also in this section, a few brief remarks are given on some very general scientific 
philosophical questions that have also informed the choice of theoretical approaches. Next 
follows a section that comments on a few overarching research design and methodolgical 
issues that seem particularly applicable to the study of local politics. The subsequent section 
presents the four substantive research questions that are dealt with in the separate chapters of 
the thesis. Lastly, and as mentioned, the final section attempts some broad conclusions in 
terms of an overall assessment of results: Does the study viewed as a whole find any evidence 
of “democracy at work” in the context of Norwegian local politics? 
1.2 Theoretical approaches and previous research 
So, how fares local democracy in Norway? Is the gloomy conclusion of defunct local 
democratic politics in the face of ever more intense national intervention warranted? If not, to 
what extent and in what ways are local political institutions – i.e. municipal and regional 
assemblies and the parties that make them up – able to efficiently aggregate local voter 
preferences into representative policy? And what, if anything, seems to hinder the realization 
of even fuller local distinctiveness and the playing out of even more intensive local politics? 
 
A clarifying starting point for discussion is to ask about what role there is for representative 
democracy at the local level in Norway. Much research into the quality of Norwegian local 
democracy has concentrated on supplemental opportunities for direct citizen participation or 
also on prospects for greater practical involvement of citizens with the representative political 
level.4 In either case, both the competitive democratic politics perspective that emphasizes 
control of political elites through the ballot5, and those strands of participatory democratic 
theory that stress citizen involvement alongside representative politics6 face much the same 
problem: How can citizens make sure that politicians and bureaucrats do what they’re 
supposed to do? While proponents of participatory democracy models would see 
opportunities for greater citizen involvement the solution, theorists that focus on mechanisms 
for voter control of competing political elites typically search for remedies elsewhere: What, 
for instance, are the effects of different constitutional setups, of variations in voter 
heterogeneity or of differing formal chains of institutional responsibility?  
 
Figure 1 below presents the general line of inquiry, within which can be located the specific 
research questions as dealt with in the separate chapters of the thesis.7 As such, the diagram 
highlights a coarse chain of delegation that might be applicable to competitive and 
participatory models of democracy alike: Power is formally delegated  from citizens (voters) 
to representative institutions (parties and assemblies) (I), and, ideally, the latter should in their 
turn formulate policies (in the aggregate) that are in a certain sense representative of the views 
of the former (II). In this process political institutions may among themselves organize the 
formation of plans for sound policy action in ways that may be more or less instrumental (III). 
In the next step, political institutions hand over formal responsibility for implementation of 
policies to local bureaucracies (IV). The actual policies that local bureaucracies in the end 
                                                 
4 This is especially true of research into local democratic politics on the regional level. See chapter two (pp. 16-
19)  for a more detailed discussion of previous research in this field. 
5 Central references for models of competitive democracy are Schumpeter (1942), Riker (1982) and Downs 
(1957). 
6 See for instance Cohen (1984), Pateman (1970) and Ware (1987) for models of participatory democracy. 
7 Regular case entries in figure 1 alluding to the units of analysis in chapters two through five. 
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deliver (V) may, however, come out distorted, and problems of delegation that cause policy 
failures in the wider sense may be located at each of the stages of the process (I-V).8
 
 
I
Local citizens'
voting behavior and 
preferences
local voters
Local representative 
institutions
local assemblies and 
political parties
Local representative 
policies
local representative 
spending preferences
Local organization 
of the policy 
process
local committee 
membership
Local policy 
outcomes
local tax policies,
local decisions on 
municipal mergers
Local 
implementation of 
preferred policies
local bureaucracies
Exogenous constraints on 
local policy making
local spending needs, 
national regulatory regimes,
national partisan influences
I II IV V
III
 
Figure 1.1: The chain of delegation in local democratic politics. 
 
 
The thesis will give emphasis to the competitive model of democracy as it takes on 
problematics of local voter control, local parties’ organizing roles and the politics of local 
outputs in a context of voter responsiveness. The motivation for this is threefold. All three 
motivations are in effect critical stances against the research tradition that is inclined towards 
the ideal of participatory democracy (PD hereafter).9 And, although the third motivation is in 
a basic sense superfluous in terms of motivating the present research effort, it is nevertheless 
important - precsisely because it points beyond the present research questions. 
 
First of all, PD research in the local political context predominates the field. For instance, in 
chapter two, the review of literature on Norwegian regional democratic politics reveals that by 
far the greatest bulk of research takes on themes such as citizen involvement in political 
processes other than elections, citizens’ knowledge of local political processes and institutions 
and similar issues. Also, in chapter five, very much of the cited research is predictaed on 
implications from manipulating basic opportunities for more or less citizen involvement (i.e. 
municipality size). Of course, other than the approach applied here being relatively novel in 
the midst of such preponderance, this particular motivating impulse is relatively weak should 
it stand alone. But there is more. 
 
                                                 
8 The bracketing of the box containing “local implementation” signifies that relations between the representative 
and administrative levels will not be analyzed in the present thesis, due to reasons of space. 
9 For argument’s sake, I subsume under the ‘participatory democracy’ term also concepts that have more to do 
with processes dealt with within the ‘discourse democratic’ tradition (see e.g. Rose (2000:ch. 3) for a dsicusion 
of the two traditions). While there certainly are differences in terms of the realms and implications that these two 
politico-philosophical traditions attend to, much is also common ground: For instance, (popular) participation in 
political debates and dsicussions is simultaneously a precondition for discovering a true preference and an 
instance of political self-realization.    
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Second, PD research in local democracy sudies is at the same time insufficient. Not only does 
PD research necessarily stop short of direct inquiry into issues of voter control of 
representative level institutions, it does so on very fragile foundations. Typically, PD 
researchers would criticize proponents of the competitive model for not taking heed of some 
very significant issues. Specifically, PD scholars would argue that unless citizens are duly and 
thoroughly informed – i.e. unless citizens are quite personally involved in the political process 
- the very rationale for controling representative bodies is lost sight of: Citizens need to be 
highly informed in order to make reasoned choices. Nevertheless, one may on purely 
theoretical grounds question this very need for highly informed and active citizens that is 
ususally stressed within the PD tradition. In many cases voters are rendered capable of 
reasoned choice from acting on simple cues from their surroundings – voters need only be 
sufficiently informed.10 In other words, there is no strong theoretical argument to the effect 
that good democracy may not depend almost exclusively on real opportunities for competitive 
politics. 
 
Furthermore, the competitive element is important in its own right. It is not too much to say 
that the competitive mechanism is quite explicitly the reference in the laws and regulations 
that (should) govern local democratic politics in Norway (and other democratic systems, local 
and national). In principle, therefore, and regardless of any particular factors or particular 
motivations that inform local political processes or local political outcomes, one may at some 
certain level legitimately ask of the general quality of local democracy. This legal impetus is 
to say that there is a normative assumption that there are at least some universals that a (local) 
government must stick to in order that it be deemed democratic. And the issue of voter control 
is certainly among them, the reason simple enough: Should ruling elites be exempt from 
external control, consequences could be dire. If popular input is important – and in terms of 
basic democratic values there will be no disagreement between PD scholars and others on this 
point – then control is likely the most important issue.11 All the more surprising is the gross 
neglect of control issues in contemporary local democracy stuidies. 
 
Certainly, no PD researcher would seriously consider relinquishing the possibility of electoral 
control on the grounds that more or less informal citizen involvement is a sufficient condition 
for good democracy. Even so, viewed up against the preponderance of PD thematical research 
in local democracy studies, such a posture would have put things in more perspective. But, 
even though the PD argument is admittedly that wider popular participation is but a necessary 
condition, there is even trouble with this more moderate working hypothesis. 
 
Third, and in practical terms, the bulk of research with a PD inclination is either misdirected 
or underdeveloped at best. And it is not necessarily the theoretical arguments of PD that are at 
                                                 
10 See Lupia and McCubbins (1998:2) on this point. For a more detailed discussion of the analytical arguments 
and the arguments on the theoretical focus and shortcomings of previous research, see chapter two (pp. 19-21). 
11 One should offer some obvious qualifications to the argument at this point. The interest in general democracy 
thematics in the present thesis is very much academic. As such, the empirical context of Norwegian local politics 
may be likened to a laboratory setting. Still, democracy is more than a potentially positive result: If it seems not 
to be present at all, then there is indeed grounds for alarm and outcry. Even so, if results should show that there 
simply isn’t much to be said for democracy at the local level in Norway, that would most likely be a lesser 
concern. Norwegian citizens are not in general bereft of their democratic rights – democracy is presumably up 
and going at other levels (the national level). Thus, local democratic deficits would most likely have to be 
viewed as minor democratic imperfections in the larger picture. The bottom line is nevertheless that a 
characterization of the (Norwegian and Nordic) field today as “local democracy studies” is somewhat of a 
misnomer. Hopefully, as the present definition of democracy conforms to the standard definition, the present 
studies should also contribute to the field. 
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fault. On the contrary, they are quite clear: Greater citizen involvement in local politics is an 
effective and necessary mechanism for (better) attuning the representative level to the public 
view. But, even if one should admit that wider popular participation is necessary in terms of 
bringing democracy up to a certain level, the empirical results that would substantiate such a 
claim are very much lacking. Stated another way, much current research treats participation as 
a dependent variable where it should instead be treated as an independent variable. For 
instance, again with reference to the literature reviewed in chapters two and five, phenomena 
such as electoral turnout in local elections and local citizenries’ levels of political interest, 
knowledge and confidence is either analyzed descriptively or else patterns of (such) 
participation are sought explained (by locality size, say).12
 
Direct investigations into the question of whether voters seem to be getting the actual policies 
they want is certainly the focus of the present studies. Furthermore, as the foregoing 
discussion has hopefully made clear, that question has not figured very high on the agenda in 
Norwegian and (Nordic) local democracy studies. And, partly as a logical concomitant to 
such a development, neither has the issue of voter control with the representative level. This is 
the principal motivation behind the present research effort. Nevertheless, there is a potential 
case to be made on the part of PD arguments – and this points future research in a certain 
direction: Further research of local service satisfaction levels should be undertaken, and so 
should research looking generally into how well (local) representataive level opinions and 
policies reflect public opinion as opportunities for greater citizen involvement vary (with 
locality size, say). 
 
All this said, the contribution of the thesis lies first and foremost in a more stringent overall 
formulation of the problem in local politics (i.e the issue of voter control of political outputs). 
Further, since the thesis is primarily an empirical enterprise, there is also some innovation in 
terms of method and design, and the next section of this outline offers some general notes on 
such issues. The separate articles that make up the thesis apply models that are well-known in 
the literature on delegation problems in particular and the political economy literature in 
general. As such, the thesis contributes less in terms of pure theory development.  
 
The hypotheses that are explored in the thesis stem from rational choice models of politics, 
broadly conceived.13 Criticisms of the rational choice approach will usually center on the 
trade-off between validity14 and parsimony. While rational choice theorizing is often accused 
of making too simple assumptions for social behavior, and so of being too attuned to the goal 
of parsimony, there is – perhaps as a direct consequence of this “bias”- certainly a case to be 
made for its defense on a purely analytical note:  
 
For one thing, the very simplifying aspects of rational choice theory is hardly a drawback with 
a view to theory development. Inasmuch as rational choice theorizing aids in the formulation 
                                                 
12 Of course, these results are relevant if greater personal involvement is an end in itself (see note 9). Still, they 
do not pertain to questions of voter-representative level congruence. Only in a few instances does the reviewed 
literature touch upon the question of  whether voters get the political outoputs that they want (Baledrshiem et al. 
2003; Lolle (2003a); see note 131 on p. 83 for a discussion of substantive results). The point here is that these 
two instances need to be supplemented by further research. 
13 Central comprehensive references in this respect are Strøm et al. (2003), Mueller (1996) and Besley (2005), to 
mention but a few. All focus on general problems of delegation (problems of “adverse selection” and 
“asymmetric information” within an agency theoretical perspective) as they are to be found in different 
constitutional settings (presidential and parliamentary systems). 
14 Perhaps, though, in line with Quine (1969:ch. II), “preference for subjective detail” should be substituted for 
“validity”. 
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of simple basic assumptions and precise and consistent definitions that are also amenable to 
measurement, scientific revision is made easier in the face of gross discrepancies between 
model and reality. Simplification and precision makes for greater ease with which some 
crucial assumptions may be altered and others incorporated in revised and combined models. 
For instance, one may question the simpler model assumptions of running candidates deriving 
utility from holding office combined with campaign platforms that may be freely altered to 
accommodate voter preferences. Perhaps there is something to the proposition (as put forth 
first in chapter two) that the latter assumption is not valid in the context of Norwegian local 
politics. It is partly promises of fruitfulness such as this, i.e. that assumptions and components 
of models may be altered with relative ease, that has guided the choice of theoretical 
approaches in the present thesis. 
 
As this is not the place for a general philosophical discussion of research approaches, we note 
merely at this point that the rational choice foundations of the present thesis is grounded in an 
established “standard” tradition of theorizing and empirical research that aims for 
generalizability and isolation of certain interesting theoretical principles (Mjøset 2006): It is 
the operation of the (studied) theoretical principle in itself that is the focus of interest.15 In 
interpreting the results from the individual studies of the thesis, then, the aim is not to deliver 
anything near a complete account of outcomes in local politics. On the contrary, the aim is 
very much to turn attention towards some interesting features that resonate reasonably well 
with the wider public and normative debate, on the one hand, and that have also previously 
been inadequately examined, on the other. Still, as the thesis is primarily an empirical 
evaluation of certain interesting and important theoretical propositions, there is the quite 
obvious need for empirical method to disentangle the operative from the contextual features. 
This point carries naturally over into issues of research design. 
1.3 Some general notes on research design and methods 
Theoretical discussion is, as always, in a context of ceteris paribus.16 Two implications for 
the present study seem to apply, one general and the other more specific. First of all, from a 
general econometric point of view, it is of course essential that the analyses include proper 
(measured) controls, the exclusion of which might possibly make for distorted interpretations 
of the operative effect estimates of interest. This problem is too general to be dealt with in 
depth here: The specific contexts of specific research problems will demand different 
empirical controls and research designs, and so the problem is by and large better dealt with 
as the different research settings of the individual chapters are presented. 
 
The second implication is perhaps more fundamental and also particularly relevant to local 
politics as it concerns control for a very special and generic confounding variable – at least in 
the case of Norwegian local politics: In most models one assumes that candidates or parties 
are either free to adjust their policy platforms in the face of changing voter preferences or that 
                                                 
15 As pointed out Steinmo (2001) and by Fiorina (1995a:110-11) rational choice scholars are not so much 
interested in comprehensively understanding real outcomes as in appreciating some underlying theoretical 
principle or general logic; they will find more pleasure in explaining ten percent of the variance among nine 
cases than with understanding ninety percent in one case. 
16 Generally, critics of the rational choice approach often “assume that a monocausal explanation is being offered 
because they fail to recognize that [rational choice] propositions typically are stated with a ceteris paribus 
condition” (Fiorina 1995b:88). 
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they are not, say because of the varying rigidity of purely ideological “trademarks”. Most 
often analyses offer control for partisan effects to take account of this. In local politics it 
could be that this sort of statistical control is doubly important, in that most local parties are 
merely local chapters of nation wide party organizations. Thus, local parties are not only at 
the mercy of the impersonal effects from long-term ideological labels. In the short run they 
are also very much dependent on the vagaries of the central party organizations for their 
electoral success and the policies that they may credibly offer to local constituents.17
 
Presumably this trait of local politics interplays strongly with the first point mentioned to 
make local political affairs especially difficult to grasp – for voters and political scientists 
alike. For the bulk of theorizing on agency problems in the democratic chain of delegation is 
indeed general in the sense that it mainly focuses on established systems of democratic 
government, i.e. on variants of parliamentary and presidential systems as they are to be found 
at the national level. In the context of Norwegian local government things are rather trickier. 
Systems of parliamentarism or presidentialism allow for precise conceptions of formal 
responsibility for policy – for clear conceptions of incumbency, that is. This, one may argue, 
is lost sight of in the Alderman system of Norwegian local politics, whereby all major parties 
of the local assembly form an executive board that collectively stands responsible for policy. 
In other words, there is no clear Norwegian local analogue to a national incumbent as 
separated from the wider assembly or from any other (local) independent political 
institution.18 Particularly when analysis is focused on responsibility for policy and on 
prospects for accountable government, care needs to be taken as to what, if any, party or 
combination of parties is to be considered the responsible sponsor of local policies.19 As such, 
both these points relate to the tilted arrow shape in the lower right hand corner of figure 1: 
The influence of common organizing principles (the Alderman principle) and the influence of 
national party organizations, and both these considerations will guide the analyses of different 
parts of the local chain of delegation. 
 
Viewed up against this aspect of Norwegian local politics, a few brief and general notes on 
econometric techniques may be offered. Needles to say, the data at hand allows for extensive 
statistical analysis. While a detailed account of the specific statistical techniques that will be 
utilized in the individual chapters of the thesis is difficult to give at this point,20 the 
overarching and generic problem in much statistical analysis of field data is that of providing 
proper control for “undue” influence on the effects estimates of operative variables21 and of 
devising of proper significance tests. In closing this section, then, a few points may be made 
with reference to the application of some advanced statistical techniques that are well 
equipped for handling such problems in general and that would also seem quite appropriate in 
light of the mentioned complexity of Norwegian local politics. 
 
The foregoing discussion has alluded very much to issues such as local party dependence on 
national party organizations and local jurisdiction dependence on national regulatory regimes. 
In addition, a local jurisdiction is just that: One may reasonably assume that sub-jurisdictional 
                                                 
17 Chapter one, in particular, goes some way in attempting to disentangle these different influences on local 
parties’ electoral success. 
18 Practically all Norwegian local jurisdictions have since 1837 been organized according to the Alderman 
principle. 
19 This too, is much the focus of discussion in the analysis of local parties’ electoral fates in chapter one (see 
Monkerud 2005a:20-21). 
20 Suffice it to say that the techniques that will be applied throughout the thesis must be sensitive to the specific 
research question in ways that adequately deal with the ceteris paribus assumptions (as discussed above).  
21 For which the inclusion of control variables is the traditional remedy. 
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processes going on within it (local partisan policy positioning, say) are highly informed by 
factors that are common to the jurisdiction as such (in economic or politico-institutional 
terms). In other words, not only will local parties’ electoral fates likely cluster or move in 
unison around a national party trend over time, on the one level, individual local politicians’ 
attitudes or behavior is in addition likely to be dependent on both local and national party 
processes, as well as on purely local jurisdictional factors. Detailed delineation and 
measurement of influences at every relevant level is probably too much to hope for. 
Techniques nevertheless exist that grant to the researcher efficient methods of differentiating 
between relevant level-specific processes, thus making for some additional leverage in 
unbiased interpretation of effects estimates. Without going into detail at this point, the issue at 
hand is the application of various mixed models, fixed effects models and panel data 
techniques, whereby variation is partitioned in ways that may be said to model the mentioned 
complexity over and between levels of data reasonably well.22 These comments necessarily 
very brief and coarse, the reader is invited to consider the specific applications as they are put 
to use in the individual chapters of the thesis. 
1.4 Aspects of local democracy: The specific research questions 
Below is given short research problem outlines of chapters two through five. Each chapter 
deals with specific substantive aspects of Norwegian local democracy, the focus of study 
progressing from different aspects of voter control, via questions of local parties’ command of 
the policy making process to queries into the determinants of actual policy decisions. 
 
The focus of inquiry in chapter two (“Regional velgermakt og politikktilpasning? Om 
betingelser for et virksomt lokaldemokrati”)23 is the preconditions for efficient local 
democratic politics, and as such it offers an evaluation of the operative chain of local 
democratic delegation, all from the manner in which voters efficiently are able to select 
representatives that campaign for certain policy platforms,24 to the way in which voters might 
sensibly punish or reward ruling coalitions after policy has been implemented. Empirically it 
analyzes the electoral fates of local parties in regional (county) and municipal elections over 
                                                 
22 For example, in chapter two panel data (numerous local party branches’ electoral fates in a number of 
elections) is analyzed. The choice between fixed effects models (in which observed and unobserved locality 
effects are completely factored out) and the more statistically efficient random effects models (which provides 
and factors out an estimate for variation in cross sectional effects) is tricky with noisy data. However, results do 
not differ markedly from the one model to the other. Chapter five, on the other hand, analyzes cross sectional 
(synchronic) data at the individual (politician) level nested within municipalities. One may hypothesize that 
many of the determinants of local politician preferences derive not only from individual characteristics, but also 
from contextual factors (municipal economic conditions, say). In addition, preferences may converge locally 
simply because individuals are located in a common social setting. Multilevel analysis of simultaneous 
individual and group level effects models such clustering of responses, and in so doing provides both proper 
tests of significance and some intuitive measure of explained variation. Needless to say, applications of such 
mixed models (or different panel models) requires that data may sensibly be partitioned in levels or cross-
sections and time periods. This is not the case, for instance, in chapter four as it relies on the “control variable 
approach” as the only workable “remedy” for controlled analysis of purely cross-sectional data. For a discussion 
of panel data analysis, see e.g. Hsiao (2003). For discussions of multilevel analysis, see e.g. Singer (1998) and 
Bryk and Raudenbush (1992). 
23 In English: “Regional voter control and policy adjustment? On the preconditions for effective local 
democracy”. 
24 Specifically the question is whether political parties (i.e. local branches of nation wide parties) are able to 
freely alter policy platforms in response to changes in local opinion (i.e. whether platforms are exogenously 
given or not).    
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seven election periods against expectations from theories of pre-election and post-election 
politics (Tabellini 2000:11-14; Ferejohn 1994; Cox 1997).25
 
Chapter three (“Self-organizing committees? An analysis of committee members' spending 
preferences in Norwegian local councils 1991-1999”), takes a fresh look at local assemblies 
and parties with respect to their ability to rationally organize the policy making process. In 
particular it seeks to assess the merits of two distinct hypotheses as delineated by for instance 
Krehbiel (1991): Are members on committees first and foremost spokesmen for extreme 
sector oriented views, able, in the absence of strong parties, to self-select to the committee of 
their choosing? In short, are committee members extreme preference outliers? Or are they 
carefully selected by strong and policy responsible parties – carefully, in the sense that 
selected members are allowed to hold only moderately outlying preferences, thereby 
rendering them credible specialized informants in parties’ efforts to make sound sectoral 
policies?26  
 
Chapter four (“Do Parties Matter for Local Revenue Policies? A comparison of Denmark and 
Norway”), is an empirical inquiry into the ‘Do parties matter?’ controversy in the context of 
local tax policies in two quite similar Nordic countries. On the one hand, one may argue that 
tax policy plays straight into a strong Western left-right dimension, and so is a major arena for 
political positioning (Boyne 1996). On the other hand, tax policy, like any other policy, is 
characterized both by path dependency and the demands of a well functioning economy (Rose 
1985): Since revenues are routinely raised through established tax laws, politicians (left and 
right) will shy away from tax raises out of fear for electoral reactions. Thus, while the former 
line of argument would lead to expectations of substantial partisan effects, the latter argument 
would predict quite the opposite. In addition, and as a variant of the latter argument: If the 
local demands of modern economics has not effectively frustrated opportunities for local 
partisan positioning, one may posit that national governments have done so most adamantly. 
Declining local political leeway in the face of intense national involvement in and regulation 
of local politics would make substantial local partisan effects even more incredible in the 
context of Nordic local politics.27
 
Lastly, chapter five (“Local opposition to municipal mergers: Efficiency, local political 
diversity and redistribution”), analyzes the political and economic determinants of local 
politicians’ preferences for merging their own locality with neighboring municipalities. 
Drawing upon previous research, suggesting that policy issues related to taxation and 
municipal service levels form central categories in voters’ local political attitudes (Pettersen 
and Rose 1997), it combines efficiency gains data on proposed municipal mergers (Langørgen 
et. al 2002) with municipal level data on municipal income and tax levels and individual 
representatives’ preferences. In a setting that resembles a substitute for Tiebout (1956) 
migration, distributive effects in municipal income and in the tax policy area are assumed to 
                                                 
25 Data sources in chapter two: Local parties’ electoral shares, local parties’ assembly shares and local economic 
data from Statistics Norway/Norwegian Social ScienceData Services, local citizen policy preferences from the 
Institute for Social Research, N ∈ [1318, 2828]. 
26 Data sources in chapter three: Survey questionaire data form four Norwegian School of Management surveys 
to local politicians, N ∈ [856, 3753]. 
27 Data sources in chapter four: Local parties’ assembly shares and local economic data form Statistics 
Norway/Norwegian Social Science Data Services and Statistics Denmark; survey questionaire data form 
Norwegian School of Management survey to local politicians N ∈ [113, 433]). The survey is documented in 
Monkerud (2003). 
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influence local decisions to merge with neighboring localities.28 In a certain respect, the 
research question in this chapter seeks to identify the determinants of institutional choice 
rather than day-to-day politics or policy making: Going beyond an evaluation of Norwegian 
local democracy at work, it also asks of possible obstacles to local democratic reform.29
1.5 Summary of results: Democracy in the context of Norwegian local 
politics 
What are the wider implications from the findings in the present thesis? What is the state of 
local democracy in Norway? Do the separate studies of the thesis find that democracy in 
general is up and going? First of all, as one central motivation for work on the thesis has been 
the evaluation of democratic politics in general, some reflections should be offered on 
whether the empirical setting of Norwegian local politics has aided any in the attempt. 
Obviously, there is also the need for an overall assessment of whether the proposed 
theoretical patterns in fact do find their counterparts in the empirical realm. Second, and 
needless to say, an overall characterization of Norwegian local democracy as based on the 
empirical findings is clearly in order. 
 
So, have the present studies managed to shed light on pertinent and general issues of 
democratic politics, and has the empirical context of Norwegian (and Nordic) local politics 
proved an appropriate laboratory to that end? The answer to this question is very much in the 
affirmative: Each of the separate studies shows that predicted patterns do also emerge 
empirically. In chapter two, it transpires that voters are more prone to punish local incumbents 
electorally as signs of policy responsibility on the part of the latter become more marked. 
Furthermore, electoral punishment is harsher as exogenous conditions worsen, the blame 
predictably placed with the local incumbent, and harsher still as voters are accorded real 
opportunities for installing an alternative ruling coalition. In chapter three, it is shown that 
there is an organizational role for local parties: Larger and presumably more responsible 
parties are all the more careful in selecting for functional committee work candidates that are 
but moderately sectorally inclined. Specifically, since larger local parties have a stake in local 
policies and finances, they also require good informants on committees that do not exaggerate 
sectoral needs. Smaller parties, with lesser stakes in local policies and finances, seem in their 
turn less inclined to hedge against committee members that hold extremely outlying sectoral 
views and that are therefore worse informants. The analysis in chapter four shows that there 
are indeed partisan effects in Nordic local politics: As socialist shares in local assemblies rise, 
so do local taxes and fees, although the effect is more pronounced and somewhat different in 
the Danish case (see below). Finally, in chapter five, it turns out that local politicians are quite 
sensitive to neighbors’ tax and fee policies as they make up their minds with regards to more 
or less prospective mergers. 
 
                                                 
28 In addition, it is reasonable to assume that municipal assemblies are unable to strike credible ex ante deals, 
with the enlarged assembly collectively responsible for the enlarged jurisdiction’s joint resources. This further 
substantiates the assumption that decisions to merge will have to be informed by potential distributive effects 
(see Coase 1960). 
29 The chapter an extension of my Master thesis (hovedoppgave) from the University of Oslo. See Monkerud 
(2004). Data sources in chapter five: Local economic data form Statistics Norway/Norwegian Social Science 
Data Services; survey questionaire data form Norwegian School of Management survey to local politicians, 
N=1379. The survey is documented in Monkerud (2003). 
 11
Next, one may ask what the present studies have to offer in terms of characterizing 
Norwegian local democracy in particular. On the face of it, the above account goes to show 
that all is apparently well: voters seem to react sensibly in local elections, local parties act as 
real organizations, parties may position themselves saliently in the tax policy area and voter 
and politician awareness is quite high in certain policy areas. The finer conclusion is not so 
generous, however. First of all, the cited patterns in local parties’ electoral performance 
(chapter two) apply only to municipal governments. Regional (county) level jurisdictions 
cannot show for the same reasonable local voting patterns. Moreover, even in municipal 
elections, voters seldom get the chance to coordinate their voting behavior so as to effectively 
punish incumbents that do not deliver the required results: In the Norwegian multiparty 
system voters are only in the rarest of circumstances faced with clear alternatives to the 
incumbent coalition, this very much a necessary precondition for any substantial electoral 
losses on the part of the ruling coalition. 
 
While local parties do seem to act as organizations in some circumstances, it is found in the 
study of committee organization (chapter three) that this is only the case in the one out of four 
economically salient policy areas that is not heavily regulated by central authorities. 
Specifically, the interpretation is that even large and potentially responsible parties need not 
care much about organizing the local policy process when policy is anyway severely 
restricted. This view may be contrasted with the premise underlying the assertion that “the 
[local] party – and, through it, the executive board and the assembly at large – is a relatively 
effective coordination mechanism” (Vabo 2001:32; my translation), The argument here is that 
local parties most of the time needn’t worry too much about being effective in this manner. 
 
As for the analysis of partisan influences (chapter four), it also shows that effects are by and 
large small. Furthermore, it seems that effects in Norway are not as clear as they are in 
Denmark. First of all, effects (i.e. in terms of policy differences between local assemblies of 
different compositions) are much more pronounced and stronger in the Danish case. Second, 
Danish assemblies of different compositions (in terms of socialist shares) seem to a much 
greater extent than their Norwegian counterparts to be able to act on financial motives (total 
tax revenues) and redistributive motives (the mix of progressive and regressive tax 
instruments). Presumably, this has much to do with the more restrictive regulation of other 
local tax instruments (income taxation) in the latter country. 
 
Furthermore, even though politicians (and, presumably, voters) are quite sensitive to 
neighboring municipalities’ tax policies when contemplating on whether or not to merge 
(chapter five), local policy is much a neighborhood fad anyway: For the most part, local 
opposition to mergers is grounded in economic disparities between neighbors. The ideal of the 
politically aware local citizenry reacting to prospective policy changes is very unlikely a fair 
description of the state of affairs. 
 
Viewed as a whole, then, the different studies of the thesis would seem to corroborate a 
general contention that Norwegian local politics is quite low on salient and ideal democratic 
processes. Also, the studies would seem to confirm the accompanying contention that this has 
much to do with ever-stricter central regulation of local policy and finances. For instance, as 
voters seem to punish incumbents in times of local recession (chapter two), the latter is very 
much penalized for lack of adequate central financing. The central regulatory effect already 
mentioned as highly relevant in the above accounts of local organizational (chapter three) and 
local partisan positioning (chapter four) processes, it is also present in the process of 
municipal mergers: The larger portions of municipal expenditures – disparities in which are 
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the greatest obstacles to structural reform - are financed through the central transfers scheme. 
Still, the studies do find that there is at least potential for substantial political processes. Only 
in certain circumstances does local political action seem to matter in real terms. An overall 
conclusion is that there is plenty of room for improvement of local democratic politics in 
Norway. 
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2 Regional velgermakt og politikktilpasning? Om 
betingelser for et virksomt lokaldemokrati 
2.1 Innledning 
Fylkeskommunen som selvstendig forvaltningsnivå har alltid stått under hardt press. Med 
innføringen av direkte valg til fylkestinget og knesettingen av egen beskatningsrett i 1976 – 
reformer som skulle understreke fylkeskommunens demokratiske og autonome rolle – var 
forventningene høye. Men, mens valgdeltagelsen i det første valget lå på 71,5 prosent, var den 
ved siste valg (2003) nede i 55,1 prosent. Nyere undersøkelser tyder også på at nær en 
tredjedel av fylkestingsrepresentantene er for nedleggelse av fylkeskommunen (Kommunal 
Rapport 2003). Det kan altså se ut som om presset er tiltagende over tid. Samtidig luftes idéer 
om nye regionale løsninger for utøvelse av offentlig politikk: Bør man i det hele tatt holde seg 
med et folkevalgt nivå mellom kommuner og stat? Eller holder det med statlig 
regionalpolitikk der det viser seg behov for regionale løsninger og koordinering? Eller kan 
endog kommunene ordne dette selv, gjennom frivillig interkommunalt samarbeid? Og hvilke 
oppgaver bør et eventuelt mellomnivå ha? Bør et nytt mellomnivå i større grad finansiere sine 
tjenester selv gjennom øket beskatningsrett? Nylig har den såkalte Distriktskommisjonen lagt 
frem sine anbefalinger (NOU 2004:19) for et nytt regionalt nivå og Kommunenes 
sentralforbund har også utarbeidet  en rapport som ser for seg en reduksjon i antallet regionale 
styringsenheter (Selstad 2004). Mye av debatten dreier seg om regionnivåets oppgavetilfang 
og handlefrihet, og kritikken mot offentlige og andre utredninger har blant annet dreiet seg 
om manglende visjoner og konkrete tiltak på disse områdene, slik dette kan undergrave det 
demokratiske innslaget i regiontanken (Hervik og Rattsø 2005).30 Under i de fleste innlegg 
ligger nemlig at et fremtidig regionalt styringsnivå skal være folkevalgt.31  
 
Med den pågående norske regiondebatten som en særdeles aktuell motivasjonskilde, er det 
generelle fokuset i denne artikkelen følgende: Hvordan kan lokale folkevalgte enheter – 
herunder mulige nye regioner – fungere som effektive demokratiske institusjoner? Utvilsomt 
kan det være på sin plass å trekke på de erfaringer man har gjort med den selvstendige 
fylkeskommunens virke gjennom snart 30 år. Utover en spesiell interesse for det regionale 
nivået i seg selv – der én modell altså er utprøvet i fylkeskommunen – trengs det til 
sammenligning: Hvor godt fungerer fylkesdemokratiet sett opp mot det lokale demokratiet i 
primærkommunene? Mens sistnevnte arbeider etter mye de samme prinsippene som fylkene 
(med hensyn til valgordning, intern organisering [formannskapsmodellen] mv.), er det nok av 
andre forhold som skiller de to forvaltningsnivåene fra hverandre (oppgaveportefølje, 
beskatningsfrihet mv.). 
 
                                                 
30 I Tor Selstads utredning faller eksempelvis “[d]røfting av finansieringsordninger og –modeller […] utenfor 
rammen for […] rapporten” (Selstad 2004:17). 
31 Se for eksempel ECONs utredninger (2004a;2004b), gjengitt i kortversjon i Kommunenes Sentralforbund 
(2004): “Samtlige offentlige utredninger som er gjennomført i de senere årene argumentere[r] for et folkevalgt 
mellomnivå i forvaltningen” (min uthevelse). 
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Artikkelen er organisert som følger: I neste del gjennomgås den foreliggende forskningen om 
det fylkeskommunale demokratiet. Vi skal her særlig påpeke to relaterte forhold som utgjør 
en svakhet ved den foreliggende forskningen. For det første legger mesteparten av 
forskningen som omhandler befolkningens input i fylkespolitikken vekt på holdninger til og 
kunnskap om fylkeskommunen og på befolkningens direkte deltagelse i fylkeskommunens 
virksomhet. For det andre har de studier som allikevel undersøker samsvaret mellom det 
folkelige og representative nivå i fylkeskommunen enten valgt å undersøke samsvaret i sosial 
bakgrunn mellom velger og representant, eller man har også mer eller mindre deskriptivt og 
statisk søkt å fastslå graden av holdningssamsvar mellom de to. Få undersøkelser knytter an 
til Cox’ (1997:226) begrep om vedtaksrepresentativitet, dvs. til betraktninger omkring 
hvordan lokalpolitiske beslutninger fanger opp velgerpreferanser, hvordan velgere eventuelt 
kan reagere på lokalpolitiske utfall, og, i forlengelsen av dette, hvordan ulike systemiske 
betingelser kan tenkes å gjøre slike prosesser mer eller mindre vanskelige. Artikkelens første 
del munner ut i en presisering og begrunnelse for det konkurransedemokratiske synet på 
lokalpolitikk som legges til grunn i de påfølgende empiriske analyser. 
 
På bakgrunn av gjennomgangen av demokratibegrepet vil artikkelen så i neste del trekke inn 
teoretiske perspektiver på velgerkontroll og politikktilpasning, og i påfølgende del også søke 
å teste empirisk noen av de generelle implikasjoner som fremsettes på data fra fylkesnivået – 
og også fra kommunenivået som et sammenligningsgrunnlag. Artikkelens siste del 
oppsummerer funnene i de empiriske analysene og konkluderer. 
2.2 Fylkeskommuneforskningen og ulike demokratibegreper 
I det følgende oppsummeres først forskningen omkring fylkesdemokratiet, og det pekes 
spesielt på berøringspunkter med relevant forskning på lokalpolitikk generelt (fylkes- og 
kommunepolitikk sett under ett). Fremstillingen støtter seg i stor grad på Signy Vabos (1995) 
brede forskningsoversikt over feltet, der de fleste aspekter ved fylkeskommunen som 
organisasjon behandles.32 Dernest settes forskningen inn i et større bilde: Funnene og 
forskningsfokus må nettopp diskuteres opp mot en prinsipiell forståelse av de grunnleggende 
begreper om ‘representativitet’ og ‘demokrati’. 
2.2.1 Forskningen omkring befolkningens forhold til fylkespolitikken 
En rekke av de forskningsbidrag som refereres i Vabos (1995) oversikt undersøker 
befolkningens generelle holdninger til fylkeskommunen som et mer eller mindre viktig 
forvaltningsnivå i det norske styringssystemet.33 Hovedinntrykket er at befolkningen har en 
“rimelig oppslutning” om fylkeskommunen (Vabo 1995:28), men også at den som viktig 
forvaltningsnivå rangeres på tredjeplass etter vekselvis kommunen og staten med hensyn til 
dens innvirkning på hverdagen eller dens betydning ved valg (Vabo 1995:28-30). Samtidig er 
befolkningen usikre når det gjelder faktisk og ønsket oppgavefordeling mellom 
forvaltningsnivåene, men et flertall ønsker allikevel en dreining av oppgaver mer mot det 
lokale (kommunene) heller enn i statlig retning. Dessuten  mener et flertall (utenom en andel 
                                                 
32 Befolkningens forhold til og kunnskap om fylkeskommunen, fylkeskommunens interne organisering, 
fylkeskommunal tjenesteyting, planprosesser mv. Her vektlegges kun det første aspektet. 
33 Blant annet refereres landsomfattende undersøkelser fra 1983 og 1990 og fylkesvise undersøkelser fra Sogn og 
Fjordane i 1988 og Rogaland  i 1991 (Vabo 1995:28-32).   
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på 20 prosent usikre velgere) at “fylkeskommunen har sin naturlige plass i styringssystemet” 
(Vabo 1995:29). 
 
Et annet fokus i forskningen er befolkningens kjennskap til og kunnskap om fylkeskommunen 
som organisasjon og styringssystem.34 Det generelle inntrykket er at kunnskapen om 
fylkeskommunens oppgaver er lav, men at kjennskapen til hvem som utgjør den øverste 
politiske ledelse og de politiske organer er forholdsvis høy: Over halvparten (opp mot 65 
prosent) kjenner navnet til fylkesordføreren, mens et noe knappere flertall (54 prosent i Sogn 
og Fjordane) svarer at fylkestinget er øverste politiske organ (Vabo 1995:32-33). Omfattende 
informasjonstiltak fra fylkeskommunens egen side – om fylkets egen virksomhet - ser heller 
ikke ut til å være særlig utbredt (Klausen og Østtveiten 1999:65-67). Selv om 
kunnskapsspørsmål slike som disse kun søker å fange opp “visse minimumskunnskaper” som 
må til for å oppnå “kontakt mellom de styrende lokalt og regionalt og velgerne” og dermed 
bedre lokale tilpasninger (Vabo 1995:32-33), kan det innvendes: Uten at dette sammenholdes 
med tendenser for eksempel på andre forvaltningsnivåer (vet et flertall av velgerne hvem som 
er Stortingspresident eller hvordan Stortinget er organisert?) sier de lite. En mer prinsipiell 
innvending er at velgerne egentlig ikke trenger særlig mye av den typen informasjon som her 
fokuseres på: Befolkningens politiske preferanser tas best hånd om – kan det hevdes – av 
organisasjoner som evner å formulere og tilgodese befolkningens mål. Dette poenget tas opp 
igjen med større tyngde i neste del av artikkelen. 
 
Også direkte brukermedvirkning har stått i fokus: Klausen og Østtveiten (1999:65-71) 
dokumenterer at “den reelle graden av brukerinnflytelse er ganske moderat” innenfor 
videregående opplæring og at “pasientorganisasjonene i ganske stor grad trekkes inn” selv om 
det er en “viss variasjon mellom fylkene” på dette punktet (Klausen og Østtveiten 1999:80). 
Igjen kan man stille et prinsipielt spørsmål om både forskningsfokus og reelle implikasjoner 
av slike funn: Dersom man antar at et virksomt representativt folkestyre – dvs. dersom det 
representative demokratiet virker etter hensikten – kan man hevde at direkte medvirkning fra 
velgernes side ikke har noen nødvendig instrumentell verdi. Politikk er snarere resultatet av at 
ulike partier konkurrer i valg og deretter gjennomfører politikk etter den platformen velgerne 
gir sin tilslutning. Hvordan et representativt demokrati kan eller ikke kan virke etter hensikten 
er selve det teoretiske og analytiske hovedfokuset i denne artikkelen. Mens en videre 
prinsipiell begrunnelse for å vri fokuset i en slik retning tas opp i neste del av artikkelen, skal 
det her kun påpekes at fokuset uansett flyttes til det folkevalgte nivå eller – enda bedre – til  
forholdet mellom velgere og folkevalgte. 
 
I Vabos (1995) oversikt finnes allikevel få henvisninger til folkevalgte og karakteristikker av 
deres adferd og politiske holdninger slik de oppfattes av dem selv eller av velgerne. Ett unntak 
er Baldersheim og Jamils (1992:55) dokumentasjon om rogalendingenes labre interesse for 
“hvem som har flertall i fylkestinget” (Vabo 1995:31). I et annet spørsmål mener over 
halvparten at “partitilhengere og interessegrupper […blir] tatt mest hensyn til når beslutninger 
tas” (Vabo 1995:31; Baldersheim og Jamil 1992:55-57). Baldersheim og Jamil dokumenterer 
også at rogalendingenes avstand til politikken (målt gjennom spørsmål om hvor lett partiene 
kan skilles fra hverandre) er større på fylkesnivå enn på kommunenivå (ibid). Av nyere 
fylkesforskning tar eksempelvis Botvar (2006a) for seg konfliktlinjene (parti-, geografi- og 
sektorkonflikter) i de nordiske regionforsamlingene slik de oppfattes av de folkevalgte selv, 
                                                 
34 Blant annet refereres tre undersøkelser i Telemark (1979-1983) i tillegg til undersøkelsene nevnt i note 33. 
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mens Buch (2006) ser på ulike individuelle rolleoppfatninger (politiker-, parti- eller 
velgerorientering) for politikere i de samme forsamlinger.35
 
En innvending mot de sistnevnte studier er at de ikke tar for seg aktuelle stridsspørsmål og 
heller ikke trekker inn velgernivået. For det første, ettersom de ikke trekker inn aktuelle 
stridsspørsmål kan de heller ikke relatere undersøkte adfreds- eller holdningsmønstre i 
forsamlingen til rimelige preferansemønstre hos velgerne.36 En empirisk studie som ser 
eksplisitt på partienes politiske oppfatninger på fylkesnivået kan godt nevnes. I deres studie 
av fylkespolitikernes politiske holdninger viser Sørensen og Hagen (1998) at i alle fall 
potensialet for partipolitisk posisjonering er stort også i fylkeskommunen på visse områder. 
Både når det gjelder faktiske og ønskede prioriteringer av forskjellige oppgaver er 
partiforskjellene små både i primærkommunene og i fylkeskommunene - og svakere i 
sistnevnte: Fylkeskommunen har et langt smalere oppgaveportefølje enn kommunene, og kan 
også sies å være sterkere regulert av nasjonale standarder. På andre områder er imidlertid 
ønskene klart divergerende - både i kommunestyrene og i fylkestingene er representanter for 
sosialistpartiene i sterkere grad for høyere skatter og avgifter, for bruk av private produsenter 
og for friere brukervalg. For kommunene slår dette også ut i faktisk politikk der 
sosialistpartirepresentanter er i flertall, mens det i fylkeskommunene ligger hindringer i veien 
gjennom skattereguleringen (fylkene kan ikke kreve inn gebyrer av betydning og krever ikke 
inn eiendomsskatt) og gjennom liten tilgang til private produsenter (kjøp av private 
sykehustjenester skjer sjelden) (Sørensen og Hagen 1998:111). Dette viser at partifarve, og 
lokalforsamlingens sammensetning etter partifarve, ofte kan være en god indikator på hvilke 
holdninger som gjenspeiles i forsamlingen: Uten at den enkelte studien undersøker 
velgernivået direkte, kan slike resultater relateres til analoge velgermønstre gjennom 
henvisning til andre studier – som ofte nettopp vil vise at partitilhørighet også der er gode 
indikatorer for en rekke aktuelle holdninger.37
 
For det andre er det likevel et potensielt problem at velgernivået ikke trekkes inn. Dersom 
valg til forsamlinger har noe for seg, er det grunn til å etterlyse forskning som søker å 
avdekke hvorvidt velgere har reell kontroll over hvilken politikk som vedtas og føres og 
hvilke representanter som velges inn i folkevalgte organer.38 En innfallsvinkel har vært 
studier av det lokale rommet for politikk. Et eksempel er Hilmar Rommetvedts (1988) studie, 
der forskjeller i partienes valgoppslutning mellom kommunestyre-, fylkestings- og 
stortingsvalg undersøkes, og der det dokumenteres at fylkestingsvalg heller enn 
kommunetsyrevalg oppviser større likheter til stortingsvalget med hensyn til den lokale 
partivise oppslutningen. Tolkningen er at fylkestingsvalgene i sterkere grad enn 
kommunestyrevalgene gjenspeiler rent nasjonale disposisjoner blant velgerne, og at den større 
                                                 
35 Botvar (2006a) og Buch (2006) er deler av et større fremstøt (Mydske 2006) som undersøker flere prosessuelle 
forhold på det folkevalgte regionnivået i de nordiske landene: I tillegg til de nevnte problemstillingene 
undersøkes også politikeres selvoppfattning av egen innflytelse i regionale institusjoner og deres kontakter med 
det omkringliggende samfunnet. Kun Botvar (2006b) trekker in velgernivået (se diskusjonen nedenfor). 
36 Eksempelvis sier en studie som finner at geografiske heller enn partimessige konflikter spiller en rolle lite om 
hvorvidt og hvordan ulike preferanser langs den førstnevnte dimensjonen munner ut i faktisk politikk.   
37  Med bakgrunn i en ofte implisitt henvisning til valgforskningen knytter flere studier direkte eller indirekte 
(gjennom partitilhørighet) an mellom preferanser og forsamlingsvedtak. Eksempelvis kan nevnes Borge (2000), 
Borge og Rattsø (2004), Blom-Hansen et al. (2006), NOU (2005:6, vedlegg 8) og Monkerud og Sørensen (2004) 
som alle knytter politiske vedtak (om skatter og avgifter eller om konkurranseutsetting) til kommunestyrets 
sammensetning og/eller behov og preferanser i elektoratet. 
38 Et mønster med hyppige utskiftninger ikke trenger allikevel ikke å være det man er på jakt etter: I enkle 
modellforståelser holder det med at velgerne kan true effektivt med utskiftninger, slik at forsamlingen tilpasser 
seg preferanser.  
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spredningen i kommunevalgsresultatene viser at det er større rom for politikk på 
kommunenivå enn på fylkesnivå (Rommetvedt 1988:162-163). Også Botvar (2006b:93-99) 
undersøker noe av det samme i en sammenlignende studie over de nordiske landene, mens  
Klausen og Østtveiten (1999:15-24) ser valgdeltagelse i fylkestingsvalgene som en indikasjon 
på “legitimiteten i systemet” (ibid.:15). Her kan det selvsagt innvendes mot den siste 
innfallsvinkelen at høy valgdeltagelse er “en nødvendig, men ikke tilstrekkelig betingelse for 
at befolkningen skal bli i stand til å styre i overensstemmelse med de demokratiske idealene” 
(ibid.). Både de studiene som blott ser på lokale varisjoner i den partivise oppslutningen og de 
som undersøker valgdeltagelsen vil se bort fra de spesifikke mekanismer gjennom hvilke 
velgerne kan tenkes å kontrollere politikken. Det nettopp er et slikt poeng som ligger bak 
analysene i denne artikkelen. Før analysedesign og –resultater presenteres kan de ankepunkter 
som forskningsgjennomgangen hittil har oppregnet med fordel presiseres og sammenfattes 
ytterligere: Hvilke teoretiske fundamenter kan i særlig grad underbygge fokuset på 
kontrollaspektet ved demokratisk politikk? 
2.2.2 Noen betraktninger omkring begrepet representativt demokrati  
Av gjennomgangen over synes det klart at mesteparten av fylkesforskningen har lagt vekt på 
befolkningens inngående kunnskap om og forhold til fylkeskommunen som 
forvaltningsorganisasjon. Også direkte brukermedvirkning har stått i fokus for forskningen. 
Mindre inngående har vært skrevet om fylket som representativ politisk og demokratisk 
institusjon, der beskrivelser av befolkningens forhold til sine politiske representanter står i 
sentrum. Her trengs altså til avklaring på tre relaterte punkter: For det første, hvor inngående 
kjennskap må befolkningen ha til fylkeskommunen før man kan kalle sistnevnte 
“demokratisk”? Spørsmålet er altså om den type kunnskap som fylkesforskningen stort sett 
dokumenterer er nødvendig  eller relevant i sammenhengen. For det andre, hva skal vi forstå 
med begerepet ‘representativitet’? For det tredje kan det diskuteres hvor viktig 
medvirkningsaspektet er: Hvor viktig kan det være i et politisk fellesskap som fylket? Og er 
det viktigere enn andre mekanismer når det til syvende og sist skal fattes et overordnet 
representativt vedtak? 
 
Befolkningens detaljerte kunnskap om det representative politiske nivået – dvs. institusjonene 
og også partiene og deres posisjoner - kan hevdes å spille en mindre rolle enn det en kan få 
inntrykk av gjennom den refererte forskningen. Gjennom ulike signaler fra omgivelsene – for 
eksempel meningsmålinger, etablerte partinavn, informasjon fra meningsfeller ol. - kan de 
aller fleste (når det virkelig gjelder) treffe rasjonelle valg med hensyn til det å stemme på den 
eller de kandidater som tilbyr politikk som ligger nærmest ens egne preferanser: “Reasoned 
choice does not require full information; rather, it requires the ability to predict the 
consequences of actions”(Lupia og McCubbins 1998:2). 
 
Representativitet kan på sin side defineres på flere måter. For det første kan representativitet 
forstås både som bakgrunnsrepresentativitet og holdningsrepresentativitet. I det første av 
disse tilfellene er det et poeng at de valgte delegater (lokalpolitikerne) har samme bakgrunn 
som de representerte (velgerne) hva gjelder sosio-økonomiske, etniske og kulturelle faktorer. 
Idéen er at en slik dypere kobling mellom representanten og den samfunnsgruppen han/hun 
representerer kan gi større legitimitet til de politiske beslutninger som tas – i tillegg til at det 
sikrer meningssamsvar mellom velger- og representantnivå via det holdnings- og 
interessefellesskapet som antas å eksistere innenfor de ulike samfunnsgruppene. Det kan 
imidlertid hevdes at dette idealet i praksis er vanskelig å oppnå. For eksempel skiller 
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fylkestings- og kommunestyrerepresentantene seg fra velgerne når det gjelder både utdanning 
(overrepresentasjon av høyt utdannede blant politikerne) og kjønn (flest mannlige 
representanter) (se for eksempel NOU 2000:22:kap. 8; Botvar 2006a:99-107). Det er 
imidlertid ikke sikkert at dette trenger å ha så store uheldige konsekvenser: 
 
Gjennom holdningsrepresentativitet kan ulike velgergrupper sikres politikere som målbærer 
deres holdninger, slik “[r]epresentation [often is] defined as having one’s views voiced in the 
legislative decision-making process” (Cox 1997:225, min uthevelse). Tidligere studier har vist 
at holdningene hos norske lokale partipolitikere (kommunestyrerepresentanter) stort sett 
gjenspeiler holdningene hos tilsvarende grupperinger på velgernivå (Hagen og Sørensen 
2001). 
 
Mot disse gjennomgripende formene for representativitet kan det på den annen side hevdes at 
vedtaksrepresentativitet må være det mest sentrale og egentlige mål dersom politikk i det hele 
tatt er interessant. Representativitet kan nettopp defineres som graden av “having one’s views 
reflected in the final product of the legislative decision-making process, that is, in enacted 
policy” (Cox 1997:225-226, min uthevelse).39 Mens et elektorat vil bestå av et i prinsippet 
uendelig antall nyanser i holdninger, må forsamlingen til sist treffe et vedtak på bekostning av 
alle alternative vedtak. I de empiriske analysene som følger er idéen om 
vedtaksrepresentativitet styrende, slik de undersøker på hvilke måter ulike vedtak kan tenkes 
kontrollert av velgerne gjennom utskiftninger av representative beslutningstagere.  
 
Idéen om det representative demokrati kan kvalifiseres ytterligere. I denne artikkelen legges 
størst vekt på å kartlegge erfaringer med lokalpolitikken som konkurransedemokratisk arena, 
der blikket rettes mot velgernes muligheter for å skifte ut konkurrerende styrende eliter 
gjennom valg (se for eksempel Rasch 2000a; Schumpeter 1942; Riker 1982; Downs 1957). Et 
deltagerdemokratisk perspektiv vil i tillegg vektlegge muligheter for medvirkning og nær 
kontakt mellom velger og folkevalgt (se for eksempel Rose 2000:69-72; Cohen 1984; 
Pateman 1970; Ware 1987). Begge retninger innenfor studiet av lokaldemokratiske prosesser 
vil ha sin berettigelse – på like og ulike vilkår: Ytre sett kan begge idealtyper lede frem til 
politisk representasjon som avspeiler velgernes preferanser eller som også er representativ i 
bakgrunns- eller holdningsmessig forstand. I tillegg vil det ligge et formativt og oppdragende 
element på velgernes vegne i det deltagerdemokratiske perspektivet. Og i et 
diskursdemokratisk perspektiv kan det hevdes at bred deltagelse og diskusjon legger opp til en 
ytterligere gevinst ved at argumentenes vekt snarere enn et aggregat av egninteresserte 
synspunkter vil komme til å prege utfallet av den politiske beslutningsprosessen (Rasch 
2000b:14): Selve diskursprosessen vil virke til at eventuelle skinnuenigheter avdekkes. 
 
Alt annet likt kan man imidlertid anta at et større politiske fellesskap i større grad trenger 
sterke formelle institusjoner (les: representative partier) skal det lokale demokratiet fungere 
godt. I et lite politisk fellesskap kan den direkte tilgangen til både enkeltpolitikere - og til hele 
styringskjeden fra det politiske nivå og ned til de enkelte tjenesteenheter - lettes betraktelig. I 
et større fellesskap kan man anta at mer eller mindre klare politiske plattformer slik de 
fremføres av partiene må spille en større rolle. Poenget er altså at man i et større politisk 
fellesskap nok kan ha større forhåpninger om demokratiske gevinster gjennom forbedrede 
                                                 
39 Slik sett er også den mest representative politikken på en enkelt dimensjon den sentrumsorienterte (Cox 
1997:226). Mer presist kan det hevdes at politikk som tilgodeser medianvelgerens preferanser er den mest 
representative (slik den minimerer det gjennomsnittlige avviket til velgernes preferanser).  
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konkurransedemokratiske betingelser (politiske ansvarsforhold, valgordning, intern politisk 
organisering mv.) enn gjennom tilretteleggelse for bredere deltagelse og medvirkning.40
 
Dessuten kan man generelt anta at den nevnte diskursdemokratiske proseessen frem mot 
enighet sannsynligvis må ende på et visst punkt: Til sist kan man sitte igjen med et residual av 
konflikt, og det må uansett fattes en avgjørelse som kan regnes som omforent (Rasch 
2000b:15).41 Fokuset tvinges dermed over til effektive kontrollmekanismer for å sikre best 
mulig samsvar mellom velgerpreferanser og poitiske beslutninger. I et slikt perspektiv blir 
begreper som gjenvalg og partikonkurranse sentrale. Delegasjon gjennom representasjon og 
en virksom partikonkurranse må meget sannsynlig spille en helt sentral rolle i de fleste typer 
demokratier. 
2.3 Betingelser for et velfungerende representativt demokrati 
Den foregående diskusjonen har forhåpentlig vist at det godt kan anlegges en forståelse av 
lokalpolitikk som prosesser innenfor et representativt (konkurranse)demokrati – både utfra et 
prinsipielt standpunkt og utfra det fokuset som forskningen generelt og overveiende har hatt 
på andre aspekter ved lokalpolitikken. Med dette som forutsetninger kan betingelsene for et 
effektivt lokaldemokratiet presiseres ytterligere. 
2.3.1 Betingelser for et velfungerende lokaldemokrati: Partiløfter og velgerreaksjoner 
For at et representativt demokrati skal fungere hensiktsmessig må to overordnede betingelser 
være oppfylt. Partiene må for det første tilkjennes tilstrekkelig lokalt handlingsrom: 
Interessante løfter skal kunne fremmes og innfrielse av løftene må kunne gjøre praktisk 
forskjell. For det andre må velgerne ha anledning til å kunne straffe de politiske partier som 
ikke innfrir sine løfter. Kravene kan ses som gjensidig opprettholdende: Dersom partiene 
mangler evne til å kunne formulere betydelige politiske løfter, vil det heller ikke foreligge 
noen rasjonelle grunner for velgerne til å straffe eller belønne faktisk politikk. Og omvendt, 
dersom velgerne av ulike grunner ikke reagerer på faktisk politikk, vil heller ikke partiene ha 
incentiver til å formulere alternative politiske løsninger. Flere forhold kan imidlertid stå i 
veien for at disse oppfylles: 
 
Det første forholdet er definerende for representative systemer som sådan, og springer ut av 
potensielle agent-problemer i forholdet mellom velgere og representanter. De to neste 
omhandler organiseringen av lokaldemokratiet – slik det kan hevdes at forskjellige politiske 
ordninger gjør styringskjeden mer eller mindre oversiktlig og håndterlig. De to siste 
forholdene har med de videre rammebetingelser å gjøre: Dersom lokaldemokratiet ikke levnes 
særlig spillerom, så finnes verken grunnlag for partienes tilpasning til lokale preferanser eller 
for reelt virksomme straffereaksjoner fra velgernes side. 
                                                 
40 Selv i smågrupper vil det være enkeltpersoner som tar ordet og fører debatten, og i større grupper forsterkes 
tendensen. Dersom dette er selve hovedproblemet, ligger den demokratiske utfordring i å finne frem til “rules of 
fair representation” (se for eksempel Klausen (2004b:83-84) og hans diskusjon av bla. Schumpeters (1942) og 
Dahls (1989) synspunkter på slike problemer). 
41 Se for øvrig Elsters (1983:33-42) prinsipielle diskusjon omkring etiske og praktiske problemer forbundet med 
oppnåelsen av en enhetlig flertallsvilje eller enstemmighet – som man kan hevde er den politiske prosessens 
hensikt og endelige formål. 
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For det første, kan det altså være trekk ved representative systemer i seg selv som gjør en 
effektiv straffemekanisme vanskelig. I klassiske modeller med fullstendig informasjon (for 
eksempel Downs (1957)) er politikken gitt: Partienes plattformer og politikk tilpasses perfekt 
til velgernes preferanser – gitt at partiene har full mobilitet langs den aktuelle 
politikkdimensjonen. I Ferejohns (1994) moralsk hasard-modell er bildet annerledes: 
Politikerne/partiene vet rimeligvis bedre enn velgerne hvilke grep som skal til for nå et 
bestemt resultat gitt andre eksogene faktorer som også er med på å bestemme det endelige 
resultatet. I tillegg har politikeren/partiene bedre informasjon om hvilke forhold som ligger 
utenfor deres kontroll. Velgerne på sin side er henvist til å stemme ut eller inn kandidater på 
bakgrunn av resultater alene: De har verken oversikt over det relative innslaget av eksogene 
forhold eller over de konsekvenser slike forhold har. Denne informasjonsasymmetrien kan 
utnyttes av politikerne, og dette kan forklare hvorfor velgerne ikke alltid får den politikken de 
vil ha og også peke på situasjoner der lokalpolitikerne finner det mer eller mindre 
regningssvarende å yte  innsats (henholdsvis i oppgangs- eller nedgangstider). 
 
For det andre kan et proporsjonalt valgsystem være en praktisk hindring: I partisystemer med 
få partier (to eller tre) har velgerne alltid mulighetene til å kaste en sittende (flertalls)koalisjon 
og erstatte den med en ny en. I flerpartisystemer som det norske kan dette i praksis vise seg 
vanskelig. Velgerne kan vanskelig koordinere sine valg seg imellom for å sikre én alternativ 
koalisjon valgseieren. Cox (1997:122) viser at for systemer med flere enn 4-5 partier, så 
finnes ingen rasjonelle holdepunkter for velgerne dersom dannelsen av slike alternative 
koalisjoner er et mål.42
 
For det tredje, kan det hevdes at forklaringen på manglende tilpasning og velgerkontroll heller 
ligger i at norske kommuner og fylker (i det store og hele) arbeider etter 
formannskapsprinsippet. Ordningen innebærer en vektlegging av konsensus fremfor politisk 
ansvarlighet (Hagen og Sørensen 2001) og gjør det vanskelig for velgerne å plassere ansvaret 
for den politikken som føres. Mot dette kan det hevdes at noen holdepunkter vil velgerne 
alltid ha: Martinussen (2004) finner for eksempel at ordførerpartier går sterkere tilbake når 
lokale skatter og gebyrer settes opp – men substansielt sett er effektene uansett små. 
Allikevel: Muligens vil velgerne ha problemer med å plassere ansvaret for lokalpolitikken i et 
konsensusdemokrati a lá det norske. 
 
For det fjerde, er det blitt trukket frem at norsk lokalpolitikk arbeider under stadig strammere 
rammevilkår. Kommunene, og fylkene spesielt, møter økende statlig overstyring i form av 
strengere minstestandarder og tiltagende bruk av øremerkede statlige overføringer (NOU 
2005:6:kap.5). Statlige overføringer utgjør brorparten av fylkenes inntekter, og i kommunene 
utgjør overføringene sammen med sterkt regulerte lokale skatter 72 prosent av inntektene 
(SSB 2001). Samtidig utgjør samlet kommunalt konsum 13,5 prosent av BNP (NOU 
2005:6:tabell3.3, kap.3). Sørensen og Vabo (2004:21) viser at fylkestingsrepresentantene over 
tid vurderer statlige reguleringer av lokalpolitikken som stadig strengere på de fleste 
tjenesteområder, og at den også vurderes som strengere i fylkene enn i kommunene. Slik sett 
kan en forklaring på eventuelt manglende lokaldemokratisk tilpasning av politikken ligge i det 
trange formelle handlingsrom statlige myndigheter levner lokalpolitikken. 
                                                 
42 Med (strategisk) koordinering menes at velgerne samler sine stemmer omkring lavere rangerte kandidater med 
høyere vinnersjanser. I likevekt gir slik adferd velgerne anledning til å skifte ut sittende koalisjoner ved 
koordinert stemmegivning uten at det tys til sentraliserte beslutninger. 
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For det femte, og som en variant av det ovenstående argumentet, kan manglende evne til lokal 
politikkformulering bunne i de nasjonale partiorganisasjonens overherredømme. 
Lokalpolitikk kan rett og slett ha blitt for viktig for nasjonale aktører generelt til at den kan 
overlates til lokale aktører, og sistnevnte må i sitt avhengighetsdilemma innse at de må spille 
på lag med førstnevnte: Manglende lokalpolitiske evner er et tegn på at det er den nasjonale 
partikonkurransen som er den toneangivende, dvs. at de nasjonale partiorganisasjonene ikke 
tillater de lokale partiene å formulere lokalt tilpasset politikk. 
2.3.2 Norsk lokalpolitikk: Mandatmodell eller sanksjonsmodell? 
En grunnleggende forutsetning er at velgerne kan tilbakeføre resultatet av utført politikk til et 
ansvarlig parti eller en ansvarlig koalisjon for eventuelt å kunne straffe med stemmeflukt 
(eller true med det) i et enkelt valg. Sett at partiene, av ulike grunner, ikke kan justere sin 
politikk etter velgernes preferanser før et valg, for eksempel fordi det vanskelig lar seg forutsi 
hvor ansvaret vil ligge i kommende valgperiode. Denne idéaltypiske forståelsen av 
demokratisk politikk kan benevnes sanksjonsmodellen, slik den kjennetegnes ved at velgerne 
vurderer nettopp utført politikk når de avgir sin stemme (såkalt post-election politics, se 
Persson og Tabellini (2000:11-14)). 
 
Men det er heller ikke sikkert at en slik straffereaksjon etter en gjennomført valgperiode lar 
seg gjennomføre i praksis. Dersom også observerte ansvarsforhold er diffuse er velgerne 
henvist til å stemme på de partier som før valget kan tilby troverdig politikk – troverdig i den 
betydningen at det er i partienes interesse å gjennomføre den politikken de gikk til valg på når 
beslutningen skal tas. Forutsetningene om at norsk lokalpolitikk arbeider etter 
formannskapsprinsippet (slik det utydeliggjør ansvarsforhold), at ulike politiske partier har 
bedre informasjon enn velgerne om forhold som påvirker politiske resultater (slik det 
utydeliggjør den politiske innsatsen) og at velgerne mangler evne til å koordinere 
“straffeutmålingen” (slik det skaper usikkerhet omkring alternative løsninger) kan uansett 
gjøre slik kontroll ex post (etter gjennomført politikk) mer eller mindre vanskelig. 
 
Dersom partiene (eller kandidatene) er opptatt av posisjoner - enten i seg selv eller som 
middel til å gjennomføre en spesiell velgeruavhengig politikk - og dersom ansvaret for utført 
politikk på sin side kan plasseres utvetydig, vil partiene kunne tilby troverdige løsninger i 
forkant av valget – aktiv kontroll ex post i det enkelte valg blir overflødig. Slik sett skulle 
velgerreaksjoner i det hele tatt ikke kunne spores. I denne idéaltypiske mandatmodellen43 kan 
altså partiene tilpasse sin politikk til velgernes preferanser før et enkelt valg. Men, vi støter 
igjen på de praktiske problemer rundt tydelig plassering av ansvaret for politisk handling. I et 
lengre perspektiv kan det imidlertid hevdes at partier kan arbeide etter en slik modell: Partier 
kan over tid bygges opp rundt langsiktige partinavn, som organisasjoner med egne mål til 
forskjell fra enkeltrepresentantenes (Krehbiel 1993:238), og de kan signalisere troverdighet 
for at politikken gjennomføres gjennom intern partidisiplin og utvelgelse av kandidater.44
 
Fra diskusjonen ovenfor kan man  altså slutte at lokal demokratisk kontroll med det 
representative nivå kan skje på to idéaltypiske måter. I analysene som følger undersøkes 
nærmere hvordan en sanksjonsmodell synes oppfylt på fylkes- og kommunenivå - gjennom å 
                                                 
43 Såkalt pre-election politics (Persson og Tabellini 2000:11-14). 
44 Se for eksempel Snyder og Groseclose (2000) og Wright og Schaffner (2002) for empiriske resultater som 
støtter opp under slike institusjonelle partieffekter. 
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se på endring i partioppslutning på bakgrunn av forhold som kan innvirke på velgernes 
vurderinger av ytt innsats etter en endt valgperiode. 
 
I første omgang skal vi imidlertid se nærmere på muligheten for partienes tilpasning til 
velgerpreferanser.Vi spør altså: Kan partikonkurransen best beskrives som en mandatmodell 
der et lokalparti (på lang sikt) er nødt til å tilby én bestemt type politikk? Eller har typiske 
lokalpartier snarere anledning til å tilpasse sin plattform spontant til den lokale opinionen? 
2.4 Hvordan fungerer velgerkontrollen? 
I analysene som følger benyttes data om oppslutningen til de tradisjonelle og landsdekkende 
partiene i de sju lokalvalgene fra 1979 til 2003. De ulike partienes oppslutning i lokalvalgene 
kobles til lokale velgerpreferanser målt gjennom velgernes gjennomsnittlige selvplassering på 
høyre-venstre-aksen, slik den er undersøkt i Stortingsvalgundersøkelsene.45 Gjennom disse 
analysene kan det i noen grad gis svar på spørsmålet om hvordan velgerne ved å stemme på 
ulike partier kan gi uttrykk for ønsket politikk. I neste omgang skal det legges til grunn et 
post-election-perspektiv: Hvilke muligheter har velgerne for å straffe ansvarlige 
partier/koalisjoner? 
2.4.1 Hvordan tilpasses politikken til lokale preferanser? 
Sett at partiene som stiller til valg fritt kan tilpasse sine plattformer til velgerpreferansene i det 
aktuelle valgdistrikt.46 Dersom velgerne beveger seg til høyre på den aktuelle dimensjonen, er 
det en enkel forventning at også partiene tilpasser seg dette: Dersom opinionen beveger seg til 
høyre, beveger alle partiene seg til høyre, og velgeroppslutningen om de enkelte partiene 
skulle forbli nokså uendret. Mot dette kan man anføre de hindringer som ligger i veien for 
spontane tilpasninger som ble belyst i forrige del av artikkelen: Man kan anta at de nasjonale 
og landsdekkende partier både representerer klare potensielle “labels” på en sentral høyre-
venstre dimensjon – slik det viser seg i flere opinionsundersøkelser der partiene plasseres 
langs denne dimensjonen - og at de som organisasjoner rår over virkemidlene som skal til for 
å gjøre en slik “label” troverdig (gjennom utvelging av kandidater mv.). I 
opinionsundersøkelser ses dessuten at høyre-venstre-dimensjonen stadig er en viktig 
                                                 
45 Se tabell A2.1 og A2.2 i appendikset for deskriptiv statistikk over variablene. Opplysninger om partienes 
oppslutning i lokalvalgene er hentet fra NSDs kommunedatabase, og måler oppslutning omkring en oppgitt liste 
som antall stemmer for listen i den enkelte kommune delt på totalt antall stemmer i kommunen. Der antallet 
stemmer oppgis som null, antas at listen ikke stiller til valg i vedkommende kommune, og observasjonen kodes 
dermed med verdien “manglende”. Se tabell A2.3 og A2.4 for deskriptiv statistikk. Opplysningene om HV-
selvplassering er hentet fra Statistisk sentralbyrå og Institutt for samfunnsforsknings valgundersøkelser; 1977, 
1981, 1985, 1989, 1993 og 1997, og er tilrettelagt i aggregert form av sistnevnte institusjon. 
Spørsmålsfotmuleringen har variert noe opp gjennom årene, både med hensyn til benevnelser (radikal-
konservativ vs. venstre-høyre), skala (1-7 vs. 1-9 vs. 1-10 vs. 0-10) og retning (høyeste skalverdi til venstre vs. 
til høyre). Her er indeksen selvsagt både fortolket (“konservativ”=“høyre”), likerettet (“høyre” > “venstre”) og 
standardisert (til en 0-9-skala). Verken Statistisk sentralbyrå, Institutt for samfunnsforskning eller NSD er 
ansvarlig for den analysen eller tolkningen som er gjort på bakgrunn av disse dataene i denne artikkelen. 
46 I en klassisk formulering av partitilpasning – med to partier som stiller til valg etter flertallsmetoden (samt en 
rekke andre forutsetninger, se for eksempel Helland (2003)) - kan det vises at partienes/kandidatenes posisjoner 
konvergerer mot medianvelgerens veldefinerte idealpunkt på én veldefinert politisk dimensjon (Downs 1957). I 
flerpartisystemer (med flere enn tre partier) med proporsjonale valg vil imidlertid partienes plattformer (i 
likevekt) spres langs den aktuelle dimensjonen (Helland 2003). 
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skillelinje i norsk politikk.47 Videre kan man anta at spesielt lokale avdelinger må belage seg 
på å gå til valg på det nasjonale partiets “label” – enkeltvis er det ikke mye lokalpartiene kan 
gjøre for å modifisere slike overordnede partivaremerker. Dersom dette er riktig, skulle man 
heller forvente at de klassiske høyrepartier/borgerlige partier (H, Frp, KrF, V og muligens Sp) 
øker sin oppslutning der lokale velgerpreferansene skifter til høyre, og at de sosialistiske 
partier (DNA, SV og muligens Sp) taper i oppslutning. Og at endringen i oppslutning for de 
nevnte partier går i motsatt retning når velgerpreferansene skifter til venstre. 
 
Formelt testes denne hypotesen ved varianter av følgende modell: 
 
{ }PP P P P P P.PVL log HV , der P SV,DNA,Sp,V,KrF,H,Frp .1-Viktikt HV kt t k iktikt u v eγ β
⎛ ⎞≡ = + ⋅ + + + ∈⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
 
Oppslutningen til de ulike landsdekkende partiene i lokalvalgene (kommunestyrevalg og 
fylkestingsvalg) estimeres altså som en funksjon av den gjennomsnittlige høyre-venstre-
selvplasseringen regionvis (HVkt).48 Det legges til grunn en logistisk (logit)transformasjon av 
oppslutningen til partiene, slik dette gir konsistente prediksjoner for oppslutning innefor [0,1]-
intervallet. I modellen er HV gjennomsnittlig selvplassering på HV-aksen i region k ved 
lokalvalg t (0=helt til venstre, 9=helt til høyre), γ .og βHV parametre, og ut, vk og eikt feiltermer 
som fanger opp variasjonen over henholdsvis valgperioder (indeksert t), regioner (indeksert k) 
og opptellingskretser (kommune i innenfor region k i hver valgperiode t; indeksert ikt).49 
Hypotesen som først og fremst skal testes er altså: 
 
Hypotese 1: βHV > 0 for borgerlige partier (H, Frp, KrF, V og muligens Sp) og βHV < 0 for 
sosialistiske partier (DNA, SV og muligens Sp). 
  
Signifikante estimater for βHV i analysene tas altså til inntekt for en modell der partienes 
posisjoner ligger mer eller mindre fast, og der velgernes endrede preferanser for høyre- eller 
venstrepolitikk kommer til uttrykk gjennom endret oppslutning om “fastlåste” partier. 
Varianskomponentene (benevnt σ.2; over ut, vk og eikt) – dvs. deres størrelse og innbyrdes  
                                                 
47 Og høyre-venstre-dimensjonen er fortsatt den viktigste i de fleste demokratier (Huber og Inglehart 1995). 
48 Valgundersøkelsene (fra 1977 og frem til 2001) måler HV-selvplassering hos mellom 1416 (i 1981) og 2143 (i 
1993) respondenter. På kommunenivå for de enkelte valgperioder er N selvsagt meget lav, og HV-mål på dette 
nivået er ubrukelige for vårt formål. I de tidlige valgundersøkelsene er enkeltkommuner av forskjellige typer 
(næringsstruktur, sentralitet mv.) valgt ut til å representere regioner – dvs. grupper av fylker. I andre analyser 
(Monkerud 2005) der det legges til grunn fylkesvise HV-mål er imidlertid resultatene ikke svært forskjellige fra 
dem som presenteres her. Uansett kan det for enkelte fylker i de tidlige undersøkelsene være en viss fare for at 
HV-målene representerer synet i spesielle kommunetyper (som valgt fra det ene av flere fylker i regionen) mer 
enn fylket som sådan. Takk til Jo Saglie som gjorde meg oppmerksom på dette. En potensiell ulempe ved dette 
regionale HV-målet er at det omfatter svært store geografiske enheter, slik at det uansett vil tilsløre (altså 
utjevne) større forskjeller mellom større subregioner innenfor enheten.  Se tabell A2.2 i appendikset for oversikt 
over regioner (fylkesgrupper). Blant regionene i de enkelte valgperioder varierer N (antallet respondenter) fra 59 
til 299. 
49Denne random effects-modellen samt de som legges til grunn i neste del av artikkelen antar 
standardforutsetningene om normalfordelte feilledd over de respektive enheter (valgperioder, regioner, 
opptellingskretser mv.), og gir dermed en enkel oversikt over variasjonen over de aktuelle enhetene (regioner og 
valgperioder). 
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Tabell 2.1: Partienes lokaltilpasning i fylkestingsvalg 1979-2003. Estimerte effekter av 
gjennomsnittlig regionvis selvplassering på HV-aksen på partienes oppslutning (L). 
- -0.572 *** 0.033
0.236 *** 0.220 *** 0.237 ***
0.102 *** - 0.105 ***
0.283 *** 0.336 0.283 ***
- -0.738 *** 0.038
0.039 *** 0.050 *** 0.039 ***
0.117 *** - 0.122 ***
0.183 *** 0.256 *** 0.183 ***
- -0.416 ** -0.171 ***
0.078 *** 0.072 *** 0.075 ***
0.705 *** - 0.675 ***
0.650 *** 0.790 *** 0.650 ***
- 0.213 *** 0.017
0.030 *** 0.028 ** 0.030 ***
0.130 *** - 0.130 ***
0.496 *** 0.615 *** 0.496 ***
- 1.128 *** 0.058
0.033 *** 0.063 *** 0.033 ***
0.293 *** - 0.284 ***
0.341 *** 0.489 0.341 ***
- 0.644 *** 0.091 **
0.084 *** 0.092 *** 0.084 ***
0.145 *** - 0.130 ***
0.259 *** 0.297 *** 0.258 ***
- 0.698 *** 0.051
0.703 *** 0.745 *** 0.705 ***
0.175 *** - 0.166 ***
0.291 *** 0.348 *** 0.291 ***
5087.2 4627.4
N 2824
N 2828
Frp
HV (HV-plassering, 0=venstre, 9=høyre)
σ u 2  (varians over valgperioder, var[u t ])
σ v 2  (varians over regioner, var[v k ])
σ e 2  (varians over kommunepartier, var[e ikt ])
-2LL 4624.3
H
HV (HV-plassering, 0=venstre, 9=høyre)
σ u 2  (varians over valgperioder, var[u t ])
σ v 2  (varians over regioner, var[v k ])
σ e 2  (varians over kommunepartier, var[e ikt ])
-2LL 4281.9 4628.1 4282.9
6032.8 5066.8
N 2754
5064.0
6500.9 5953.7
KrF
HV (HV-plassering, 0=venstre, 9=høyre)
σ u 2  (varians over valgperioder, var[u t ])
σ v 2  (varians over regioner, var[v k ])
σ e 2  (varians over kommunepartier, var[e ikt ])
-2LL
N 2828
N 2827
V
HV (HV-plassering, 0=venstre, 9=høyre)
σ u 2  (varians over valgperioder, var[u t ])
σ v 2  (varians over regioner, var[v k ])
σ e 2  (varians over kommunepartier, var[e ikt ])
-2LL 5950.3
Sp
HV (HV-plassering, 0=venstre, 9=høyre)
σ u 2  (varians over valgperioder, var[u t ])
σ v 2  (varians over regioner, var[v k ])
σ e 2  (varians over kommunepartier, var[e ikt ])
-2LL 6888.4 7386.1 6887.3
3306.6 4210.4 3310.3
N 2828
DNA
HV (HV-plassering, 0=venstre, 9=høyre)
σ u 2  (varians over valgperioder, var[u t ])
σ v 2  (varians over regioner, var[v k ])
σ e 2  (varians over kommunepartier, var[e ikt ])
-2LL
4982.0
HV (HV-plassering, 0=venstre, 9=høyre)
SV
2827
σ v 2  (varians over regioner, var[v k ])
4545.3
***) p<0,05, **) p<0,10, *) p<0,15 med ensidig t-test for variansparametre (σ . 2 ) og tosidig test for β HV .
IIII II
N
-2LL
σ u 2  (varians over valgperioder, var[u t ])
σ e 2  (varians over kommunepartier, var[e ikt ])
4541.6
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Tabell 2.2: Partienes lokaltilpasning i kommunestyrevalg 1979-2003. Estimerte effekter av 
gjennomsnittlig regionvis selvplassering på HV-aksen på partienes oppslutning (L). 
- -0.425 *** -0.014
0.120 *** 0.104 *** 0.119 ***
0.051 *** - 0.051 ***
0.267 *** 0.294 ** 0.267 ***
- -0.671 *** -0.006
0.031 *** 0.041 *** 0.031 ***
0.096 *** - 0.096 ***
0.229 *** 0.289 *** 0.230 ***
- -0.377 *** -0.027
0.053 *** 0.048 *** 0.052 ***
0.705 *** - 0.700 ***
0.667 *** 0.773 *** 0.667 ***
- 0.070 -0.071
0.010 ** 0.011 ** 0.010 **
0.076 *** - 0.077 ***
0.403 *** 0.463 0.403 ***
- 0.902 *** 0.041
0.019 *** 0.041 *** 0.020 ***
0.245 *** - 0.241 ***
0.263 *** 0.401 *** 0.263 ***
- 0.532 *** 0.037
0.033 *** 0.037 *** 0.033 ***
0.111 *** - 0.106 ***
0.291 *** 0.326 *** 0.292 ***
- 0.655 *** 0.227 ***
0.410 *** 0.406 *** 0.413 ***
0.095 *** - 0.062 ***
0.330 *** 0.355 *** 0.329 ***
***) p<0,05, **) p<0,10, *) p<0,15 med ensidig t-test for variansparametre (σ . 2 ) og tosidig test for β HV .
IIII II
N
-2LL
σ u 2  (varians over valgperioder, var[u t ])
σ e 2  (varians over kommunepartier, var[e ikt ])
2910.5 3056.3
HV (HV-plassering, 0=venstre, 9=høyre)
SV
1873
σ v 2  (varians over regioner, var[v k ])
2914.1
DNA
HV (HV-plassering, 0=venstre, 9=høyre)
σ u 2  (varians over valgperioder, var[u t ])
σ v 2  (varians over regioner, var[v k ])
σ e 2  (varians over kommunepartier, var[e ikt ])
-2LL 3909.6 4519.6 3913.7
N 2808
Sp
HV (HV-plassering, 0=venstre, 9=høyre)
σ u 2  (varians over valgperioder, var[u t ])
σ v 2  (varians over regioner, var[v k ])
σ e 2  (varians over kommunepartier, var[e ikt ])
-2LL 6201.1 6521.8 6204.1
N 2517
V
HV (HV-plassering, 0=venstre, 9=høyre)
σ u 2  (varians over valgperioder, var[u t ])
σ v 2  (varians over regioner, var[v k ])
σ e 2  (varians over kommunepartier, var[e ikt ])
-2LL 3795.2 4032.1 3797.6
KrF
HV (HV-plassering, 0=venstre, 9=høyre)
σ u 2  (varians over valgperioder, var[u t ])
σ v 2  (varians over regioner, var[v k ])
σ e 2  (varians over kommunepartier, var[e ikt ])
-2LL
N 2326
N 1940
3571.2
4478.3 4231.1
4503.1 3574.6
-2LL 2348.4
H
HV (HV-plassering, 0=venstre, 9=høyre)
σ u 2  (varians over valgperioder, var[u t ])
σ v 2  (varians over regioner, var[v k ])
σ e 2  (varians over kommunepartier, var[e ikt ])
-2LL 4227.6
HV (HV-plassering, 0=venstre, 9=høyre)
σ u 2  (varians over valgperioder, var[u t ])
σ v 2  (varians over regioner, var[v k ])
σ e 2  (varians over kommunepartier, var[e ikt ])
2415.8 2346.1
N 1318
N 2590
Frp
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forhold – kan dessuten gi holdepunkter for interessante tolkninger rundt det rom for 
lokalpolitikk som synes å eksistere på kommune- og fylkesnivået. Tabell 1 og 2 viser 
resultatene av analysene. 
 
I begge analyser (fylkestingsvalg og kommunestyrevalg) legges altså stemmegivningen i 
enkeltkommunene (opptellingskretsene) til grunn, slik dette bidrar til sammenlignbarheten 
mellom de to lokalvalgstypene.50  Dessuten benyttes kun data fra de 404 kommuner som 
siden 1975 ikke har opplevd kommunesammenslåinger/oppdelinger. I modellspesifikasjon I 
analyseres kun variasjonen over de ulike enhetene. Både for fylker (tabell 1) og kommuner 
(tabell2) finner vi interessante mønstre: Størst variasjon for de fleste partier (utenom for Sp, 
Frp og KrF) gjenfinnes innefor regionene.51 Uansett er det for alle partier slik at den regionale 
varianskomponenten ikke er ubetydelig: Allerede her ligger en antydning om forskjellige 
partilandskap fra den ene regionen til den andre, noe som potensielt kan forklares ved 
forskjeller i eksogene velgerpreferanser mellom de ulike regioner.52 Sammenholdt med 
signifikante, dog gjennomgående svakere, tidskomponenter (σu2) – altså en tendens til at alle 
lokallag av et landsdekkende parti samvarierer i oppslutning - forteller dette om rimeligheten 
ved å se (det sentrale) partinavnet som en drivkraft for å forklare oppslutningen om 
forskjellige lister i lokalvalg. 
 
Et gjennomgående trekk er uansett at tidsresidualens (σu2) andel er mindre i 
kommunestyrevalg (tabell 2) enn i fylkestingsvalg (tabell 1). Dette er i tråd med andre 
analyser av de to lokalvalgstypene: Rommetvedt (1988:162-163) viser som sagt at 
fylkestingsvalg i større grad enn kommunestyrevalg gjenspeiler velgernes syn i den nasjonale 
politikken (målt ved partienes oppslutning i Stortingsvalget). Det kan være rimelig å se den 
nasjonale politikken (for eksempel uttalelser fra partienes sentralorganisasjoner) som 
hoveddrivkraften i kommunikasjonen av troverdige politiske plattformer. Uansett ses altså 
tegn til at kommunepolitikk er noe annet enn fylkespolitikk – det ser ut til å eksistere større 
rom for lokale preferansedannelser i det førstnevnte tilfellet. Muligens finnes større rom for 
lokal tilpasning på kommunenivå enn på fylkesnivå, noe som ikke er urimelig tatt i 
betraktning det betydelig mindre formelle politiske spillerom fylkene er tildelt. Og muligens 
må velgerne i fylkestingsvalg i større grad enn i kommunestyrevalg informeres av et 
forholdsvis langsiktig og eksogent gitt “parti-label”. 
 
Modellspesifikasjon II tester resonnementet om stabile landsdekkende partiplattformer mer 
direkte, og estimerer βHV  ved å utnytte variasjonen over regioner og kommuner mens det tas 
høyde for uobserverbare faktorer knyttet til tidsdimensjonen. Mønsteret er tydelig både for 
                                                 
50 For kommunestyrevalgene ses av tabell 1 at på langt nær alle partier stiller liste i alle de 404 kommuner og i 
alle valgperioder som i utgangspunktet undersøkes (min(N)=1318). I fylkestingsvalgene stiller de fleste 
landsdekkende partier liste i de aller fleste kommuner (min(N)=2754). En kan innvende at dette kan skape 
skjevheter i sammenligningen mellom fylkestings- og kommunestyrevalgene. Men, dersom det kun legges til 
grunn kommuner der et parti stiller liste både i kommunestyre- og fylkestingsvalget endrer mønsteret seg (ved 
βHV eller de ulike variansparametre) ikke nevneverdig. 
51 Eksempelvis finner vi (i tabell 2) at 0,23/(0,23+0,10+0,03)·100%=64% av variasjon (på logitskalaen) i 
oppslutning over kommunale Arbeiderpartilister skyldes forskjeller mellom kommuner. 
52 Sammenholdt med dramatiske fall i –2LL fra modellene II til III også i kommunestyrevalgsanalysene (tabell 
2), har dette implikasjoner for debatten om kommunesammenslåinger: Dersom oppslutningen om de ulike 
partiene sier noe om realiserte velgerpreferanser, er det ikke sikkert at sammenslåing av kommuner (innenfor 
samme region) trenger å ha store uheldige konsekvenser – oppslutningen er i stor grad regionalt fordelt. 
Tidligere studier har også vist at kommunal skatte- og avgiftspolitikk er regionalt fordelt (Monkerud 2004:59-
60). 
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fylkestingsvalg og kommunestyrevalg: De tradisjonelle sosialistiske partiene (SV, DNA), 
samt Sp, har systematisk lavere oppslutning i fylker der velgerpreferansene ligger til høyre på 
HV-skalaen (og omvendt for de resterende partier), og effektene er substansielle. For 
eksempel: Med en oppslutning om DNA på 35% i fylkestingsvalget53 i et gitt fylke (dvs. en 
odds på 0,54), forventer vi ifølge modellen at DNA-oppslutningen er 0,54·e-0,74/(1+0,54·e-
0,74)·100%=21% i et fylke med ett skalapoeng høyere skåre på gjennomsnittlig HV-
selvplassering. 
 
I modellspesifikasjon III gis en sterkere test av hypotesen, ved at det også tas hensyn til ulike 
nivåer i partioppslutningen fra region til region i undersøkelsesperioden. Dermed får en bedre 
tak på effekten av endringer i HV-selvplassering innenfor de enkelte regioner i tidsperioden: 
Modellen redegjør (som i modell I) altså i tillegg for uobserverbare forhold ved det enkelte 
regionale partiavsnitt. Effektene her er betydelig mindre (fra –0,17 til 0,23 på logitskalaen) og 
i langt mindre grad signifikante. Dette kan tyde på at oppslutningen om de ulike partiene 
regionalt er ganske robust overfor endringer i opinionens svingninger på HV-dimensjonen. 
Der resultatene er signifikante går de imidlertid ikke imot den predikerte retningen i forhold 
til en rimelig plassering av partiene langs HV-aksen.54
 
I kommuneanalysen er det allikevel i stor grad høyrepartiene (H og Frp) som går frem som 
følge av en dreining i gjennomsnittlig HV-selvplassering (signifkant og sterkt for Frps del i 
kommunene, signifikant men svakere for H i fylkene). I fylkestingsanalysen estimerer 
modellen imidlertid også at Sp går systematisk tilbake som følge av en venstredreining i 
opinionen. Eksempelvis: Med en typisk oppslutning om Frp på 10% i kommunestyrevalget i 
en tilfeldig region (dvs. en odds på 0,11), forventer vi ifølge modellen at Frp-oppslutningen 
øker til 0,11·e0,23/(1+0,11·e0,23)·100%=12% som følge av en høyredreining i opinionen på ett 
skalapoeng på gjennomsnittlig HV-selvplassering. Resultatet for Sps del i fylkesanalysen gir 
holdepunkter for å påstå det eksisterer et visst potensial for folkelig forankret høyre-venstre-
politikk også på fylkesnivået. Men, som tidligere påpekt, ligger det ikke i særlig grad til 
fylkene å omsette velgerpreferansene det her er snakk om til faktisk politikk (i form av valg av 
tjenestorganisering eller skatte- og avgiftspolitikk).55
 
Hovedresultatet av analysene er klart: Vi finner enkelte holdepunkter for at lokalpolitikk 
tilpasses velgernes preferanser ved at velgerne stemmer på partier med eksogent gitte og 
stabile plattformer. Dette er i tråd med andre undersøkelser som analyserer noe av det samme, 
om enn med andre typer data og metoder: I Sørensen (2004:537-538) vises at holdningene til 
ulike privatiseringsreformer innenfor partiblokkene i kommunestyrene (henholdsvis Frp, H; 
KrF, V, Sp og DNA, SV, RV) er forbausende stabile over tidsrommet 1995 til 2003, på tross 
av at opinionen fra 1988 til 1999-2003 svingte i retning av større privatiseringsiver. 
                                                 
53 En oppslutning på rundt 35% er nær typisk for dette partiet. Se tabell A2.3 i appendikset for detaljer. 
54 Substansielle forklaringer på at oppslutningen om et enkelt regionale parti synes robust overfor skift i HV-
selvplassering kan ta utgangspunkt i flere forhold som i vår analyse er uobserverbare: Ubredt og sterk regional 
partiidentifikasjon eller at andre og viktigere konfliktlinjer enn HV-dimensjonen, sannsynligvis kryssende med 
sistnevnte, fanges opp av den regionale partisammensetningen. En metodologisk forklaring på få signifikante 
resultater i analysen er den svake tidsvariasjonen for HV-selvplassering vi ofte finner over de sju aktuelle 
valgperiodene (se tabell A2.2 i appendikset for detaljer) kombinert med HV-mål beheftet med betydelige feil 
(utvalgsfeil og måle- og spesifikasjonsfeil) (jf. note 48).   
55 Man kan innvende at såkalte fixed effects-analyser - der et sett regiondummies erstatter den estimerte 
variasjonstermen (σv2) - gir en sikrere test av hypotesen da dette også tar hensyn til alle observerte 
regionspesifikke og tidsinvariante forhold. Supplerende tester av slike modeller gir allikevel noenlunde samme 
mønster som det som rapporteres her. 
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 I det store og hele klarer imidlertid ikke den eksplisitte og mer eller mindre valide 
operasjonaliseringen56 av lokale preferanser vi legger til grunn å redegjøre særlig for 
variasjonen i lokalpartienes oppslutning. Eksempelvis kan vi anslå (fra modell III i tabell 1) at 
Senterpartiets generelle og typiske svingning i oppslutning er √σu2 = √0,07 = 0,26 (på 
logitskalaen) gitt ved standardavviket, mens en typisk endring på rundt s = 0,24 i HV-
plassering innenfor en region57 kun gir opphav til en typisk endring i Sp-oppslutning på +/-
|s·βHV|= 0,24·0,17 = 0,041 (igjen på logitskalaen). Lignende betraktninger kan legges til grunn 
for de andre partienes del (både når det gjelder kommunestyre- og fylkestingsvalg). Selv om 
det altså kan synes som at rommet for lokalpolitisk tilpasning er større i kommunestyrevalg 
enn i fylkestingsvalgene, antyder resultatene for begge typene valgs vedkommende at en 
sentral partiorganisasjon i relativt stor grad kan dømme alle sine lokallag til samme skjebne 
ved valgurnene. 
2.4.2 Reagerer velgerne på lokalpolitikken? 
Utover spørsmål omkring partienes tilpasning til endrede velgerpreferanser står allikevel 
spørsmålene om etter-valgs-effekter (innenfor sanksjonsmodellen) tilbake. Når et parti først 
har kommet inn i en mer eller mindre ansvarsfull posisjon i lokalforsamlingen, har det da 
noen incentiver til å gjennomføre lovet politikk? Ulike forutsetninger kan gjøre det mer eller 
mindre vanskelig for et ansvarlig og handlingskraftig parti å yte en politisk innsats som 
velgerne kan reagere på: 
 
For det første må en grunnleggende forutsetning tilfredsstilles. Et parti eller en koalisjon må 
peke seg ut som ansvarlig sett fra velgernes side. Den norske formannskapsmodellen, der alle 
større partier samlet står ansvarlig for politikken i fylket eller kommunen, kan som nevnt 
gjøre ansvarsforholdene uklare.58 Allikevel kan det argumenteres for at velgerne tross alt kan 
ha enkelte holdepunkter: En ansvarlig koalisjon må for det første være synlig for at velgerne i 
det hele tatt skal kunne reagere. I lokalpolitikken kan det hevdes at ordfører- og 
varaordførerpartiet er de mest profilerte, og at disse partiene derfor vil være det mest naturlige 
mål for straffe- og belønningsreaksjoner fra velgernes side. 
 
Dernest, for at velgerne skal kunne reagere fornuftig, og ikke kun straffe eller belønne en 
stråmann, må nevnte koalisjon ha politisk handlingsrom. I sin analyse av velgerreaksjoner på 
kommunenivå argumenterer Pål Martinussen (2004:231) for at lokalpolitikken i økende grad 
preges av forpliktende koalisjonsdannelser, der gjennomføringen av et forhåndsbestemt 
program står sentralt. Slik kan ordfører- og varaordførervervet ses som belønninger til partier 
som står sammen på en mer eller mindre klart avgrenset og sterk politisk plattform. Dessuten 
finner Martinussen (2004:242-244) altså at ordførerpartiet (og koalisjonspartiene samlet) 
endrer oppslutning som følge av endret lokalpolitikk (skatte- og avgiftspolitikk, 
                                                 
56 Høyre-venstre-dimensjonen er kun en av mange saker, og dessuten kan vårt mål altså være beheftet med store 
målefeil (se note 48). 
57 Der s=0,31 er et typisk standardavvik for endringen i HV-plassering innenfor en region (se tabell A2.2 i 
appendikset). 
58 Oslo – som har både kommunale og fylkeskommunale oppgaver – utelates fra analysene som følger. 
Analysene inkluderer imidlertid Nordland fylkeskommune og Bergen som i deler av undersøkelsesperioden har 
hatt parlamentarisme som styringsform. Resultatene påvirkes kun neglisjerbart når disse enhetene (og eventuelle 
underenheter og ) utelates fra analysene (for den ene valgperioden (1999-2003) med parlamentarisk 
styringsmodell). 
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dekningsgrader og satser for barnehager mv.). At effektene er små, kan understreke det 
problematiske ved forståelsen av ordførerpartiet eller ordfører/varaordførerkoalisjonen som en 
analogi til en klart avgrenset regjering (i et parlamentarisk eller presidentalt system) på 
nasjonalt plan. Uansett kan man hevde at ordførerpartiet/ordførerkoalisjonen er den beste 
kandidaten for dette analyseformålet i norsk lokalpolitisk sammenheng. Dessuten kan det 
argumenteres for at validiteten på dette punktet isolert sett er mindre problematisk all den tid 
det er sammenligningen av fylkes- og kommunepolitikken som står i fokus. For enkelhets 
skyld legger derfor også de følgende anlysene til grunn frem- og tilbakegangen for 
ordførerpartiet i de to lokalvalgene over tid.59
 
For det andre må velgerne ha noe å reagere på – de må kunne identifisere situasjoner der 
ansvarlige politikere yter eller unnlater å yte en innsats. Men, mens indikatorer for 
prioriteringer og andre politiske beslutninger er relativt enkle å identifisere på kommunenivå 
(jf. Martinussens (2004:253-255) indikatorer), er indikatorer for fylkeskommunale politiske 
valg vanskeligere å finne. I analysene legges følgende resonnement til grunn: Politikerne har 
bedre oversikt enn velgerne over eksogene forhold som er med på å bestemme lokalpolitiske 
resultater – eksogene forhold slike som konjunkturer og rammebetingelser. Velgerne er på sin 
side henvist til å stemme på ulike ansvarlige partier ut fra de resultater som fremkommer. Når 
rammebetingelsene ellers er dårlige, vil det dermed være lite regningssvarende for et parti å 
yte særlig innsats. Selv med stor innsats fra partiets side kan resultatet bli for svakt til å 
motvirke stemmeflukt dersom rammebetingelsene er dårlige nok, og det kan dermed uansett 
regne med å bli straffet ved det forestående valget. Dersom man kan anta at politikerne har 
bedre oversikt over rammebetingelser enn velgerne, leder dette til et forventning om at 
ansvarlige partier unnlater å yte særlig innsats i nedgangstider, og at de blir straffet for dette i 
lokalvalgene.60
 
I de følgende analysene legges derfor til grunn et mål for veksten i inneværende valgperiode 
basert på den enkelte kommunens eller fylkeskommunens frie inntekter (skatt på inntekt og 
formue samt statlige overføringer), slik disse utgjør brorparten av både kommunenes og 
fylkeskommunenes inntektsgrunnlag. En enkelt kommune eller fylkeskommune regnes å ha 
vært igjennom en nedgangsperiode ved det forestående valget (t) dersom den opplever 
nedgang i frie inntekter per innbygger i alle fire årene (a=1, 2, 3, 4) i en valgperiode (fra t-1 til 
t) eller i alle årene så nær som ett:61
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59 Martinussen (ibid.) analyserer både ordførerpartiets og ordførerkoalisjonens frem- og tilbakegang. Effektene 
kommer imidlertid klarest frem i det førstnevnte tilfellet, og vi nøyer oss derfor her med analyser av 
ordførerpartiets endring i oppslutning. 
60 Resonnementet - som nevnt hentet fra Ferejohn (1994) - peker altså på en form for styringskostnader. Dersom 
rammebetingelsene blir for ugunstige, krever gjenvalg for høy innsats til at posisjonene forsvarer kostnadene. 
61 Alle beløp er deflatert etter Nasjonalregnskapets prisindeks for kommunalt konsum (se 
http://statbank.ssb.no/statistikkbanken) og er oppgitt i 2000-kroner. Begrepet frie inntekter har noe varierende 
innhold gjennom den perioden. Særlig ved overgangen til nytt inntektssystem i 1986 oppleves et sprang i 
inntektene for alle enheter. I den perioden der dette året inngår er kun de enheter med gjennomgående nedgang i 
de tre andre årene gitt verdien 0 på NEDG.t. Tilsvarende gjøres for fylkene for perioden der året 2002 inngår: 
Etter statens overtagelse av sykehusene fra og med dette året, faller fylkeskommunenes inntekter per innbygger 
dramatisk (se tabell A2.5 i appendikset for detaljer). 
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For det tredje må velgerne kunne se for seg reelle alternativer dersom de effektivt skal kunne 
straffe en ansvarlig koalisjon. Cox (1997:122) viser at dersom det stiller tre eller færre lister 
til valg kan velgerne koordinere sine valg strategisk for å avsette en sittende koalisjon og sikre 
en alternativ koalisjon valgseieren, mens et høyere antall lister gir velgerne få holdepunkter 
for å opptre slik.62 Dersom velgerne er misfornøyd med den sittende koalisjonen (mer om 
dette nedenfor), så forventer vi at den sittende koalisjonen taper mer i valg når den skisserte 
muligheten for koordinering er til stede. Analysen inkluderer derfor følgende mål for denne 
sterke muligheten for effektiv koordinering rundt et reelt alternativ til den sittende 
koalisjonen:63
 
 
1 dersom antallet offisielle valglister er tre eller mindre
VLIST .
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For det fjerde kan ansvaret plasseres mer eller mindre presist hos ordførerpartiet. Dersom 
ordførerpartiet alene, eller en koalisjonen ledet av ordførerpartiet, har flertall i den lokale 
forsamlingen og dermed stor slagkraft, kan man regne med at ansvaret for utført politikk kan 
plasseres entydig hos det nevnte parti eller koalisjon. Men, dersom en koalisjon består av flere 
partier – eller altså høyst to når vi her ser på potensielle ordfører/varaordførerkoalisjoner – så 
kan man anta at muligheten eksisterer for at de ulike partiene kan blokkere hverandres ønsker. 
Videre kan man anta at enighet innen koalisjonen blir ekstra vanskelig dersom avstanden 
mellom koalisjonspartnerne er stor.64 Indeksen som inngår i analysene tar hensyn til dette ved 
å inkludere kriterier for situasjoner der 1) koalisjonen har et flertall av representantene bak 
seg, 2) den består av ett snarere enn to partier og 3) partiene i en eventuell flerpartikoalisjon 
kommer fra samme blokk, der partiene Frp, H, KrF og V utgjør en høyreblokk og partiene 
DNA, Sp og SV utgjør en venstreblokk.65 Vår forventning er at økt styrke hos den sittende 
                                                 
62 Se note 42 om strategisk stemmegivning. 
63 Antall valglister utelates fra fylkesvalgsanalysene, ettersom antallet aldri er mindre enn åtte og maksimalt er 
fjorten i perioden som analyseres. 
64 Resonnementene her er klassiske vetospillerargumenter (Tsebelis 1995;2002): Idéen er at en koalisjon kan 
være internt svak ved å bestå av flere vetospillere (koalisjonspartier), og eksternt svak overfor opposisjonen ved 
at den for eksempel kan ha et mindretall av representantene i forsamlingen. I litteraturen som har undersøkt 
betydningen av koalisjoners styrke i forhold til budsjettunderskudd er det funnet støtte både for flertalls- og 
koalisjonskriteriet som det viktigste (se Helland 2005:16-17). Kodingen av indeksen for koalisjonsstyrke – der 
flertallskriteriet ses som det avgjørende - er uansett i tråd med lignende indekser hos Roubini og Sachs (1989a, 
1989b) og Borge (1996;2005). I tillegg har altså avstanden mellom koalisjonspartnerne selvstendig betydning – 
noe som søkes fanget opp med kriteriet om samme/forskjellige partiblokker: Dersom koalisjonspartnerne vil det 
samme vil det spille mindre rolle at de kan blokkere hverandres ønsker (se Helland (2005:6-7) for en diskusjon 
av empiriske studier som unnlater å ta høyde for avstanden mellom koalisjonspartnere). I Martinussens (2004) 
studie har også ideologisk nærhet innenfor koalisjonen selvstendig og signifikant betydning i forhold til 
ordførerpartiets oppslutning. 
65 Sp regnes tradisjonelt med på borgerlig side i norsk politikk. At Sp her regnes med i venstreblokken kan 
imidlertid være rimelig (og analyseresultatene blir mer uklare dersom partiet regnes med i den andre blokken): I 
analysene i tabell 1 ses at Sp-oppslutningen avtar der opinionen dreier mot høyre, og i senere 
opinionsundersøkelser ser man en tendens til at Sp-velgere plasserer seg til venstre for DNA-velgere på høyre-
venstre-aksen. 
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koalisjonen fører med seg en strengere reaksjon fra velgernes side i form av velgerflukt, 
dersom velgerne har grunn til å reagere og dersom de har mulighet til det. Styrkeindeksen for 
koalisjonen av ordfører- og varaordførerpartiene er bygget opp på følgende vis (der økende 
indeksverdi angir økt koalisjonsstyrke): 
 
 
0 der koalisjonen er i mindretall og består av to partier fra hver sin blokk
1 der koalisjonen er i mindretall og består av to partier fra samme blokk
2 der ordfører og varaordfører er fra samme m
STYR t = indretallsparti3 der koalisjonen er i flertall og består av to partier fra hver sin blokk
4 der koalisjonen er i flertall og består av to partier fra samme blokk
5 der ordfører og varaordfører er fra sa
.
mme flertallsparti
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
 
 
 
Det kan være verdt å presisere følgende: I en streng fortolkning er de tre nevnte betingelser 
(nedgangstider, velgernes koordineringsmuligheter og stor koalisjonsstyrke) nødvendige, men 
ikke tilstrekkelige, betingelser for at velgerne skal straffe ordførerpartiet i et enkelt valg. For 
eksempel: Der resultatene uteblir er det trolig  mindre attraktivt å straffe ved velgerflukt 
dersom velgerne ikke kan koordinere sine valg seg imellom i den hensikt å sette inn én ny 
slagkraftig koalisjon eller gi et handlingskraftig parti et klart mandat. Omvendt vil det 
selvsagt være meningsløst å straffe et parti eller en koalisjon som har frembragt et godt 
resultat kun fordi koordineringsmulighetene er til stede for å sette inn en ny koalisjon. Og 
velgerne (som rasjonelle straffere) trenger heller ikke bry seg om ansvarsplassering (gitt ved 
koalisjonsstyrke) dersom de politiske resultater ellers er fordelaktige. I analysene vil det 
derfor være spesielt viktig å se på samspillet mellom de nevnte variabler. Formelt estimeres 
varianter av følgende modeller for å teste resonnementene (der samspillsvariablene 
representeres ved βI-termene i modellene nedenfor):66
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for fylkestingsvalgene og 
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66 I modellene indekseres variablene ettersom de varierer over kommuner/opptellingskretser (i), fylker (j), 
regioner/fylkesgrupper (k) og valgperioder (t). Indeksene P og B angir variasjon over landspartier og 
landspartiblokker (se nedenfor). 
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for kommunestyrevalgene. 
Modellene estimerer altså den enhetsspesifikke endringen i logiten til oppslutningen om 
ordførerpartiet som en funksjon av de variablene vi har skisserte ovenfor. De skisserte 
variablene sporer imidlertid (betingede) effekter i oppslutningen som følge av en ansvarlig 
koalisjons prestasjoner, de sier i seg selv ikke noe om oppslutningsendringer som følge av 
eventuelle (endringer i) velgerpreferanser. I tillegg kontrolleres derfor for endringen i HV-
plassering hos befolkningen - som analysen i tabell 1 fant holdepunkter for var utslagsgivende 
for oppslutningen om et enkelt parti. For hver valgperiode teller en enhets endring til høyre 
(positiv endring på 0-9-skalaen) i den regionvise preferansen for høyre-venstre-politikk som 
en positiv enhetsendring for høyrepartier og som en negativ enhetsendring for venstrepartier. 
Forventningen er at indikatoren har positiv effekt i analysene: 
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Som en ytterligere kontroll registreres nivået på frie inntekter, slik det sier noe om de 
ressurser som står på spill når politikere yter eller ikke yter innsats og velgerne reagerer. For 
hvert år beregnes gjennomsnittlige frie inntekter per innbygger over de aktuelle enhetene 
(fylker eller kommuner). Deretter måles den enkelte enhets årvisse frie inntekter per 
innbygger som en proporsjon av årssnittet. For den enkelte enhet tas så snittet av de årvisse 
proporsjonene over den fireårige valgperioden: 
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I modellene for fylkestingsvalgene er videre uPt og vjt feiltermer som er ment å fange opp 
henholdsvis den delen av variasjonen i oppslutningen om ordførerpartiet som skyldes at 
partiet (på tidspunkt t) er et lokallag av et landsdekkende parti og den delen som skyldes det 
spesifikke for det enkelte fylket i det enkelte valg. I kommuneanalysene kan uPt tolkes på 
samme måte som i fylkesanalysene, mens wkBt-termen i begge analysens tolkes som den delen 
av variasjonen som skyldes forskjeller mellom regionale partiblokker i det enkelte valg.67 
                                                 
67 Rent teknisk spesifiserer denne feiltermen at det bergenes riktige signifikanstester for ΔHVB-målet – som 
registreres nettopp på det tidsbestemte regionale partiblokk-nivået. 
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Også i disse analysene kan feiltermenes relative størrelsesforhold gi grunnlag for å utsi noe 
om det lokalpolitiske handlingsrommet.  Formelt, og først og fremst, er det allikevel følgende 
hovedhypoteser som skal testes: 
 
Hypotese 2: βNEDG avtar og antar negativ verdi når VLIST og STYR begge øker. 
 
Hypotese 3: βVLIST avtar og antar negativ verdi når NEDG og STYR begge øker. 
 
Hypotese 4: βSTYR avtar og antar negativ verdi når VLIST og NEDG begge øker. 
 
Det forventes altså at faktorene som skal til for at velgerne skal straffe ordførerpartiet i valget 
må spille sammen for at en enkelt faktor skal være utslagsgivende. For eksempel kan man ha 
svake forventninger om hvordan velgerne vil reagere dersom odførerkoalisjonen skulle bli 
sett på som ansvarlig (økende verdi på STYR) i en situasjon der de ellers observerer at det er 
god grunn (NEDG=1) til å straffe, men ikke gis mulighet til å straffe effektivt (VLIST=0). Alt 
annet likt, forventes allikevel at reaksjonen blir mindre blidgjørende sett fra ordførerpartiets 
side dersom det i nevnte tilfelle kan straffes effektivt, og det forventes at partiet faktisk 
straffes (i form av tilbakegang i valget) i nedgangstider når dets ansvarlighet og velgernes 
mulighet for å straffe ellers antar høye, men ikke urealistiske, verdier. Tabell 3 viser 
resultatene av analysen. 
 
Som et utgangspunkt analyserer spesifikasjon I kun variasjonskomponentene (u-, v-, w- og e-
termene), og ingen av varianskomponentene synes å endres i stor grad når de operative 
variablene på lokalpolitisk nivå (NEDG, VLIST og STYR) inkluderes (i modellene II og 
III).68 Ytterligere kommentarer omkring varianskomponentene gis nedenfor, og diskusjonen 
skal i første omgang konsentrere seg om effektene av de operative variablene:  
 
Modellene II og III inkluderer operative variabler og kontroller i to trinn: Som nevnt er stilte 
valglister i fylkestingsvalgene gjennomgående høyt (fra åtte til fjorten) i hele perioden som 
studeres, og dermed er det for analysene av dette valgets del kun anledning til å inkludere 
NEDG og STYR (og samspillet mellom dem). For å kunne sammenligne 
kommunestyrevalgene med fylkestingsvalgene, presenteres analysen med kun disse to 
variablene også for kommunestyrevalget (modell II), mens den komplette modellen altså kun 
gjelder sistnevnte lokalvalg (modell III). For å lette tolkningen estimeres modellene II og III 
med egne parametre (β) for VLIST, STYR og VLIST·STYR for ulike tilstander av NEDG.69
 
                                                 
68 Men, modellene II og III gir signifikant bedre tilpasninger til data enn henholdsvis modell I og II: Når 
modellene estimeres med ML (full maximum likelihood) snarere enn REML (restricted maximum likelihood) 
faller –2LogLikelihood-målet fra 1127,7 i det første tilfellet til 1001,9 (strekt signifikant fall, df=5) og deretter til 
987,0 (p=0,007, df=4) i modell III. Ingen av effektestimatene endres ellers nevneverdig i og med ML-estimering, 
og tilsvarende fall registreres ikke i fylkesanalysene. Se for eksempel Singer (1998:352) om ML-estimering for å 
evaluere bedre tilpasning i modeller med tillegg av flere fixed effects (som her).   
 69 Dvs. effektparametre for XNEDG=1 og XNEDG=0 der  { {1 0X dersom NEDG=1 X dersom NEDG=0X  og X  for X=VLIST, STYR, VLIST STYR.0 ellers 0 ellersNEDG NEDG= == = ⋅  
Denne formuleringen er ekvivalent med den som legges til grunn i modellene ovenfor. 
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Tabell 2.3: Endring i ordførerpartiets oppslutning (ΔL) 1979-2003. 
-0.077 ** 0.007 0.014
0.223 ***
STYR -0.020 * -0.030 *** -0.031 ***
VLIST (=1)·STYR -0.056 *
0.005
STYR -0.002 -0.035 *** -0.030 ***
VLIST (=1)·STYR -0.184 ***
0.016 0.039 0.030
0.076 -0.009 -0.015
0.023 *** 0.024 *** 0.021 *** 0.025 *** 0.025 ***
0.013 *** 0.013 *** -
- 0.003 *** - 0.003 *** 0.003 ***
0.044 *** 0.094 *** 0.044 *** 0.089 *** 0.089 ***
III
Kommuner
-412.0
2418 2213 2418 2116
-395.41177.9
σ u 2  (var[u Pt ]) 
NEDG (=1)
Effekter for NEDG=0:
Effekter for NEDG=1:
I II
Fylker Kommuner Fylker Kommuner
1038.6
VLIST (=1)
ΔHVB
N (kommuneparti·valgperiode, 
-2LL
VLIST (=1)
***) p<0,05, **) p<0,10, *) p<0,15 med ensidig t-test for variansparametre (σ . 2 ) og tosidig test for β . .
σ v 2  (var[v jt ])
ΙΝΝΤ
σ w 2  (var[w kBt ])
σ e 2  (var[e ijkBPt ], var[e ikBPt ])
2083
1039.1
 
 
 
I modellspesifikasjon II ses for fylkestingsvalgenes del at vekst eller nedgang er 
utslagsgivende for fortsatt oppslutning om ordførerpartiet: Dersom det tas utgangspunkt i den 
gjennomsnittlige ordførerpartioppslutningen over hele perioden som studeres på 29 prosent, 
tilsvarende en logit på log(0,29/(1-0.29)) = -0,895, predikerer modellen at logiten som følge 
av nedgangstider faller til –0,895+(-0,077) = -0.972, tilsvarende en oppslutning på  e-0,972/(1 + 
e –0,972) = 28 prosent når koalisjonsstyrken ellers ligger på et typisk nivå.70 Effektene er altså 
meget svake i utgangspunktet. Allikevel avtar den negative effekten av nedgangstider med 
økende verdier på STYR. Eksempelvis predikerer modellen at effekten av nedgangstider kun 
er –0,077 + 3,8·(-0,002-(-0,020)) = -0,009 når STYR antar sin høyeste verdi (der ordfører og 
varaordfører kommer far samme parti og partiet har flertall i forsamlingen). Videre er effekten 
av STYR større i negativ retning (og signifikant) i vekstperioder (β=-0,020) enn i 
nedgangsperioder (β=-0,002). For fylkeskommunenes del går resultatene altså imot 
hypotesene som ble fremsatt. 
 
I de tilsvarende analysene (modell II) av kommunestyrevalgene er bildet annerledes: Mens 
NEDG ikke synes å ha effekt for oppslutningen om koalisjoner med typisk STYR-verdi 
(β=0,007), er effekten sterkere i negativ retning for sterkere koalisjoner, slik den endres til 
                                                 
70 For å lette tolkningen er STYR sentrert rundt snittet over perioden som studeres (hhv. rundt 1,2 i 
fylkesanalysene og 2,2 i kommuneanalysene, se tabell A2.6 og A2.7 i appendikset). 
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0,007 + 2,8·(-0,035-(-0,030)) = -0,007 for de aller sterkeste. Dessuten er altså  effekten av 
STYR sterkere i nedgangstider (β=-0,035) enn i oppgangstider (β=-0,030). Så langt støtter 
altså resultatene opp under de hypotesene som ble fremsatt. 
 
Modellspesifikasjon III inkluderer i tillegg VLIST i kommunestyreanalysen. Som kan ses 
redusres effekten av STYR i nedgangstider noe fra den generelle modellen (β=-0,035 i modell 
II) til modellen som tar hensyn til om velgerne har sterk mulighet til å koordinere rundt en 
eventuell alternativ koalisjon (β=-0,030 i modell III). Uansett ser effekten av at velgerne gis 
effektiv koordineringsmulighet ut til å være klar. Gitt nedgangstider øker effekten av STYR i 
negativ retning for økende verdier av VLIST og omvendt. Samspillseffekten på β=-0,184  
antyder at sterke ordførerpartier som i nedgangsperioder står overfor en handlekraftig 
velgermasse kan regne med å tape relativt mye i valg.71 Dette er i tråd med det teoretiske 
utgangspunktet, og vi skal se nærmere på de substansielle implikasjonene nedenfor. 
 
For begge lokalvalgstypenes del ses også en effekt av opinionsdreining, om enn ikke 
signifikant: Substansielt estimeres at ordførerpartiet taper dersom opinionen svinger i favør av 
det som kan antas er partiets “farge”. I kommunestyrevalgene vinner ordførerpartiet i snitt 
rundt 0,030-0,040 i oppslutning på logitskalaen dersom det er Fremskrittspartiet, Høyre, 
Kristelig Folkeparti eller Venstre det er snakk om og opinionen svinger til høyre, eller dersom 
det er snakk om Sosialistisk Venstreparti, Arbeiderpartiet eller Senterpartiet og opinionen 
svinger motsatt vei. I fylkestingsanalysene er effekten ikke like stor og heller ikke der 
signifikant. Effektene er uanssett av samme moderate størrelsesorden som dem i 
tilpasningsanalysene i forrige del av artikkelen (tabell 1, modell III). Nivået på frie inntekter 
ser ut til å spille mindre rolle (ingen signifikante effekter, men mer betydelig og positiv i 
fylkestingsanalysene). 
 
Hovedhypotesene finner støtte i materialet når det gjelder prediksjoner for ordførerpartiets 
frem- eller tilbakegang i kommunestyrevalgene. For fylkestingsvalgenes del er mønsteret 
adskillig vanskeligere å tolke. På den ene siden kan det synes som at det eksisterer en generell 
tendens til at nedgangstider fører med seg slitasje for ordførerpartiet i fylkeskommunen. På 
den annen side viskes altså betydningen av nedgangtider ut ettersom ordførerpartiet leder en 
sterkere koalisjon. “Spennet” i effektene i kommunestyreanalysene kan også synes 
betydeligere enn de tilsvarende i fylkestingsanalysene. Samtidig er snittverdien for 
ordførerpartiets endring fra det ene valget til det neste (en endring på –0,10 på logitskalaen) 
omtrent de samme i fylkestings- og kommunestyrevalg (se tabell A2.6 og A2.7 i 
appendikset).72 Men, variasjonen er noe større i kommunestyrevalgene (s=0,34) enn i 
fylkestingsvalgene (s=0,27). Slik sett kan det hevdes at ordførerpartier på fylkesnivå sliter 
med generell slitasje mer enn tilsvarende partier på kommunenivå.73
 
                                                 
71 En kan innvende at variabelen VLIST ikke fanger opp det “reelle” antallet partier. For eksempel inkluderer 
Martinussens (2004) analyser partifragmentering, men uten at effektene er signifikante eller retningssvarende i 
forhold til teorien. VLIST måler dessuten antallet lister som stiler i valget, snarere enn et partiantall i den 
sittende lokalforsamlingen. I tillegg er samspill mellom koalisjonsstyrke og indikatorer for 
koordineringsmuligheter (antall partier el.) ikke analysert i Martinussen (2004). 
72 Med en gjennomsnittlig ordførerpartioppslutning på 36 prosent i kommunene gir dette en typisk tilbakegang 
på 2,3 prosentpoeng. Dette er sammenlignbart med den gjennomsnittlige tilbakegangen på 2,9 prosentpoeng som 
Martinussen (2004:240, tabell1) finner for ordførerpartier i kommunestyrevalget i 1999. 
73 Se for eksempel Rose og Mackie (1983:119-120) om effekten av å sitte i posisjon, slik det forenkler 
ansvarsplasseringen i og med fokuset på alt som går (mer eller mindre) galt. 
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For å få en enklere og mer systematisk oversikt over de substansielle implikasjonene av 
kommunemodellen, beregnes i figur 1 forventet endring i ordførerpartiets oppslutning direkte 
i prosentpoeng. Beregningen tar utgangspunkt i typisk oppslutning for ordførerpartier av ulike 
styrke (se forklaring i figur), og figuren illustrerer således hvor stor andel av velgermassen 
som under ulike betingelser (gitt ved NEDG, VLIST og STYR) kan ventes å endre adferd til 
ordførerpartiets favør eller disfavør. 
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Forklaring:  Beregnede endringer baserer seg på effektestimatene (β ) fra tabell 2.3 og verdier for henholdsvis VLIST, NEDG og STYR 
som angitt i figuren. Det legges til grunn typiske verdier for opinionsendringer og inntektsnivå: dHVB=0 og INNT=1. Fra 
logitendringene (β ) beregnes prosentpoengsendringer med utgangspunkt i gjennomsnittlig oppslutning for ordførerpartier av ulike 
styrker: STYR=0 (24%), STYR=1 (24%), STYR=2 (40%), STYR=3 (32%), STYR=4 (33%) og STYR=5 (54%).  
Figur 2.1: Estimert endring i oppslutning for ordførerpartier av ulike styrker. 
Kommunestyrevalgene 1979-2003. 
 
 
Av figuren ses, for det første, at ordførerpartiets synlighet og/eller ansvarlighet slik dette kan 
tenkes å oppfattes av velgerne (STYR) gjennomgående bidrar til å svekke partiets 
valgsuksess: Under alle omstendigheter synker endringen i oppslutning ettersom STYR øker 
(alle linjer heller fra venstre mot høyre). For det andre ses tydelig at hypotesene som ble 
fremsatt vinner støtte: I tillegg til at effekten av STYR altså er gjennomgånde negativ, avtar 
effekten når VLIST og NEDG øker til sine høyeste verdier (mørk heltrukken linje har den 
sterkeste negative helningen av alle); effekten av NEDG avtar til sin laveste og negative verdi 
når STYR og VLIST øker til sine høyeste verdier (avstanden mellom mørk og lys heltrukken 
linje for STYR=5 er minst av alle avstander mellom mørke og lyse linjer av samme type 
(heltrukken/stiplet) for alle mulige verdier av STYR); og effekten av VLIST avtar til sin 
laveste og negative verdi når NEDG og STYR på sin side øker til sine høyeste verdier 
(avstanden mellom mørk heltrukken og stiplet linje for STYR=5 er minst av alle avstander 
mellom heltrukne og stiplede linjer av samme type (mørk/lys) for alle mulige verdier av 
STYR). For det tredje, og som tidligere nevnt, kan samspillet mellom effektene være ganske 
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betydelige i det ekstreme: Av figuren leser vi at et sterkt ordførerparti (ordfører og 
varaordfører fra samme flertallsparti) kan regne med å tape så mye som 17% i oppslutning når 
innsats fra partiets side presumtivt ikke er regningssvarende (og resultater dermed uteblir; 
NEDG=1) og velgerne har mulighet til å koordinere sine valg omkring én alternativ koalisjon 
(VLIST=1) (jf. den negative ekstremverdien til mørk heltrukken linje). 
 
Allikevel: Selv om analysene av kommunestyrevalgene viser at straffen i det ekstreme kan 
være nokså hard, kan man spørre om det ikke er helt andre faktorer som allikevel driver 
partienes frem- og tilbakegang i lokalvalgene.74 For eksempel er det ikke urimelig å tenke seg 
at de nasjonale partiorganisasjonenes utspill i lokalvalgkampen har stor betydning for 
lokallagenes skjebne. Resultatene viser en betydelig clustering rundt partinavnet: Men, mens 
variasjonen over partivalgår i fylkestingsvalgene utgjør om lag σu2/( σu2+σv2+σw2+σe2) = 
0,023/(0,023+0,00+0,013+0,044) ·100% = 29 % av totalvariansen, er andelen i analysen av 
kommunestyrevalgene kun om lag σu2/( σu2+σw2+σe2) = 0,024/(0,024+0,003+0,094) ·100% = 
20 %.75 Det kan altså synes som velgernes stemmegivning i fylkestingsvalg i større grad enn i 
kommunestyrevalg følger landspartivise svingninger.76 Partivalgårvariasjonen er imidlertid av 
noenlunde samme størrelsesorden i kommunestyrevalgene som i fylkestingsvalgene, og selv 
om kommuneanalysen fant visse effekter av de operative variablene (NEDG, STYR og 
VLIST), er disse sjelden store nok til å overkjøre de førstnevnte effekten.77
2.5 Konklusjon: Fylker, regioner og kommuner i et effektivt 
lokaldemokrati  
Resultatene fra analysene kan kaste lys over flere aktuelle spørsmål omkring organiseringen 
av det norske lokaldemokratiet. Til slutt i artikkelen skal det antydes noen implikasjoner for 
det fremtidige lokaldemokratiet i Norge, og også knytte dette opp mot annen forskning som 
har kommet frem til resultater som belyser noen av de samme implikasjonene: Hva kan 
analyseresultatene si oss om behovet for ett eller flere forvaltningsnivåer, om man bør holde 
seg med mange eller få enheter, og om hvilket ansvar og hvilke oppgaver lokale enheter bør 
ha – gitt at man samtidig skal beholde et visst rom for lokalpolitisk engasjement? 
 
Ett første resultat i analysene av partioppslutningen for de landsdekkende partiene (tabell 1 og 
2), var at oppslutningen i stor grad synes å være regionalt fordelt. Dessuten ble det funnet 
holdepunkter for at tilpasningen til lokale velgerpreferanser foregår ved at partier med mer 
eller mindre stabile plattformer endrer oppslutning heller enn at de tilpasser sine plattformer 
                                                 
74 Som ses av tabell A2.7 i appendikset har det i kun 3,3 prosent av kommune-valgperiode-enhetene vært stilt tre 
eller færre lister. 
75 I modellene for fylkestingsvalget lar det seg ikke gjøre å estimere en selvsetndig wkBt-feilterm, og den blir 
dermed satt till null: Den og fylkesfeiltermen vjt vil korrelere for sterkt til at begge lar seg estimere samtidig. Den 
beholdes i analysene først og fremst for å kunne gi riktige signifikanstester for ΔHVB-variabelen (se note 67). 
For kommuneanalysenes del kan wkBt-termen tolkes som den delen av variasjonen som skyldes at regionale 
partiblokker samvarierer i frem- og tilbakegang. Komponeneten er uansett liten: Det ser for eksempel ikke ut til 
at det finnes noen rolle for regionale “partiblokk-høvdinger”. Ingen av resultatene i noen av analysene endres 
nevneverdig når wkBt-termen utelates.     
76 Clustering rundt en eventuell regionalpartivis endring i kommunestyrevalgene (i hvert enkelt valgår) ser 
derimot ikke ut til å forekomme i særlig grad (jf. relativt ubetydelige σv =0,008). 
77 Dette kan fremkomme ved å betrakte produktet av de operative variablenes hovedeffekter og deres typisk små 
standardavvik (se tabell A2.6 og A2.7 i appendikset) opp mot estimatene for σv  (partieffekten). 
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til lokale preferanser. Dermed kan man også være sikrere på at den regionale fordelingen i 
oppslutningen om partiene sier noe om realiserte politiske preferanser på velgernivå. 
 
Den klassiske begrunnelsen for lokaldemokrati vektlegger allokeringseffektivitet (Oates 
1972) – dvs. effektiviteten som går ut på at ulike deler av landet med forskjellige 
preferanseprofiler får anledning til å organisere tjenesteyting og skattebyrde etter eget behov. 
Siden det altså ser ut til at velgerpreferanser i stor grad er regionalt fordelt leder dette lett over 
i argumenter om et hensiktsmessig antall nivåer og/eller et hensiktsmessig antall 
lokalpolitiske enheter. Tidligere studier har som nevnt vist at det er større spillerom for faktisk 
høyre-venstre-politikk i kommunene enn i fylkene – og det lar seg enkelt vise at dette har 
sammenheng med det større politiske handlingsrom man finner i førstnevnte enheter. 
Argumentet leder dermed over i en anbefaling om færre og større kommuner, siden verken 
allokeringseffektiviteten eller det lokalpolitiske potensialet trenger lide vesentlig, samtidig 
som de lokale enhetene blir mer robuste og kostnadseffektive. I det aller minste kan 
argumentet romme en anbefaling om regioner med helt andre oppgaver og et annet og mye 
større ansvar enn det fylkene har i dag, om det ikke fra et lokaldemokratisk synspunkt også 
slår bena under tanken om et eget folkevalgt regionalt nivå uten særlig ansvar og uten de helt 
store oppgaver. Dette siste poenget henger sammen med de resultater vi ellers har funnet i 
analysen av velgerreaksjoner på de to lokalpolitiske nivåene. 
 
I analysene av velgerreaksjoner var resultatet at velgerne i kommunestyrevalgene mer enn i 
fylkestingsvalgene ser ut til å følge rimelige forventninger om hvordan det reageres på det 
som må antas er utført lokalpolitikk, selv om frem- og tilbakegangen synes å henge aller mest 
sammen med hva de landsdekkende partiorganisasjonene foretar seg.78 Ettersom denne 
potensielle kontrollmekanismen synes å være helt uvirksom på fylkesplan, støtter resultatene 
samlet sett opp under tidligere “inntrykk […] av fylkeskommunen som et administrativt 
system [med et] «demokratioverskudd» - institusjonen har for mye demokrati i forhold til 
oppgavene.” (Sørensen 1995:196).  
 
Et hovedpoeng i analysen av lokale velgerreaksjoner er dette: Det skilles ikke mellom det som 
de lokale forvaltningsenheter selv er herre over og det som bestemmes utenfra. Denne studien 
har kun identifisert situasjoner der velgerne kan tenkes å mangle kunnskap om politikernes 
informasjonstilgang og handlingsvalg og der lokale beslutningstagere derfor rimeligvis kan 
tenkes å unnlate å yte en innsats. Gitt denne informasjonsasymmetrien mellom politikere og 
velgere er det dermed rimelig å forvente at de faktiske lokale politiske resultater uteblir i 
“dårlige tider” og at velgerne – som er opptatt av resultatene - dermed straffer den ansvarlige 
koalisjonen. Dette er essensen i Ferejohns (1994) moralsk hasard-argument om velger-
kontrollen i representative systemer. Og det er nettopp et slikt mønster som gjenfinnes i 
analysene. 
 
Videre var antagelsen at en stor del av den eksogent bestemte ressurstilgangen i norsk 
lokalpolitisk sammenheng kommer som statlige overføringer og en sentralt bestemt 
skatteinngang, og analysene viser at det er denne “drahjelpen” (eller mangel på sådan) som i 
et visst monn driver velgeradferden. Slik sett må det hevdes at straffen velgerne utmåler ikke 
er særlig målrettet eller effektiv: Lokale myndigheter straffes for forhold som de ikke er herre 
                                                 
78 Martinussen (2004) og Sørensen og Vabo (2004) finner en del av den samme effekten ettersom oppslutningen 
om ordførerpartiet nasjonalt har innvirkning på ordførerpartiets frem- og tilbakegang. 
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over.79 En anbefaling som flyter naturlig fra dette resonnementet er derfor at man gjør 
kommuner, fylker eller fremtidige regioner mer uavhengige av eksogene forhold, eksempelvis 
gjennom å øke den lokale beskatningsfriheten. Slik kan moralsk hasard-problemet i alle fall 
avhjelpes noe, i og med at rommet for informasjonsasymmetri (om lokale beslutningstageres 
handlingsvalg) innsnevres. Spesielt for fylkene kan dette sies å ha vært et problem, ettersom 
de ikke har hatt anledning til å kreve inn gebyrer og skatter av særlig omfang. 
 
Også den norske valgordningen og den gjeldende organiseringen av det representative nivået i 
norsk lokalpolitikk har implikasjoner for en effektiv demokratisk kontroll. Analysene finner 
som nevnt at evnen til å identifisere en ansvarlig koalisjon (gitt ved ulike indikatorer for dens 
styrke) har innvirkning på en eventuell straffeutmåling i form av velgerflukt. Likeså er 
muligheten for velgerne til å kunne koordinere sin stemmegivning avgjørende. Og man kan 
hevde at en fyllestgjørende realisering av disse betingelsene er særdeles vanskelig i det norske 
systemet. I forbindelse med poenget i forrige avsnitt – om økt beskatningsfrihet – kan man i 
utgangspunktet hevde at en frigjøring av den lokale beskatningsretten kan føre galt av sted: 
Systemet er slik utformet at ansvarsforhold og politiske handlingsvalg uansett lett tilsløres, 
slik at økt lokal beskatningsrett uavvendelig vil føre med seg et betydelig høyere skattetrykk 
generelt. Mot dette kan man hevde at skattekontrollen allikevel er nokså effektiv gjennom 
stemmegivning på ulike partier (ved at skattepolitikken og partinavnene har en mer eller 
mindre klar høyre-venstre-forankring).80 Av resultatene i denne artikkelen kan man uansett 
lese at det ligger en ytterligere kilde til økt velgerkontroll i både det å gjøre det norske 
valgsystemet mer oversiktlig (ved å tilrettelegge for færre partier eller bevege seg vekk fra 
ordningen med proporsjonale valg) og/eller det å gjøre endringer i den gjengse organiseringen 
av lokalforsamlingene (ved for eksempel å innføre lokal parlamentarisme i stedet for 
formannskapsorganisering). Og dette gjelder selvsagt for fylker og kommuner som for 
eventuelle fremtidige regioner. 
                                                 
79 Sørensen og Vabo (2004:18), som har separate indikatorer for endogene og eksogene faktorer, anslår at 
“kommuneeffektene trolig er et sted mellom halvparten av statseffektene og like store som statseffektene”. 
80 Se for eksempel Erna Solbergs reaksjon på Lokaldemokratikommisjonens anbefaling: “Dette vil føre til økt 
skatt” (Aftenposten 2005). Anbefalingen fra Lokaldemokratikommisjonen (NOU 2005:6) er nettopp å øke 
beskatningsfriheten – basert på analyser av virksom lokal skattekontroll. 
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3 Self-organizing committees? An analysis of 
committee members' spending preferences in 
Norwegian local councils 1991-1999 
3.1 Introduction 
A longstanding claim in the literature on the organization of assemblies is that its members 
first and foremost seek to accommodate certain ‘favorite’ policy areas: against any 
commitments supposedly fostered by members’ party affiliation there will be a tendency for 
the individual representative to harbor particular sectoral interests. For instance, one might 
assume that assembly members from rural districts are particularly concerned about 
agricultural policy, whilst urban representatives are more set on confronting social policy 
issues. Left to themselves, assembly members are free to pursue logrolling deals: by the 
mechanism of exchange they will get in areas that are important to them in return for giving in 
areas that are unimportant (Shepsle 1986; Collie 1988; Vabo 2005). To facilitate working 
alliances between assembly members that have strong preferences in a particular policy area 
and constituent groups of the same outlook, assembly members may position themselves in 
the most policy relevant functional committees (Collie 1988:429). An empirical implication 
of this view is that committee members are preference outliers as seen form the plenary point 
of view: they are high demanders on the part of their particular policy area of interest. 
 
Against this view one may posit that candidates are carefully assigned to committee work by 
a rational assembly. Granted that assemblies, and the partisan groups within them, are 
mechanisms for coordinating policy across areas, it is reasonable to assume that they will 
wish to enhance their decision making ability by selecting committee members in a fashion 
that reaps the informational gain from a specialized committee system. In this setting 
information passed on from committee members whose preferences are extremely outlying 
will be of little value to responsible sponsors. Policy recommendations from such ardent 
policy area supporters will likely downplay any collectively detrimental effects from their 
implementation (Krehbiel 1991:80-101). Even so, committee members are expected to invest 
considerable time and effort in order to specialize in a certain policy field. Thus, committee 
members need to be compensated for their efforts, and this may be accomplished by some 
amount of distributive benefits targeted to the committee in question. Similarly, then, the 
informational theory of assembly organization expects that committee members are 
preference outliers, albeit in a weaker fashion: they are but moderate preference outliers.81
 
As both the gains from exchange hypothesis and the informational theory of committee 
organization lead to much the same rough empirical implication - i.e. outlying committee 
preferences – claims of support for either hypothesis merely in the face of such a finding are 
problematic. What is needed is some sort of benchmark measure against which one can 
compare the ‘substantive outlierness’ of committee members. This would require a deeper 
                                                 
81 The expectation from the informational perspective is weaker in two senses. First, one would expect that the 
compensation to individual representatives for specializing do not run higher than whatever informational gains 
that can be reaped. Secondly, representatives may be compensated by other means than by distributive gains to 
their policy area of interest. 
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probing into the underlying theoretical assumptions and the wider causal chain of the 
respective arguments with an eye to deriving empirical implications that will follow from the 
one argument but not the other. However, while this general contention merely relates to the 
themes that have been up for discussion in the literature, there are other and arguably more 
serious conceptual and specificational issues at play: As will become quite clear as the paper 
proceeds, the contention is also that much empirical research in the field has relied on a poor 
operative conception of parties as organizations. This paper takes a fresh look at the general 
claims set forth by the two theoretical frameworks in the empirical setting of Norwegian local 
politics, and it proceeds as follows: 
 
The next section presents some brief notes on the theoretical debate between the two 
perspectives, along with a short review of the theoretical and empirical research that has been 
conducted on the topic. The ensuing section follows up on the preceding review by 
developing a starting point for further inquiry, namely that only assemblies or parties that 
conceivably might be held accountable for policy decisions will want to control the process of 
high-demanding representatives’ self-selection to relevant committees. The section then 
outlines the design of the present investigation and the data which is put to use: responses to 
survey questions on spending preferences for key municipal and county service areas going to 
Norwegian local politicians over two election periods. The subsequent section presents and 
discusses the results of the empirical analyses, and a final section offers some concluding 
remarks. 
3.2 Theoretical and empirical approaches in previous research 
A formal and classical starting point for the gains from exchange hypothesis is Arrows’ 
(1963) work on voting cycles, highlighting the difficulties of reaching majority equilibriums 
in multidimensional policy spaces. In an extension of the argument, this grants to an agenda 
setter the power to shift the assembly to any position within the policy space (McKelvey 
1976). Roemer and Rosenthals (1978) model shows that sectoral committee power 
specifically is conducive to policy making as such.82 Granted that the plenary may not amend 
propositions from the committees and that actors operate in an environment of full and 
complete information83, the plenary, in taking heed of (diverging) committee propositions, 
avoids the unpredictability of universalistic voting that will plague policy making in the 
Arrowian setting. Moreover, as propositions are sectorally slanted and votes are not 
coordinated across different sectors, an additional result is that committee members – granted 
their agenda setting power - will be able to drive the total budget upward against the wishes of 
the plenary. 
 
Two problems of the above account may be emphasized. First, it seems unreasonable that the 
political process at play between committee and floor should be characterized as one of full 
and complete information. The original rationale behind committee systems is that causes and 
consequences of decisions in certain policy areas are not known in advance, and that the 
committee system is set up in order to learn about them. In short, Roemer and Rosenthals 
                                                 
82 That is, in game theoretical terms it is an institutional equilibrium, in that it grants to actors the opportunity to 
avoid unpredictability (voting cycles in this case) (Shepsle 1979). 
83 Complete information entails that each player knows of every other players’ relevant preference structure (i.e. 
there are no types in the game), whereas perfect information entails that all players know what stage of the game 
they are at (i.e. every node is a singleton).  
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(1978) account is implausible on a very central point. Second, most assemblies (as is the case 
for Norwegian local councils) have the right to amend committee proposals  - i.e. the usual 
operating mode is an open rule amendment right. Moreover, in a setting of full and complete 
information, and in the absence of the closed rule requirement, the (median) floor preference 
will pass as policy (Helland 2000a:170). 
 
The wider intuition behind the critique may be summed up as follows: In the case that 
committee members are extreme preference outliers, the plenary, in relying on information 
from the former, will likely misestimate the consequences of making certain decisions. 
Should the floor really take heed of this information, the result would be a much larger budget 
than that which the plenary prefers. Accordingly, the plenary should disregard information 
from extremely outlying committee members. On the other hand, total disregard of committee 
information would serve as a disincentive for potential committee members to invest time and 
resources in learning about the causes and consequences of decisions in distinct policy fields, 
and so would render unutilized potentially valuable information. Thus, the very idea of 
committee systems as devices for specialization and learning would seem to crumble (Helland 
2000a:184-185). In a series of works by Crawford and Sobel (1982), Krehbiel (1991) and 
Gilligan and Krehbiel (1990;1995) this insight is elaborated upon within a framework that 
relaxes the assumptions of full and complete information.84 The resulting proposition is the 
concept of the informative outlier (agent) with preferences that deviate but moderately from 
the plenary view - informative, that is, as seen from the point of view of a rational assembly 
(principal): Policy responsible assemblies will select for committee service those 
representatives that request but some degree of compensation for specializing, although not 
too much, as this would be an indication of highly sectoral and thus grossly imbalanced views 
on the spending needs in the relevant policy area. 
 
Empirical research of the sectorization hypothesis has taken many routes, and below is listed 
but a few examples.85 One approach has been the analysis of representatives’ preferences. In 
Vabos (2005) study of spending preferences among Norwegian municipal councilors it is 
found that committee members are indeed preference outliers with respect to their particular 
field of specialization. Nevertheless, that fact is not seen to pose too great a problem, 
inasmuch as the ‘committee effect’ does not override other driving forces in Norwegian local 
politics (local needs and representatives’ party affiliation).86 In another study Helland (2000b) 
                                                 
84 That is, the assumption is that committee members do have private information about consequences of 
decisions in their field of expertise. 
85 In addition to the approaches listed here, much early research relied on analysis of patterns of contact between 
committee members and sectoral groups. The finding of close contacts between the two is, of course, in 
accordance both with the informational (information gathering) and the exchange (socialization) theories of 
committee organization. See Helland (2000b:23-24, 60 (note 23)) for a discussion of the limitations of contacts 
data in this respect. Another approach has been the analysis of individual determinants of spending preferences 
(gender, age, education, occupational background, seniority and the like). For instance, Serritzlew (2003) finds 
that Danish local councilors’ preferences in relevant fields are determined by social background (age, gender, 
occupation and education) and that seniority on committees has a substantial positive effect on spending 
preferences in the relevant functional policy field. Also, Vabo (2005:579, table 4) finds that Norwegian local 
councilors’ preferences are informed by personal characteristics such as gender and age. Both, however, find that 
(national) party affiliation has by far the greatest influence. A discussion of the implications, limitations and 
usefulness of these findings (on individual determinants in themselves and as viewed up against partisan 
influences) is offered in the ensuing section.    
86 The pioneering study in the Norwegian case is Fevolden’s (1982) analysis of county assembly representatives’ 
prioritization preferences for different policy sectors. He finds that relevant committee assignment does in fact 
override or is at least comparable to the effect of party affiliation in education, roads and local business and labor 
policy (ibid.:156-165). 
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finds scant evidence that Norwegian parliamentary representatives’ preferences87 vary 
significantly between the plenary and the relevant committee settings. Another approach is 
the analysis of the budgetary process itself. In the mentioned study of Helland (2000b:36-40) 
it is found that expansive budgetary tendencies more often than not stem from the plenary 
deliberation rounds. A more decisive approach still is the analysis of outputs. In Helland’s 
(2000a:ch. 9) study of OECD countries in the 1972-1992 period, it is shown that countries 
with strong committee systems88 can show for the greatest budgetary discipline. A similar 
result is found in Hagen and Vabo (2005), where it is shown that Norwegian municipalities 
with stronger committee systems are also the most financially disciplined. Both these results 
go against the contention that committee members are outside the control of rational 
assemblies and parties – i.e. they are not free to drive total budgets to excessive levels. 
 
This short review merely an impression of empirical results as interpreted in individual 
studies, the next section of the paper elaborates further on some very specific operational and 
specificational issues common to the literature on local government sectorization tendencies. 
As such, the listed shortcomings of previous studies may figure as contrasts to the research 
design that is put to use in the ensuing empirical analysis. 
3.3 Theoretical considerations and research design 
Taken together, the research cited in the previous section of the paper maps the various bits of 
the causal chain of committee organization. Nevertheless, two interrelated problems, one 
methodological, the other theoretical, may be identified. Firstly, the cited research on national 
assemblies (Helland 2000a; 2000b) relies both on analysis of preference selection (outlier 
analysis) and policy decisions (output analysis). While theoretically comprehensive and 
instructive, the one problem is analyzed in a single-country setting (Norway), while the other 
is dealt with by way of multi-country panel analysis techniques. This might pose a problem as 
seen from a methodological point of view. What is really needed for the broad conclusion is 
analysis that would tackle both nodes of the causal chain with similar techniques applied to a 
single sample of comparable units. National quality data of this sort is, however, hard to come 
by. 
 
The approaches of Vabo (2005) and Hagen and Vabo (2005) viewed together might seem 
more promising in that respect. But, while evidence certainly is offered to the effect that 
localities do better in financial terms when they take fuller advantage of the committee system 
(i.e. have stronger systems that invest in committees agenda setting powers), the main 
question is left unresolved. As mentioned, the main micro level result of the analysis is merely 
that the problem of outlying committee preferences by and large will be dwarfed by other 
processes of preference formation or partition (party affiliation and locality needs). Secondly, 
therefore, Vabo’s (2005) analysis does not provide an answer to the fundamental question of 
whether the outlier finding, small as it may be, is the result merely of semi-free89 self-
selection of representatives to interesting committees, or if it is also an indication of 
                                                 
87 As measured indirectly by indicators of sympathy towards sectoral interest organizations. 
88 Strong, that is, for instance in terms of delegated decision making powers, as this would heighten the stakes of 
committee service for the sectorally inclined representative.  
89 There is, of course, also the issue of committee seat allocation with a finite number of committee positions: 
Even though all representatives would wish to sit on committee A, all cannot be granted a position on it. See 
Helland (2002b) for a discussion of this problem in the Norwegian national assembly. 
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responsible assemblies’ practices of compensating moderately those representatives that are 
essentially selected for specialization in certain policy areas. Stated another way, there is a 
need for models of policy responsibility, and it is in this respect that the present article seeks 
to contribute. Before going directly further down this line, however, we contemplate a bit 
more on the mentioned specifications and results as found in previous research. Again, 
emphasis is given to the contributions within the Nordic political setting as this may be 
motivated both by substantive and methodological concerns: They have attempted both 
general characterizations of the quality of local democratic institutions in quite similar 
settings (Nordic local democracy) and they apply methods that may serve as benchmarks to 
be compared to the analysis design offered here. 
3.3.1 Conceptual and theoretical foundations: Local party organizations, partisan 
differences and committee assignment  
Both Vabo (2005) (in the Norwegian case) and Serritzlew (2003) (in the Danish case) find 
that both party affiliation and committee assignment exerts substantial influence on local 
councilors’ spending preferences and that the former influence is far stronger than the latter. 
Two potential problems plague these results, the one to do with more or less plausible 
theoretical implications, the other with conceptual and operational issues. First, and this is a 
general problem with the exclusive use of preference data, the typical (individual) preference 
is not necessarily a proxy for (collective) action in institutional terms. As local decisions are 
to be made, say by party leaderships in blunt disregard of committee views, or perhaps not 
made in the case that localities themselves are severely constrained, sectorization, viewed as 
preference clustering, might simply not matter at all in terms of essential action. Even a 
significant sectorization tendency viewed in this way might not amount to much of a problem 
in real policy terms. Stated somewhat differently, whereas typical individual preferences 
within the one institution (committees, say) may not necessarily be viewed as a precursor for 
imminent action, the analogue in other institutions (parties, say) may very well do so.90
 
Second, both the mentioned studies include partisan variables in their sector-by-sector 
analyses that are essentially measures of individual affiliation under national party labels and 
also offer control for local needs and institutional factors by way of the traditional ‘control 
variable’ approach. As for the latter point, common techniques exist that would better deal 
with the problem of confounding variables, and the data put to use here clearly allows for 
their application. Saving the details on this issue for the empirical analysis itself, the more 
important point here is nevertheless that the ‘national party labels’ procedure would not 
necessarily say very much about truly local political processes. Instead one should 
concentrate on truly local rather than national party labels when assessing relevant partisan 
differences. Even where locality specific characteristics could be totally factored out, if one 
relies on analysis of variation between national partisan categories one is still working under 
the assumption that (typical) local party differences essentially mirror national aggregate 
differences. That is, one would be assessing the tendency of local branches of nationwide 
                                                 
90 This applies equally to the data put to use in the present analysis. However, as the present analysis derives 
empirical implications from the informational perspective, it is also able to read informational value into 
individual preferences and so provides a resource measure to be acted upon should powerful and independent 
local actors (i.e. local parties) exist to take advantage of it. If the suggested pattern is detected it would be a sign 
that local party democracy is indeed working. If it is not, then democracy could still be at work through other 
institutions than local parties. As for the budgetary expansiveness argument of the sectorization hypothesis, the 
data at hand would simply not give any definitive answers: Individual preferences may for various reasons be 
disregarded locally or could be prevented from being realized due to central regulation of local spending. 
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parties to ordinally position themselves similarly from the one locality to next. In technical 
terms, an appropriate analysis calls for a design that nests partisan differences within localities 
and so sets the ground for characterizations of the relevant political arena: An 
operationalization of local party systems that would not logically prohibit local parties to 
position themselves freely in local party systems. 
 
These conceptual and operational issues aside, the basic question is still intriguing. What, if 
any, differences between local parties exist when external influences, local institutional 
factors and locality needs have been accounted for? In and of itself, an interesting question is 
how well local partisan positions seem to cover the breadth of local political preferences, as 
this would be an indication of a democratically ideal91 match between working local party 
systems and local opinions. The question, furthermore, plays indirectly into the argument 
presented here. Where local partisan positioning on a certain political dimension is totally 
absent, that would surely signify a situation where local parties with a partial eye to securing 
preferred policies rather than political positions (i.e. seats in the local assembly) would be less 
in need for costly organizational measures to enhance electoral success. Still, the troubling 
and direct consequence of including national partisan effects in the analysis is of course that 
such a procedure on the whole would misspecify the overall organizational potential for 
potentially relevant actors. First of all, local policy decisions must be feasible. Local 
institutions must be able to carry out potential policy platforms – policies should be the result 
of local decisions rather than central decree. Next, this the foundation of the present study, if 
parties are at all to have an operative organizational and managerial role in the formulation of 
local policies it is easily argued that local party organizations would have to be charged with 
that responsibility. If, in its turn, this organizational role is to be realized, a plausible 
assumption is that incentives will have to exist in terms of parties actually being held 
accountable for sound policies (by voters). With these points in mind we now proceed to the 
discussion of the potential and specific organizational roles of policy responsible local 
institutions. 
 
While the modeling of a responsible assembly would seem highly appropriate for tests of the 
informational theory, in practice such a task might prove quite difficult in a multiparty setting 
like that of Norwegian (and Nordic) local politics. Responsibility for policy is often difficult 
to pin down and voters will thus find it hard to know which parts of the assembly (i.e. which 
partisan groups) should be held accountable for implemented policy. Also, even if voters are 
mostly forward looking, the multiparty setting will most often give few clues as to what ruling 
coalition will eventually win through in elections (Cox 1997). In majoritarian systems these 
problems would generally be of less importance, with assemblies having a clear single-party 
basis, thus allowing responsibility for policy to be placed firmly with the party in question. 
Furthermore, the electoral stakes for the runner-up party in such systems would be equally 
enhanced, as it would be seen as a clear and potentially viable alternative to the present 
administration (in a two-party setting). Both the ruling party and the opposition would in this 
case have high incentives for enhancing electoral performance through organizational 
maneuvering. 
 
The ensuing empirical analyses attempt to address this difficulty by focusing directly on 
parties, the argument being that large parties would have to bear the brunt of responsibility for 
                                                 
91 This is very much the normative argument in making the case for multiparty systems: The political and voiced 
representation of a broad spectrum of opinions (Cox 1997:225). Also, in multiparty systems rational office-
seeking parties are positively expected to spread their campaign platforms out on the dimension in question (in 
models of so-called probabilistic voting; see Merrill and Adams (2002) and Adams and Merrill (1999)).     
 48
policy failures and successes even in multiparty settings. Not only may one argue that parties 
are, or, at the very least should be, central to the representative democratic process: They 
constitute the list from which voters choose their preferred policy packages. The crucial 
insight, however, is that parties are organizations and not merely labels under which like-
minded individuals gather. Parties and their leaders build reputations and have goals that are 
distinct from that of any individual representative, they select and screen candidates for ballot 
positions and they discipline individual representatives into adherence to the party line 
(Snyder and Groseclose 2000; Wright and Schaffner 2002; Krehbiel 1993). 
 
Much previous research on partisanship has neglected this very central aspect of parties and 
has instead relied exclusively on the traditional ‘difference-between-parties’ conception.92 
While informative, results from such applications go only so far – as was suggested in the 
above discussion. True, while inter-party differences in typical individual preferences is a 
plausible indication of parties’ positions, within-party differences may be far greater, and 
other positive partitions (along gender or education, say) may even overwhelm party 
differences themselves. Also true, if other partitions do seem to be of greater importance than 
differences between parties, that might similarly be taken as an indication that party politics in 
terms of positioning simply isn’t salient in the area under study. Still, this does not necessarily 
obviate the role of parties: The crucial and final test lies in assessing the tendency for 
representatives’ private inclinations to be positively and appropriately restricted by parties as 
acting organizations. As such, the present study is a first stab at evaluating a positive 
organizational role for parties in the context of local democracy. 
3.3.2 Analysis design, empirical expectations and data  
With the local party focus the starting point, the insight from the informational theory of 
committee organization would have committee members selected by parties to the effect that 
members hold but moderately high spending preferences. This in order that committee 
members be considered as credibly informative and thereby useful in the eyes of the 
sponsoring local party. Local parties are nevertheless assumed to be instrumental when 
applying costly organizational measures such as screening candidates for committee 
assignment. Et ceteris paribus, the larger the party, the greater the party’s electoral stakes as 
accountability for policy is then more easily placed at its doorstep and the greater the potential 
for actually getting certain preferred or mandated policies passed. Hence the greater need for 
the larger party to acquire good information in its efforts to make good decisions and develop 
reasonable policy platforms that will either secure its position and/or also simply make good 
use of the potential that lies in holding it. Smaller parties – less electorally exposed and less in 
a position to make a difference - would on their hand not need to worry much about 
consequences of bad sectoral information, representatives form their ranks accordingly able to 
take a seat on their favorite committee without fear of intervention from the party leadership. 
The main expectation is that larger parties will be the more careful in selecting for committee 
assignment members that hold but moderately outlying spending preferences.  
 
Conditions are not always as clean-cut as this, though. If conditions are such that very little 
difference exists between contending local parties’ spending positions in a certain area and if 
parties are partially concerned with securing feasible policy in addition to seats, then there 
will be less incentives for costly measures to hedge against electoral losses or to reap the 
benefits of electoral success, larger parties always the more exposed. Electoral success for the 
                                                 
92 As is the case with the research cited here. 
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individual party (and so the good information required to secure it) will be less a prerequisite 
for driving the preferred spending policy home, other parties standing to carry the burden 
along with it. Good information might nevertheless be required in order to stabilize current 
policy itself, but incentives for providing this becomes in a similar fashion a collective 
undertaking, the benefits of investing in information enhancing measures falling on the entire 
group of parties. The collective action problem that this entails for a group of like-minded 
parties will thus likely lead to the underprovision of the information good. Hence, one would 
expect that local parties’ incentives for selecting moderately outlying committee members will 
lessen in situations where parties’ spending preferences are much the same. Alternatively, to 
the extent that parties are first and foremost office-seekers and in the case that large spending 
differences exist between them, parties may slack considerably on any efficiency enhancing 
measures, selection of reliable candidates for committee assignment included. Since 
alternative spending platforms lay far from any single party’s position, there is simply less 
need to hedge against off-mark policies when electoral consequences in the form of massive 
vote loss isn’t very likely. Accordingly, one would expect that local parties’ incentives for 
selecting moderately outlying committee members lessen in situations where spending 
preferences are quite different.93
 
The analysis investigates the main proposition - of positive large party effects – and the 
contextual propositions – of effects from organizational fragmentation - by applying variants 
of the following statistical model for analysis: 
 
,
.P COM PSIZE COM PSIZE ,
S G
ipjt C ijpt P jpt CP ijpt jpt jpt ijptu eγ β β β= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + +  
 
that is, it estimates individual local representative i’s (in locality j and affiliated with party p 
in election period t) preference (P) for per cent increases or reductions in budget shares going 
to two central local service sectors (S) at each level of local government (G) – i.e. at both the 
municipal and county level. The operative variables of interest are first and foremost COM, 
which measures the individual representative’s membership on the relevant standing 
committee, PSIZE measuring the size of the local party with which the representative is 
affiliated and finally the interaction between the two, COM·PSIZE, intended to tap the 
hypothesized effect of a larger party’s incentives for keeping its committee members closer to 
the party line. With the basic expectation that committee members will seek interesting 
committee positions, higher spending preferences in the relevant area the indication (i.e. 
βC>0), it is expected that this tendency is dampened the larger the committee member’s 
sponsoring party (i.e. βCP<0). 
 
The crucial specificational feature of the model is nevertheless the ujpt term. It is a random 
effect over local (j) branches of eight nationwide party labels (p)94 in two election periods (t). 
                                                 
93 As the analyses include fixed locality effects (discussed below), the confounding effect of general and cross-
dimensional local party differences is controlled for. While such general contextual conditions will likely vary 
from the one locality to the other, the present data does not allow for any practicable positive measurement of 
general or sectoral differences at the local level. In any circumstance, what must then be interpreted as the 
average effect of party size-on-committee assignment is still informative: One would expect it to be significantly 
negative in a more or less salient local policy field since it would either be nearly absent (in some localities) or 
else negative (in localities where conditions are conducive) and never positive. Likewise, in evaluating the 
contextual propositions, measures of typical (average) local differences in spending preferences may only 
crudely be related to such (policy field) typical party and committee effects. 
94 That is, the Red Electoral Alliance, the Socialist Left Party, the Labor Party, the Center Party, the Liberal 
Party, the Christian Peoples’ Party, the Conservative Party or the Progress Party. 
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In technical terms it estimates an error term over local parties in addition to the traditional 
individual specific error term (eijpt), and thus specifies the appropriate level of analysis. In line 
with the argument that the local party (in the relevant election period; indexed jpt) is the 
natural organizational unit to be studied, this specification will accordingly provide estimates 
of local party level effects that may be evaluated from variation exclusively between such 
units. Technically this will provide for proper significance tests for effects over local party 
level units.95 In addition, this specification render the individual specific error term (eijpt) an 
indicator of the typical variation within local parties at time t. No variables tapping individual 
and out-of-institutions characteristics (gender, age, education and the like) are included in the 
analysis, the reason simple enough: The focus of the present inquiry is a positive evaluation of 
organizational capabilities on the part of local parties as they would plausibly counteract 
individual inclinations, whatever the latter may be.96
 
In addition to the variables cited in the statistical model, the analyses successively include 
time specific fixed effects (dummy variables) for localities (jt). This to analytically 
disentangle the truly local political systemic from plausible extraneous systemic factors and 
inter-locality differences, the former the appropriate arena for local parties’ organizational 
roles. In other words, we evaluate typical differences between truly local parties (ujpt) and 
individual preferences (eijpt) after any locality specific needs and constraints have been 
accounted for. Moreover, estimates of ujpt (local party differences) as compared to those of 
eijpt (differences between individuals) will allow for some crude assessment of the relative 
ease with which local party systems seem to account for overall local differences of opinions 
along selected policy dimensions – again, given the influence of exogenous factors such as 
locality specific needs, constraints and preferences and the very structure of local government. 
 
The rationale for studying both levels of government (G) is twofold. First, recent debate on 
Norwegian local democracy has not only criticized and scrutinized local democracy in general 
for perhaps not being too strong on local discretionary powers, intense central government 
regulation much to blame (see for instance NOU 2005:6). The regional (county) level in 
particular has always been the more criticized of the two, and the regional level of local 
government in particular is at the very least ‘up for reform’ (with reform proposals outlined in 
NOU (2004:19); see Hervik and Rattsø (2005) for a recent critique of these proposals). The 
choice of studying both levels of government reflects this two-track nature of the debate. 
Second, the present research design should hopefully be able to link arguments on the 
constraints on local democracy to the purported differences between the regional and local 
levels of government. Is county (or municipal) government incapable of (or simply not in 
need of) organizing local politics efficiently by itself (through, say, sensible use of the 
committee system)? And does this seem to go along with other indications of local party 
system incapabilities (little difference between parties’ spending positions, say)? 
 
The analyses, furthermore, look into spending preference patterns on four very central 
expenditure areas (S): Expenditures in the ‘elderly and the disabled’ and the ‘primary schools’ 
                                                 
95 The substantive rationale is that all variables that are measured at the local party level are more or less easily 
conceptualized as indicators of realized organizational capabilities. For example, local party size would be 
considered an indicator of a party’s (its leadership’s) willingness to screen potential committee members 
carefully. 
96 That other studies have investigated and found evidence of the impact of individual characteristics is 
nevertheless commendable (as is done in Vabo (2005) and Serritzlew (2003)). Such results would go to show 
that local parties are not able to totally contain plausible individual routes to individual preference formation or 
preference clustering. Even so, the present analysis is bent on revealing mechanisms for counteracting the 
playing out of individual preferences, however they must have come about in the first place.  
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areas in municipalities and the ‘somatic hospitals’ and ‘high schools’ areas in counties. These 
four spending areas constitute the two single-largest specific expenditure areas at the two 
levels, accounting for approximately 21, 15, 38 and 18 per cent of gross local expenditures 
respectively.97 As such, and in isolation, the inherent salience of these services along with 
their sheer economic importance should bode well for the intensity of local partisan politics. 
 
The data put to use in the analyses consists of responses to questions in survey questionaires 
going to all municipal councilors in a sample of Norwegian municipalities and counties 
(Nmunicipality=1543 and Ncounty=508 in 1995, Nmunicipality=2706 and Ncounty=581 in 1999).98 The 
response rate for the surveys is considered quite satisfactory (58-65 per cent), and the survey 
answers do not seem to be biased in any apparent way. The dependent variable (P) records 
answers to items listing the mentioned service sectors under the following general question: 
 
We are interested in how you think resources of your municipality (county) should be 
allocated in next year’s budget. In comparison with this year’s budget, we ask that you 
consider whether the service sectors listed below should be granted: 
 
(1) considerably less resources (i.e. reductions in excess of five per cent) 
(2) somewhat less resources (i.e. reductions in the range of one to five per cent) 
(3) the same resources as this year 
(4) somewhat more resources (i.e. increases in the range of one to five per cent) 
(5) considerably more resources (i.e. an increase in excess of five per cent). 
 
Keep in mind that increases in one service sector usually must be matched by reductions in 
other sectors. 
 
For ease of interpretation, in the ensuing analyses the original variable has been recoded as 
follows: (1) = -6, (2) = -3, (3) = 0, (4) = 3 and (5) = 6. In this way effects may be interpreted 
directly in terms of preferred percentage change in the budget share of the service sector in 
question stemming from a unit change in an independent variable. As is shown in the 
appendix (table A3.1) local representatives typically seem to favor moderately more resources 
to the sector in question (increases of less than five per cent), with large groups also 
advocating a stand still and with smaller groups still either wanting larger increases or even 
reductions. In addition to the dependent variable, the surveys also record information on party 
affiliation (p), membership on standing committees (COM) and on the local executive 
                                                 
97 Figures reflecting averages over the 1991-1995 and 1995-1999 election periods respectively as taken from 
local accounts data form Statistics Norway/Norwegian Social Data Services. Neither the Norwegian Social Data 
Services nor Statistics Norway bears any responsibility for the use of data in the present paper, or for the 
interpretation thereof. 
98 That is, the data are same as those put to use in Vabo (2005), only augmented by the earlier survey 
(1994/1995) to maximize the number of data points. Both surveys were conducted by the Norwegian School of 
Management/the Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research (NIBR) towards the ends of the 1991-
1995 and 1995-1999 election periods, i.e. in 1994/95 and 1998/99 respectively. In 1995 the municipality sample-
size was 80 and in 1999 121 municipalities were sampled. In both surveys populous municipalities are over-
represented, so as to reflect political processes in localities where most people live. In the county surveys all 
counties (19 in total) are represented (save the special case of Oslo, which has municipal as well as county 
responsibilities). 
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board.99 Information on parties’ numerical strengths (PSIZE) is supplied by Statistics 
Norway/Norwegian Social Data Services. Further documentation and descriptive statistics for 
analysis variables is given in appendix (table A3.2). 
3.4 Analysis: Why are committee members preference outliers? 
In tables 1 (municipal services) and 2 (county services) is analyzed local politicians’ 
preferences for spending increases or reductions in the four mentioned service sectors.100 
Considering first the simple specification (models I), one observes that there is indeed 
clustering of individual preferences around local party labels: Overall, ujpt/(ujpt+eijpt) · 100% = 
1.19/(1.19+4.82) · 100% = 19.8% of the variation in municipal councilors’ preferences for 
changes in primary schools budgets is accounted for by local party affiliation, with a 
comparable share of 13.3% of the variation so accounted for in services for the elderly and the 
disabled. Likewise, in the county services analysis (table 2) the picture is much the same, with 
19.0% of variation in preferences in the somatic hospital area and 10.7% in the high schools 
area accounted for by differences between local parties.101 Even so, the larger part - i.e. the 
remainder - of the variation is still to be found within local parties, thus highlighting the fact 
that parties are not first and foremost compact clubs of the like-minded. Presumably, 
individual representatives initially chose their party affiliation in light of a compromise 
between parties’ general position on several dimensions, much like other and perhaps more 
individual specific characteristics would merely indicate affinity with other multi-faceted 
organizations. Such indications of affinity aside, the local and, specifically, local 
organizational role of parties themselves is contemplated in more detail below. 
 
Local parties do seem to matter, then, in the sense that parties are composed of individual 
representatives with typical preferences that tend to vary from the one party to the next. 
However, the measures of local party differences in models I are essentially appraisals of the 
system-wide variation between local parties. As such they contain portions of variation that 
are likely accounted for by inter-locality differences. 
                                                 
99 For party label categories, see note 94. For the COM variable classification is either in pure educational 
committees or in committees that combine educational issues with pre-school child care, church and/or culture 
issues in the case of assignment to the relevant committee responsible for the ‘primary schools’ or ‘high schools’ 
spending areas, and in overall health and care services committees in the case of assignment to the committee 
responsible for the ‘elderly and the disabled’ and the ‘somatic hospitals’ areas. 
100 Models are evaluated using the MIXED procedure in SAS version 9.1. As the models include effects of 
localities, of parties nested within localities and effects of committee assignment nested within local parties, it 
will put considerable strain on the data: With 1,030 (or 1,031) municipal party observations with recordings on 
the one (or the other) dependent variable in the data set, the maximum number of individual respondents within a 
single observation is 24, the median number 3 and the 75th and 90th percentile 5 and 8 respectively. Among the 
analogous 244 county parties the maximum, median, 75th and 90th percentile number of respondents are 17, 3, 5-
6 and 9 respectively. The multilevel or mixed model methodology is nevertheless highly efficient as it utilizes 
information where it is to be found. 
101 All of these measures of intraclass variation (IC) considerably higher than coarse rule-of-thumb of 5 per cent 
for rejecting a two-level data structure (as is assumed here). Also, large and highly significant reductions in the –
2LogLikelihood statistic from models with no local party effect would indicate the same (with drops of 204.4, 
98.6, 27.1 and 60.4 for the primary schools, elderly and the disabled, high schools and somatic hospitals areas 
respectively, all on df=1). 
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Table 3.1: Municipal councilors' preferences for budget changes in primary schools and services for the elderly and the disabled 
1995-1999. Percentage increase from previous year (t-values (betas) and z-values (sigmas)). 
0.82 *** 0.68 *** 0.59 *** 0.79 ***
(6.58) (3.66) (4.94) (4.51)
-0.92 *** -1.13 ***
(-2.36) (-2.79)
0.97 -1.55 *
(0.94) (-1.55)
1.19 *** 0.37 *** 0.26 *** 0.26 *** 0.68 *** 0.43 *** 0.53 *** 0.50 ***
(9.22) (3.72) (2.36) (2.40) (7.09) (4.63) (4.65) (4.45)
4.82 *** 4.81 *** 4.78 *** 4.77 *** 4.42 *** 4.40 *** 4.27 *** 4.27 ***
(37.50) (37.56) (32.87) (32.91) (37.74) (37.79) (32.85) (32.83)
3753 2962 2962
yes yes
Primary schools
II III IV
***) p<0.05, **) p<0.10, *) p<0.15. Two-tailed test for betas, one-tailed test for sigmas.
12771.2 16649.8 16132.0 12568.5 12556.5
2963
12779.5
3753
Elderly and the disabled
I II III
yes
IV I
no
Member of relevant 
committe (COM)
Party's share of seats in 
council (PSIZE)
Interaction: COM·PSIZE
σ u 2  (var[u jpt ])
Jurisdiction fixed effects 
(D jt
k )
yes yes yes
σ e 2  (var[e ijpt ])
no
3753 2963
16409.5
N
17147.7
3753
-2LL
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Table 3.2: County councilors' preferences for budget changes in high schools and somatic hospitals 1995-1999. Percentage 
increase from previous year (t-values (betas) and z-values (sigmas)). 
1.52 *** 1.64 *** 0.69 *** 0.73 ***
(6.65) (5.02) (3.09) (2.41)
0.32 -1.34
(0.44) (-1.42)
-1.04 -0.43
(-0.52) (-0.21)
0.67 *** 0.00a 0.00a 0.00a 1.42 *** 0.50 *** 0.66 *** 0.66 ***
(3.59) - - - (4.79) (2.17) (2.45) (2.48)
5.61 *** 5.62 *** 5.30 *** 5.31 *** 6.09 *** 6.16 *** 5.56 *** 5.56 ***
(20.38) (22.08) (20.58) (20.55) (19.83) (19.79) (18.02) (18.04)
1011 884
4569.0
N
4705.5
1011
-2LL
yes yes yes
σ e 2  (var[e ijpt ])
no
Member of relevant 
committe (COM)
Party's share of seats in 
council (PSIZE)
Interaction: COM·PSIZE
σ u 2  (var[u jpt ])
Jurisdiction fixed effects 
(D jt
k )
yes
IV I
no
Somatic hospitals
I II III
***) p<0.05, **) p<0.10, *) p<0.15. Two-tailed test for betas, one-tailed test for sigmas. a) The zero estimate for local party variance in the 
high schools sector is set to the boundary constraint (of non-negative variance components).
3928.9 4802.9 4668.4 3996.1 3989.1
884
3933.8
1002 1002 875 875
yes yes
High schools
II III IV
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When time specific locality dummy variables are added to the model (in models II), the 
measure of local party differences (ujpt) drops accordingly, with intraclass variation now 
estimated at 0.37/(0.37+4.81) · 100% = 7.1% in the primary schools area and at 9.0%, 0% and 
7.5% for the elderly and the disabled, the high schools and somatic hospitals sectors 
respectively.102
 
Specifications III add the COM variable to the model and give clear indications that a seat on 
the relevant committee typically carries with it higher spending preferences for the service 
area in question: For instance, in municipalities (table 1), members on the committee 
responsible for educational issues will typically prefer around 0.7 to 0.8 per cent more 
spending in the primary schools area than will non-members, while members on health and 
care services committees typically want spending increases in the care for the elderly and the 
disabled area that are 0.6 to 0.8 per cent higher than those of non-members.103 Moreover, all 
the mentioned effects are highly significant, and, as such they corroborate the results found in 
Vabo (2005). In the county analyses (table 2) much the same pattern is detected, with 
membership on the relevant committee entailing extra spending preferences in the range of 
0.7 per cent in the health area and a high 1.5-1.6 per cent in the education area.104 Overall, 
then, taking private spending preferences as an indicator of where individual interest lie, there 
seems to be a general tendency for local representatives to take seats on certain ‘favorite 
committees’. 
 
But how large and troublesome is exactly this effect? One way of further assessing the 
substantiveness of the effects is to view them up against the typical variation of preferences. 
In municipal education this would amount to a comparison of the 0.8 effect up against the 
total (typical local) variation of around 5.1.105 In other words, membership on the relevant 
committee would typically indicate that spending preferences in this field would increase by 
0.8/√5.1 = 0.35 standard deviations, whereas the comparable measure in the health and care 
field would be 0.7/√4.8 = 0.32 standard deviations. In county health and care services 
membership on the relevant committee would typically imply an expected increase in 
spending preferences of 0.7//√6.4= 0.28, whereas in the county education field one should 
expect preferred spending increases to be as much as 1.5/√5.4 = 0.65 standard deviations 
higher amongst members of the relevant committee than amongst non-members. 
 
Yet another way of assessing committee effects is to view them up against typical party 
differences. This would have the estimated effect of the COM variable viewed up against the 
                                                 
102 The zero estimate in the (county) high schools sector is purely logical as it follows from observance of the 
boundary constraint of non-negative variance components. It seems, however, that the variation between local 
parties is negligible in this sector: As was shown above, total between-parties variance is at its lowest in this 
sector (i.e. across all models I). Moreover, in supplemental analyses using the nobound option in the MIXED 
procedure so as to allow for negative variance components, between-parties variance varies from –0.04  (model 
II) to –0.17 (models III and IV), with substantive patterns in terms of estimated effects of PSIZE, COM and their 
interaction staying essentially the same. 
103 Viewed over estimates in specifications III and IV. 
104 We note also that inclusion of the COM variable alters estimates for inter-party differences (ujpt) somewhat in 
all cases where it can be estimated (downwards in municipal education, upwards in municipal care and upwards 
in county health). This goes to show that it is an important control variable in the present analyses of local party 
differences: Theoretically it is most likely among the clearest institutional indicators of individual preferences, it 
is clearly statistically related to the dependent variable and local party samples are likely so small and few as to 
possibly produce systematic over- or under-representation of certain committee members within parties that have 
certain inherent spending profiles. 
105 Viewed as an average of estimates across specifications II (i.e. ujpt + eijpt = 0.4 + 4.8 =5.2), III (5.1) and IV 
(5.1). 
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estimate of ujpt, one question being whether the former in some reasonable sense may be said 
to override the latter. In the municipal education area an estimate of party differences 
covering 95 per cent of the most typical spending positions would roughly equal 4·√0.26 = 2.0 
per cent.106 Clearly, the effect of committee assignment of 0.8 is nowhere near of spanning 
this range of potential and typical policy platforms in the area. Likewise, in the municipal care 
area, the committee effect of 0.7 could hardly be said to override a typical range of policy 
positions of 4·√0.51 = 2.8 per cent. Similarly also, in the county health area the typical county 
would not seem to be in want of substantial party differences, with the said 95 per cent range 
at 4·√0.52 = 3.2 per cent and the committee effect only 0.7.  
 
In the county education area results are suggestive in quite another direction, albeit 
inconclusive: Since typical party differences cannot be estimated, any definite interpretation 
of results is precluded. However, since it would seem that party differences in this sector are 
indeed small, a cautious interpretation would nevertheless link this observation to the 
otherwise large committee effect: Maybe, since parties do not or are otherwise unable to 
position themselves at different ideal points, some of the substantial effect is likely a 
consequence of scant incentives for the individual party to act to secure policies that are 
shared among many parties. The overall impression is nonetheless this: Party differences 
outweigh committee effects in three out of four service sectors that one should feel are of 
some inherent salience. We return to a fuller discussion of the implications of this finding in 
the concluding section and go on to consider results from the more direct test of parties’ 
organizational role: 
 
Specifications III include party size (PSIZE) and the interaction between it and the committee 
assignment variable (COM·PSIZE). We note first that the specification centers variables 
around appropriate means – with PSIZE around the locality mean and COM around the local 
party share of committee members:107
 
 
PSIZE* PSIZE PSIZE jtjpt jpt= −  and COM* COM COM jptijpt ijpt= − . 
 
 
In this way zero values reflect typical party sizes within each locality and typical committee 
assignment within each local party.108 Moreover, effects form single terms may be interpreted 
straightforwardly as effects that obtain in otherwise typical situations. A first observation is 
that PSIZE has a significant effect in the analyses of municipal services: Associated with a 10 
per cent increase in a local party’s share of seats is a 0.09 per cent reduction in preferences for 
spending in the primary schools area and a 0.11 per cent reduction in the elderly and the 
disabled area. Expressed in terms of the effect of moving form a typical share of seats (0.17, 
see table A3.2 in the appendix) to the maximum (0.67) observed share of seats, this would 
entail reductions in typical spending preferences of 0.9·0.50 = 0.45 per cent in the former area 
and 1.1·0.5=0.55 in the latter. Also, in the county service area of somatic hospitals a similar 
                                                 
106 Granted (as is the standard assumption) normally distributed party platforms. While the overall distribution of 
local parties’ spending profiles bears the characteristics of a unimodal and light-tailed distribution they will not 
perfectly conform to normality. The following interpretations must therefore be regarded mainly as suggestive. 
107 This specification is retained throughout, i.e. in models I through IV, and is the reason for the relative 
similarity of estimated effects from simple terms entries (PSIZE, COM) across models with and without 
interaction terms. For a discussion of centering see Singer (1998:334) and Bryk and Raudenbush (1992). 
108 The actual number of represented parties is used to arrive at locality mean party sizes, while sampled local 
party means are used for measures of mean committee assignment (as no official statistics are available).  
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effect (β = -1.3) obtains, although it is not nearly as significant. A reasonable interpretation of 
this finding is that larger parties will attract representatives from large societal groups that 
will have to internalize the costs of local tax financed spending more than will the typical 
smaller group that would prefer to let the larger collective pay up for the special service 
package that it specifically demands (Sørensen 2003). That this effect is most apparent in the 
municipal analyses is also suggestive: Municipalities are to some, albeit modest, degree self 
financed through the use of local fees and property taxes, while counties are by and large 
totally dependent on central government grants and local tax regulations.109
 
The real focus of the analysis is nevertheless the COM·PSIZE variable. In the municipal 
primary schools area (table 1) the term takes on a positive, albeit insignificant, value, 
implying that committee members from larger parties would want increased spending. This 
clearly goes against the hypothesized effect that would instead have larger and more 
responsible parties select relatively disinterested candidates for committee duty. In the 
municipal elderly and the disabled area the picture is different indeed: While it is estimated 
that typical committee members in typical assemblies (i.e. members from averaged sized local 
parties) will want 0.8 per cent more spending in this field than the typical non-member, an 
increase in party share of 10 per cent will reduce this difference to d = 0.8-1.5·0.1 = 0.65, and 
an increase from the average party share of 0.17 to the maximum of 0.67 would have the 
difference virtually disappear as d = 0.8-1.5·0.5 = 0.05. The effect is, furthermore, significant 
at a conventional, although lenient, level (p<0.15). In the elderly and the disabled area, then, 
results do seem to favor the hypothesized organizational role of parties in retrieving sound 
information for sound and responsible policy making. In the county services of high schools 
and somatic hospitals (table 2) a similar pattern prevails, although effects are not nearly as 
significant nor as substantive in terms of narrowing down the general difference between 
members and non-members on committees as party shares rise.110
 
A final refinement of the analysis may be considered. The hypothesized mechanism implicitly 
involves party leaderships rising to the occasion in terms of controlling candidate selection to 
relevant committees. If the informational theory has anything going for it, party leaderships 
will bar fringe preferences from being represented on the committee in question. But, if party 
leaderships do require sound information, indicating that there are salient policy choices to be 
made at the local level, it would seem unreasonable that leaders of responsible parties should 
deviate much from the party line anyway (here: the mean party spending preference in a 
salient policy field): If responsible parties have real stakes in a certain policy field, leaders 
that do not adhere to the party line will simply not last long. Thus, under such ideal 
conditions, one should observe party leaders that adhere to the party line regardless of their 
committee membership status. Still, leaders would nonetheless have to assess the 
                                                 
109 Counties and municipalities alike collect income and wealth taxes, but both levels of local government 
uniformly tax at the maximum rate allowed. 
110 One may argue that the finer test of responsibility for enacted policy lies in contrasting majority parties (or 
coalitions) with minority parties. The use of the party share of seats (PSIZE) variable here is grounded in both 
theoretical and practical issues: First, Borge and Sørensen (2001) find in the Norwegian case that municipal 
parties’ numerical strength is a better predictor of parties’ budgetary imprints than is dominance in the form of 
median position or majority status. In a certain sense this would substantiate the implicit claim that policy 
responsibility is a function of share of seats. Secondly, as no county party holds a majority of seats in the 
election periods under study and in order to ensure comparability over government levels, only results from the 
party share specifications are reported. Additional analyses of the municipal services in question substituting 
majority status for party shares nevertheless reveal much the same pattern: In the municipal care sector 
committee effects are completely washed out for majority parties, the effect gaining in significance in 
leadership/non-leadership specific formulations (see below), and effects in the other sectors are similar to those 
found in the PSIZE formulation. 
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informational value of junior members’ preferences as they are considered as candidates for 
committee duty. 
 
In other words, as the models hitherto have not distinguished between effects for party leaders 
and back-benchers, they have possibly also misspecified the relevant working mechanism by 
allowing irrelevant differences between members and non-members of committees among the 
leadership to enter into the estimation of what should more correctly be viewed as a process 
of leadership intervention into the semi-free self selection to committees by ordinary party 
representatives.111 As such, reanalysis should sharpen the effects found so far. In table 3 is 
analyzed the full models from table 2 with the refinement of two variables and also an 
additional term for whether the individual representative is an ordinary party member or is 
conversely a member on the executive board, the latter condition serving as a proxy for ties to 
the party leadership. In other words, the general effect of COM and the COM·PSIZE 
interaction term are both constructed to be specific to executive board non-members:112
 
 
COM if respondent is  on the executive board
COM* = 
0 otherwise
not⎧⎨⎩  
 
 
and 
 
 
COM PSIZE if respondent is  on the executive board
COM PSIZE* = 
0 otherwise
not⋅⎧⋅ ⎨⎩ . 
 
 
The analysis shows that overall patterns stay much the same: No committee effects deviate 
very much from those reported in the general analysis in table 1. But, while all the interaction 
terms (COM·PSIZE ) certainly retain their direction, there is also a clear tendency in the 
municipal care area for the interaction variable to gain in substantiveness and significance 
(with p=0.02). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
111 In the sample 14 per cent of municipal education committee members are also members on the executive 
board. The figures for municipal and county health and social affairs committees and county education 
committees are 18, 21 and 18 per cent respectively. 
112 The COM* variable in its turn also centered around the appropriate mean, i.e. around the local party share of 
ordinary (non executive board) committee members. 
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Table 3.3: Local councilors' preferences for budget changes in primary schools, care for the 
elderly and the disabled, high schools and somatic hospitals 1995-1999. Percentage increase from 
previous year (t-values (betas) and z-values (sigmas)). 
0.58 *** -0.03 0.16 -0.14
(6.07) (-0.31) (0.88) (-0.72)
-0.97 *** -1.08 *** 0.20 -1.28
(-2.48) (-2.65) (0.28) (-1.35)
0.47 *** 1.00 *** 1.67 *** 0.79 ***
(2.36) (5.04) (4.51) (2.28)
1.27 -2.56 *** -0.30 -2.63
(1.16) (-2.34) (-0.13) (-1.13)
0.26 *** 0.50 *** 0.00a 0.64 ***
(2.44) (4.39) - (2.33)
4.72 *** 4.27 *** 5.31 *** 5.62 ***
(32.65) (32.57) (20.32) (17.74)
Non-member on executive 
board
Member of relevant 
committe (COM)
Effects specific to non-members on 
executive board:
Primary 
schools
Elderly and 
the disabled
High 
Schools
Municipalities Counties
Somatic 
hospitals
***) p<0.05, **) p<0.10, *) p<0.15. Two-tailed test for betas, one-tailed test for sigmas. a) 
The zero estimate for local party variance in the high schools sector is set to the boundary 
constraint (of non-negative variance components).
3907.6
856
3847.8
2913 866
12338.6
N
12531.7
yes
σ e 2  (var[e ijpt ])
yes
Party's share of seats in 
council (PSIZE)
Interaction: COM·PSIZE
σ u 2  (var[u jpt ])
Jurisdiction fixed effects 
(D jt
k )
2916
-2LL
yes yes
 
 
 
Also, in the county somatic hospitals analysis the counteracting negative influence of party 
size on committee assignment is now considerably larger in substantive terms. But although it 
is also more significant – which is in line with the general expectation – it is nevertheless not 
significant at any conventional level. In the county service area of high schools and the 
municipal area of primary schools, moreover, operative effects become even less pronounced 
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as viewed up against the hypothesized pattern. The significant contribution of the finer 
analysis is in the municipal care area.113
3.5 Discussion and concluding remarks 
The present study has applied the informational perspective of committee organization to 
Norwegian local politics and has found that derived party effects could be at work in at least 
some local policy areas. On its way it has addressed what may be considered both conceptual 
and operational shortcomings in the literature on local committee organization. To take the 
last point first, it has argued that party effects should be assessed at the truly local level. 
Secondly, it has argued that an answer to the question of whether party differences (correctly 
specified) overshadow typical differences in prefernces between members and non-members 
of functional committees is not necessarily very informative in itself: 
 
First, such data would not answer the implied question of whether committee members are 
able to drive their preferences home in terms of real budget allocations. Secondly, if, at the 
very minimum, preferences may be regarded merely as indicators of private interests, and if 
policy is salient at the local level, then one would expect groups to form spontaneously that 
would take up different stances along the political dimension in question. In other words, one 
would expect there to be local parties with different policy platforms formulated with at least 
an eye to implementation. If such groups do form, then it would have been altogether truly 
surprising had individual representatives partitioned themselves (i.e. chosen institutional 
affiliation) in a more distinguishing fashion a second time around. Still, the analysis of party 
versus committee effects is instructive as it would go to show how salient (or possible) 
exactly is party positioning as benchmarked against committee effects. If committee effects 
should outweigh party differences the implications might or might not be a real problem. 
Below we comment further on this point and also discuss how and why such situations might 
transpire. 
 
While the above is much an auxiliary problem in the present study, the focus has instead been 
on a positive organizational role for parties, the potential lying in retrieving good sectoral 
information by putting sensible candidates on relevant sector committees. In the analysis of 
committee preferences in the municipal care for the elderly and the disabled sector results do 
seem to show that parties can make a difference: Larger and presumably more accountable 
and responsible parties are found to be less burdened with outlying committee members, this 
an indication that they care about who sits on the responsible committee. In the other sectors 
that are analyzed (primary schools in municipalities and high schools and somatic hospitals in 
counties) patterns are either indefinite or less pronounced. But why is this so? While the 
                                                 
113 Analysis of the full differentiated models (not reported) – i.e. with executive board membership and non-
membership specific committee effects – reveal that effects (COM and COM·PSIZE) are by and large 
insignificant and modest for executive board members in the municipal care area. This is line with the general 
argument that party leaders stick to the party line when policy is salient. In the other sectors patterns are 
different: In municipal education (positive and significant) committee effects are larger and more significant 
among executive board members than among non-members; in county education committee effects are all 
significant and as substantial among members on the executive board as among non-members; in county somatic 
hospitals positive committee effects among executive board members increase with rising party shares, possibly 
indicating that seats on the health committee are popular and seized upon by senior members of the assembly 
that do not stick to the (mean) party line. The ensuing discussion underlines that these patterns need not be 
interpreted in terms of real policy implications.  
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literature on local committee organization has attempted merely to empirically assess the 
relative impact of parties versus committees, the present analysis has to some extent sought to 
relate such patterns theoretically to plausible problems in local politics. In other words, the 
literature would seem to suffer from a shortage on positive conceptions of problems that 
might transpire in otherwise natural and healthy local democratic systems. Thus, against the 
backdrop of the ideal situation, wherein parties of distinct stances compete for office with an 
eye to making a difference, and inasmuch as one should feel that this is an unproblematic 
assumption in itself, one should hardly be surprised that party effects most of the time 
outweigh committee effects (as was explicated above). Nor should one be surprised if patterns 
are different. If local party differences are small and individual representatives seem to able to 
position themeselves quite freely, this could have more to do with the basic assumption of 
healthy local democracy itself than with any tendencies on the part individual representatives 
to try and outsmart an otherwise salient policy making process. In other words, what is 
needed is a more thorough contextual understanding of local democracy.  
 
Conversely, the present study has attempted both to theoretically embed its conception of 
party effects thoroughly in the informational perspective of committee organization and to 
relate this basic point of view to contextual features that might prove more or less conducive 
to its positive and ideal occurrence. Has it been successful in that respect? True, in most cases 
party effects may reasonably be said to overwhelm the impact of committee assignment, save 
perhaps in the case of the county education sector (where results are anyway inconclusive). 
What’s more, the positively hypothesized conditioning effect from contexts of organizational 
fragmentation in the face of similar sectoral policy platforms does not carry the analysis very 
far. True, general sectorization tendencies seem to be greatest in the areas where typical local 
partisan positioning is at its lowest (in the municipal primary schools sector and the county 
high schools sector). But, in the two sectors where party positioning seems to peak (in county 
somatic hospitals and in municipal care for the elderly and the disabled), the one sector 
(elderly and the disabled) is simultaneously burdened with substantive general sectorization 
tendencies and blessed with equally substantive correctional mechanisms while the other 
(somatic hospitals) is similarly burdened while not as significantly blessed with counteracting 
party effects.114
 
So, what other explanations might shed further light on the observed patterns? For one thing, 
and looking now beyond the purely local setting, the measures of local party differences 
offered in the analyses are not simply ipso facto. The very structure of local government is in 
the end a central government responsibility. And, since an appropriate structure ideally will 
need to take into account issues both of classical allocative efficiency (stressing intra-locality 
homogeneity and inter-locality heterogeneity) and of local democracy (stressing intra-locality 
heterogeneity), the observed pattern might have something to do with the structure of local 
government itself. Perhaps county jurisdictions happen to be strong on the one dimension 
(allocative efficiency) and weak on the other (potential for internal conflict)? Even so, the 
argument is not very persuasive: In isolation, one should feel that the larger counties are 
internally more heterogeneous than are the smaller municipalities, and taking politicians’ 
preferences as clues to the wider public opinion (as was done in the foregoing analysis) there 
is nothing to indicate that preferences do not vary substantially within. 
 
Apart from the very structure of local government itself there is also one other issue that has 
not been touched very much upon in the foregoing analysis, namely the issue of service 
                                                 
114 And patterns are not nearly as tidy in the former area. See note 113.  
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portfolios and regulatory regimes at the two government levels. In general there is a persistent 
overall contention that Norwegian local government is heavily burdened with ever more 
intense central intervention by way of standardization of services, central financing through 
earmarked grants and limits on local taxing (NOU 2005:6:ch. 5; Fimreite and Flo 2002). At 
the county level in particular there seems to be very little room left for policies of distribution, 
redistribution and structural adjustment. Policy will instead be embedded within a centralized 
regulatory regime as “sectors such as health policy, social policy and education are heavily 
regulated by the central government in terms of funds, recognition of needs, required service 
profiles and the like” (Mydske 2006:221).115 Moreover, this general contention is upheld by 
local politicians themselves. In figure 1 is presented responses to questions on how local 
representatives feel central regulation interferes with local politics.116 First of all, one 
observes that there is a clear tendency for respondents to characterize central government as 
much more intrusive in the county services of high schools and somatic hospitals than in the 
municipal service areas of primary schools and care for the elderly and the disabled. 
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Figure 3.1: Local politicians on central regulation of locally provided services. County 
councilors' (1995 and 1999) and municipal councilors' responses (1995) (frequencies in 
parentheses). 
 
 
                                                 
115 My translation. Falling outside the present discussion is inquiry into the question of why centralization 
tendencies are on the rise. See Sørensen and Vabo (2004) for a recent account of the Norwegian situation. 
116 The question going to county politicians in both the 1994/95 and 1998/99 surveys and to municipal politicians 
in the former survey. For ease of illustration county responses for the two election periods have been pooled, the 
general tendency not shifting much from the one period to the other.  
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Even so, whereas the three former service areas have seen the launching of far reaching and 
economically burdening central regulatory reforms,117 the municipal care sector is very likely 
an area where there might still be some room left for local political maneuvering. This is very 
much the impression one gets from the reported response tendency, with merely 20 per cent 
of respondents feeling that central government regulation in this area is too strong and 30 per 
cent even demanding that it be strengthened.  
 
The implications of these trends for the present analysis is most likely the following: If 
effective party politics is to be found anywhere in Norwegian local politics, it is perhaps not 
remarkable that we should find it in the municipal care sector. First, services for the elderly 
and the disabled is undoubtedly the sector where local politicians feel there is the most local 
leeway.118 As local policies may vary, sound information for formulating the right policy is 
potentially required. Secondly, as municipalities are to some extent financially responsible for 
their own well-being, the right policy will likely also have fiscal consequences. Hence the 
need for responsible parties to hedge against potentially bad informants. Where conditions are 
not so conducive (in the county education and health services and in municipal education) 
patterns are different. In such situations individual representatives may freely take a seat on 
their favorite sectoral committee out of pure interest for certain policy areas, knowing, along 
with their sponsoring parties, a few things: As minimum service standards and spending needs 
are pretty much known or set in advance, and as service results are more easily observed 
locally as well as through central monitoring schemes, sponsoring local parties will be less in 
need of hands-on specialization efforts from reliable and sensible committee members.119 
Private preferences that are extremely outlying, indicating overt affinity with a favorite sector, 
will pose little threat in this picture since there is simply less need for the additional good 
information that committee members potentially might produce.And, should the individual 
representative wish to push the matter, parties need not risk acting on a grossly exaggerated 
spending proposal for fear that it might be warranted. 
                                                 
117 With universal rights to high school level education (Reform 94), school enrolment age set down from seven 
to six with primary school spanning ten instead of nine years (Reform 97) and the law guaranteeing free choice 
of hospital (Pasientrettighetsloven). 
118 This conclusion goes for a comparison of services across the board. See Sørensen and Vabo (2004: table 19) 
where responses to the question in figure 1 are listed for thirteen central municipal service areas.  
119 Incidentally, the positive and significant effects of executive board non-membership in the municipal 
education area (table 2) may be viewed as a substantiation of this: Where (minimum) standards and spending 
needs may be known in advanced, it is most likely the knowledgeable and experienced (i.e. executive board 
members) that would know about them. 
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4 Do parties matter for local revenue policies? A 
comparison of Denmark and Norway* 
4.1 Introduction 
Does it matter which party controls the government apparatus? Officially, different parties 
pursue different policies. This is evident from official statements such as party manifestos 
(Budge 2001). In reality, official policy goals may also be pursued to establish political 
credibility, which is vital in parties’ competition for electoral support. Building a reputation 
may be in the rational self-interest of party leaders, but political leaders cannot always get 
what they want. They are not the only actors interested in public policy. Interest 
organizations, the bureaucracy and the voters have substantial policy interests too. Party 
leaders are also often constrained by economic or institutional factors, which may leave very 
little room for manoeuvre. Political parties are thus far from omnipotent actors, but they are, 
as noted by Schmidt (1996), omnipresent players in politics. It seems reasonable to expect 
that parties may have some influence on public policy. 
 
This article investigates the impact of party ideology on revenue politics. This area has been 
largely ignored in studies of the impact of party ideology. In the meta-analysis by Imbeau et 
al. (2001) only three out of the 43 studies included focus on revenue policy. Boyne’s (1996: 
Chapter 5) survey of the impact of party ideology in local government includes no studies of 
revenue policy. For some reason, political scientists have chosen to focus on the expenditure 
side of the public budget; a fact often lamented by the few political scientists who venture into 
the area of revenue politics (Royed & Borelli 1999:87; Peters 1991: xiii; Steinmo 1993: 1). 
 
The next section outlines the theoretical argument, and provides a brief review of the 
empirical literature.We then describe the Danish and Norwegian systems of local government 
and make an empirical investigation of the impact of party ideology on  local revenue 
policies. We find that party ideology has a considerable impact, particularly in the Danish 
case.Finally,we discuss country similarities and differences in the empirical results. 
4.2 The impact of parties’ left-right position on revenue policies 
Despite extensive debates over the past fifty years (for a review, see Blais et al. 1993: 42–43), 
most observers agree that the left-right policy dimension continues to be the most important in 
Western countries (Lijphart 1999: 78–87; Müller & Strøm 2000: 7–11). Consequently, if 
parties matter for public policy, it seems plausible to expect this influence to be related to the 
left-right ideological distinction. This is the basic hypothesis to be tested in this article. Left-
right ideology can be expected to influence revenue policy in two ways. First, leftist parties 
are more favourable towards government intervention. In other words, the more leftist a 
government, the greater the size of government and hence the greater the need for public 
                                                 
* Co-authored with Jens Blom-Hansen and Rune J. Sørensen and published in European Journal of Political 
Research 45: 445-465, 2006. 
 65
revenue. Consequently,we may expect revenue levels to be higher under leftist governments 
than under bourgeois governments. Second, revenue policy falls into the category of 
redistributive policies. This is exactly the type of public policy where the impact of party 
ideology is generally strongest (Boyne 1996:132–135). Redistribution may be pursued by 
relying to varying degrees on revenue instruments with different distributional profiles – for 
instance, through the choice of tax structure. Ceteris paribus, leftist parties should prefer 
progressive to regressive revenue instruments. Consequently, we may expect leftist 
governments to use redistributive revenue instruments to a greater extent than bourgeois 
governments. 
 
Political credibility is at the core of modern theorizing on parties (Persson& Tabellini 2000). 
The traditional vote-maximizing (Downsian) model assumes that policy commitments are 
both credible and flexible. A political party can adjust its programmes/promises in response to 
changes in electoral preferences, and voters are assumed to believe that election promises will 
be kept if the party gets majority support. In a situation with two political parties, policy 
positions are expected to converge towards the position of the median voter, and we would 
not expect tax rates to increase as a result of a shift from a right-wing majority to a left-wing 
majority government. Research by Inman (1989) and others suggests that the ‘representative’ 
or median voter approach has serious shortcomings in explaining tax policies,even in 
theAmerican-style two-party system. Moreover,the median-voter theorem does not apply in 
multiparty systems such as those studied here.Recent models of party competition in 
multiparty systems suggest that equilibrium positions will not converge towards the median of 
the voter distribution, but disperse across the relevant policy dimension (Adams& Merrill 
1999; Merrill &Adams 2002). 
 
Furthermore, credibility requires parties to offer voters clearly distinct programmes, 
commonly linked to the left-right dimension. A political party must maintain a stable 
ideological platform to build a reputation among voters; credibility would be diminished if 
policy promises were frequently altered. Party activitists are likely to induce party leaders to 
refrain from short-term office-seeking behaviour (Strom 1990). Credibility calls for party 
programmes to correspond to the preferences of party activists and elected representatives. To 
the extent that they have opinions that diverge from the party platform, credibility requires 
party discipline. 
 
Election promises may not always be credible, which induces voters to hold governments 
responsible for their actual policies. One possible reason is the multiparty system itself, which 
frequently leads to situations where no single party has a majority in the elected assembly. 
Budget making tends to involve complex negotiations involving numerous parties, and the 
resulting outcome is uncertain. Citizens will not necessarily believe parties’ election 
promises, and they may prefer to appraise actual policy results: whether taxes are increased or 
not. For example, Norwegian voters tend to turn against the ruling party in local government 
when infrastructure fees increase more than in other governments (Martinussen 2004). If 
voters punish left- and right-wing incumbents equally hard, we would not expect ideology to 
affect revenue policies. If voters punish right-wing incumbents harder than left-wing 
governments, retrospective voting will induce ideological differences in revenue policies. 
 
Most government revenue is routinely raised by established tax laws (Rose 1985: 293), and 
regulations are particularly important for local governments. One interpretation suggests that 
politicians shy away from tax initiatives because of negative electoral reactions – the 
expectation that all incumbents (left or right) are punished for tax increases on election day. 
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The most ardent advocate of this position is Rose (1985; see also Rose & Karran 1987: 
Chapter 1) who argues that politicians follow a non-decision-making approach to tax policy 
due to the political costs. If the inertia argument is correct, we would expect no particular 
partisan pattern in revenue policy at any given point of time since ‘whatever the bias in tax 
laws today, it is more a reflection of the nation’s past than of its current configuration of 
political interests’ (Rose & Karran 1987: 12). Another interpretation suggests that ideology 
has little bearing at the local government level due to central regulations. Local governments 
are simply not allowed to implement their ideological revenue policies. Others suggest that 
ideologies prevail even at the local level: central regulation of one tax instrument induces 
local governments to exploit other sources of public revenue (Shadbegian 1999; Skidmore 
1999). 
 
We are left with contradictory theoretical expectations about the impact of left-right party 
ideology on revenue policy. Nor have empirical studies resolved the issue. Schmidt’s (1996: 
169) review of left-right partisan influence concludes: “[I]t can safely be concluded from 
these studies that the hypothesis of partisan influence on public policy passes the empirical 
test reasonably well.” Boyne’s (1996: Chapter 5) survey of the effect of left-right party 
ideology in local government reaches a similar conclusion. One the other hand, Imbeau et al. 
(2001) identified more than 600 studies containing empirical results relevant to this question. 
In a meta-analysis of 43 of these studies, they found that the impact of party ideology is not 
significantly different from zero. The influence of left-right ideology is thus far from certain. 
 
Relatively few empirical studies focus directly on the impact of party ideology on revenue 
policy. In Table 1, we summarize the findings of these studies. About half the studies find no 
effect of party ideology. The typical research design uses national data from the OECD 
countries. This naturally creates a small-N problem (which in some studies is mitigated by 
pooling data across a longer time period). Some studies avail themselves of the opportunity to 
focus on the sub-national level and thus increase the number of cases,but they are all one-
country studies. This design makes it difficult to handle countryspecific effects. Furthermore, 
most studies focus on total revenue or a single revenue policy area (at most two). This design 
makes it difficult to handle policy-area-specific factors. In this study, we want to take a fresh 
look. We maximize our leverage by looking at three revenue policy areas in two countries. 
Data about local government allows us to analyze hundreds of political units. 
4.3 The institutional setting: Local government in Norway and Denmark 
We explore the relationship between left-right political ideology and revenue policy in two 
Scandinavian countries: Norway and Denmark. Both countries have a three-tiered public 
sector. In order to maximize the number of cases we focus on the lowest tier: the municipal 
level. In Norway there are 435 municipal units, in Denmark 273. In both countries, the 
municipalities are important implementing agencies of the welfare state.They provide services 
in the areas of childcare, primary education and old age care. Further, they are responsible for 
public utilities and local infrastructure.They enjoy considerable autonomy in these areas, and 
both countries represent cases of ‘legal localism’ (Page 1991: 13–42) – that is, systems in 
which local governments enjoy power over wide areas of public policy (see Fevolden & 
Sørensen 1987; Bogason 1987; Albæk et al. 1996). 
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Table 4.1: Studies of the impact of party ideology on revenue policy. 
Study Research design
Measure of party 
ideology
Measure of revenue 
policy Finding
Allers et al. 
2001
Regression analysis 
of 593 Dutch 
municipalities
Left-wing party 
control of local 
council and 
executive board
Property tax revenue 
per capita
Left-wing 
municipalities 
have higher 
property taxes
Ashworth & 
Heyndels 
2002
Regression analysis 
of 20 OECD 
countries
5-point scale of left-
right control of 
government
Tax structure No effect of party 
ideology
Berry & 
Berry 1994
Regression analysis 
of 48 American states
Liberal party 
control of 
government 
institutions
Increase in sales tax 
rate and personal 
income tax rate
No effect of party 
ideology
Borge 1995 Regression analysis 
of 414 Norwegian 
municipalities
Share of socialists 
in local council
Local fee income per 
capita
Left-wing 
municipalities 
have higher fee 
income
Borge 2000 Regression analysis 
of a subset of 
Norwegian 
municipalities
Share of socialists 
in local council
Utility charges in 
NOK
Left-wing 
municipalities 
have higher 
utility charges
Borge & 
Rattsø 2004
Regression analysis 
of 434 Norwegian 
municipalities
Share of socialists 
in local council
Tax structure 
(property tax versus 
poll tax)
Left-wing 
municipalities 
have higher 
property tax 
shares
Cameron 
1978
Regression analysis 
of 18 OECD 
countries
Left-wing party 
control of the 
central government
Change in general 
government revenue
Left-wing 
governments are 
more likely to 
increase revenue
Hallerberg & 
Basinger 1998
Regression analysis 
of 19 OECD 
countries
10-point scale of 
left-right control of 
government
Reduction of marginal 
corporate and personal 
income tax rate
Mixed evidence
Reid 1998 Regression analysis 
of 10 Canadian 
provinces
Left-of-centre party 
control of 
government
Annual change in 
revenue per capita
No effect of party 
ideology
Rose & 
Karran 1987: 
Chapter 6
Regression analysis 
of taxation in postwar 
Britain
Labour versus 
Conservative 
control of 
government
Tax rate and revenue Mixed evidence
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Table 4.1 continued 
ocal branches of national political parties govern municipalities in both countries.The 
he remainder in both countries is distributed among minor parties. Local lists (i.e., non-
he local revenue system is dominated by three types of income sources in both countries (cf. 
income tax base, while local authorities in principle decide the local income tax rate (same
Study Research design
Measure of party 
ideology
Measure of revenue 
policy Finding
Royed & 
Borelli 1999
Regression analysis 
of 14 OECD 
countries
5-point scale of 
right-left control of 
government
Annual change in 
central government 
revenue
No effect of party 
ideology
Schmidt 1982 Correlation analysis 
of 21 OECD 
countries
Left-wing parties' 
time in 
government; left-
wing prime 
minister; and left-
wing parties' share 
of cabinet seats
General government 
revenue as percentage 
of GDP
Left wing 
governments 
have higher tax 
burdens and 
faster growth in 
tax levels
Steinmo 1993 Comparative 
historical analysis of 
Sweden, the United 
Kingdom and the 
United States
Close inspection of 
party composition 
of government
Revenue and tax 
structure
No important 
effect of party 
ideology
Swank 1992 Regression analysis 
of 16 OECD 
countries
Cabinet portfolios 
held by left-wing, 
centrist and right-
wing parties
Corporate and 
personal income tax 
rate
Left-wing 
governments 
have lower 
corporate income 
tax rates and 
higher personal 
income tax rates
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distribution of seats in the election period under investigation is shown in Table 2, where the 
parties are ordered on the left-right scale. This is done according to our own understanding of 
Norwegian and Danish politics, but the ordering corresponds to well-known expert 
interpretations of party locations (Castles & Mair 1984; Huber & Inglehart 1995).The table 
shows that the local government system in both countries contains several parties, but that 
three parties dominate. In both countries, the left wing is dominated by the Labour Party 
(Social Democrats), which holds about a third of the seats in local councils. In both countries, 
the right wing is dominated by two large parties that together hold another third of local seats. 
 
T
nationwide parties) used to be influential in both countries, but account for less than 10 per 
cent of the seats in local councils today. 
 
T
Table 3). First, local taxes constitute about 40–50 per cent of all local revenue in both 
countries, and the main tax source is local income tax. The central government defines the 
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Table 4.2: The local party system in Norway and Denmark. 
Name of party N % Name of party N %
Socialist Red Electoral Alliance* 68 1 Unitary List* 14 0
Communist Party* 3 0 Socialist People's Party* 233 5
Socialist Left Party* 673 5 Social Democrats* 1.648 35
Labour Party* 3.804 31 Radical Liberals 88 2
Centre Party 1.798 15 Centre Democrats 4 0
Liberal Party 522 4 Christian People's Party 30 1
Christian Democratic Party 1.2 10 Conservatives 480 10
Conservative Party 2.086 17 Agrarian Liberals 1.557 33
Progress Party 989 8 Danish People's Party 119 3
Bourgeois Progress Party 44 1
Local Lists 1.098 9 Local lists 468 10
Total 12.241 100 4.685 100
Note: * Classified as socialist in the empirical analyses.
Seats in local 
councils, 1999–2003
Seats in local 
councils, 1997–2001
Left-right orientation
Norway Denmark
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rate for all income ranges – i.e., proportional income taxation). However, in both countries, 
the central government imposes constraints on this decision. In Norway, the local income tax 
rate is subject to an upper and lower limit. In practice, all Norwegian local authorities use the 
upper limit. In Denmark, the local income tax level is negotiated annually between the local 
government association and the central government – the so-called ‘budget cooperation’ 
between central and local government. These negotiations normally lead to a recommendation 
to the individual local authorities to keep income taxation within a specified limit. Since the 
recommendation is not legally binding and only specifies the average local income tax rate, 
there is room for local variation. In addition to the income tax, local authorities in both 
countries can also levy property taxes. In Norway, municipalities are not obliged to levy 
property taxes, but if they choose to do so, the rate must be kept within 0.2 and 0.7 per cent of 
property values. Further, property taxes may be restricted to certain areas within the 
municipality in Norway. In Denmark, the municipalities are obliged to levy a property tax. 
The rate must be kept within a range of 0.6 to 2.4 per cent of property values. 
 
Second, local fees and user charges are quite important in both countries, although more so in 
Denmark. User charges are used to finance local public utilities (water supply, sewerage, 
garbage disposal), but are also used to partly finance welfare areas such as childcare and old 
age care. The central government imposes restrictions on the setting of user charges. In both 
countries, public utilities must generally be fully financed by user charges. In the welfare 
areas, local authorities have greater, but far from full, autonomy. In Denmark, the highest 
degree of local autonomy is found in the area of childcare arrangements for school children 
(6–9 year olds). In Norway, local autonomy is highest in the area of preschool child care (1–5 
year olds) and childcare arrangements for schoolchildren (6–9 year olds). In these areas in the 
two countries, user charges may cover from 0 to 100 per cent of the costs. Third, grants from 
the central government are important in both countries, but more so in Norway where they 
constitute a third of all revenue. 
4.4 Research design 
In order to test the relationship between left-right party ideology and revenue policy,we focus 
on three revenue areas.We analyze the two most important tax sources of Norwegian and 
Danish local authorities – income and propertytaxation – plus a selected example of user 
charges. We have selected a user charge in the two countries, which is important in three 
respects: budget share, degree of local autonomy and political saliency. The last criterion 
means that we look at welfare areas rather than public utilities.The first two criteria mean that 
in Norway we select preschool child care (1–5 year olds) where parents pay to have their 
children looked after in municipal kindergardens. This area has a large budget share, and local 
authorities are free to set the user charge as long as it does not exceed the municipal costs of 
running the child care facilities. In Denmark, we analyze municipal childcare arrangements 
for schoolchildren (6–9 year olds), where parents pay to have their children taken care of after 
school. This is the only major area of user payment in Denmark where local authorities are 
free to set the user charge (as long as it does not exceed the costs of running the service). 
 
The strength of left-right party ideology can be measured in various ways and, as demon-
strated by Schmidt (1996: 157–162, cf. also Boyne 1996: 125–131), the choice of a particular 
indicator can make a very large difference. A first question to consider is whether party 
strength should be measured as proportion of seats held or simply by control of a  
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Table 4.3: The local revenue system in Norway and Denmark, 2001. 
% % of GDP % % of GDP
Taxes 40 5 54 10
– of which local income tax 38 5 46 8
– of which local property tax 1 0 3 0
Fees and user charges 16 2 24 4
Central government grants 34 4 20 4
Other 10 1 2
Norway Denmark
0
Total 100 13 100 18
Sources:  Statistics Norway; Statistics Denmark.  
 
 
council (i.e., control of more than 50 per cent of the seats). Proportion of seats may be a better 
measure than control if the parties give fuller expression to their ideology as their majority 
increases and restrain their ideological urges as their majority decreases. However, if parties 
exercise no restraint in using a small majority, control is a better measure. In the empirical 
analysis, we report results from both types of measures. 
 
A second question is which political body to focus upon when measuring party ideology.At 
the central government level, relevant bodies are the government and parliament.At the local 
level in Denmark and Norway there is no precise functional equivalent to these bodies, but a 
related distinction can be made between the mayor and the council. The mayor is responsible 
n, the council for broader policy decisions. Once elected, the 
ayor from office. Therefore, both the mayor and the council may 
be relevant to analyze. In the empirical analysis,we report results from both types of 
e 
for day-to-day administratio
council cannot remove the m
measures. 
 
A third question concerns the classification of parties on the left-right scale. The left-right 
scale may be divided into any number of units (e.g., a left-centreright trichotomy). However, 
we follow the convention of classifying parties as either socialist or bourgeois. The precise 
classification is evident from the asterisks in Table 2.This classification is, of course, 
debatable, especially in the case of Denmark where the political centre is held by a number of 
small parties. However, in practice, the empirical analyses are quite robust to the exact 
placement of the dividing line between socialist and bourgeois parties. 
 
The dependent variable – revenue policy – is measured as the rate.In the case of income and 
property taxation,this means using local income and property tax rates.The Danish case 
presents no particular measurement problems since local authorities must levy income and 
property taxes at uniform rates within their jurisdiction. However, in Norway both incom
and property tax rates are more difficult to measure. In the income tax area,Norwegian local 
authorities must,as already noted, levy the tax within centrally specified lower and upper 
limits, but all local authorities use the upper limit and have done so since 1979.There is thus 
no variation in income tax rates across local authorities. This situation is probably best 
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understood as a rational anticipation of the central government’s reaction to a reduction of the 
local income tax rate. Local authorities fear that the central government will interpret a local 
tax cut as a sign of affluence and react by cutting central grants. In other words, the absence 
of variation in local income tax rates is a product of central government discretion in the 
distribution of grants and does not reflect local ideological preferences.To measure the 
suppressed tax preferences of Norwegian local authorities,we rely on questionnaires to 
councilors in 113 local authorities and analyze the share of them in favour of increasing the 
local income tax rate. 
 
In the property tax area, the Norwegian situation is complicated too.While Danish local 
authorities must levy a property tax rate between 0.6 and 2.4 per cent of property values, 
Norwegian local authorities can choose whether or not to levy the property tax. In practice, 
the share of Norwegian local authorities that levies property taxes has remained relatively 
stable around 50 per cent over time. If levied, the property tax rate must be kept between 0.2 
to 0.7 per cent of property values in urban areas or in areas that are undergoing urbanization. 
However, local authorities may choose to restrict taxation to certain areas within their 
jurisdiction, or apply it throughout.This complicated system makes it difficult to establish a 
ingle indicator of a given local authority’s property tax rate. Instead,we have chosen to 
nalyze Norwegian local property tax policy as the municipality’s decision whether or not to 
 to 108 in Denmark. These basic 
ethodological choices are summarized in Table 4. 
riod 1999–2003 (Norway) and 1997–2001 (Denmark). Our general model is: 
a vector of variables 
escribing the party ideology of the municipal council and CONTROLS is a vector of 
This is measured as the ratio of median to mean income. Second, population size is included  
s
a
levy the tax at all. 
 
Finally, in the case of user charges there is no obvious ‘rate’ to measure. However, we use the 
functional equivalent of measuring the ratio of the user charge to the costs of the service. This 
ratio varies from zero to 41 in Norway and from 1
m
4.5 Empirical model 
In order to test the relationship between left-right party ideology and revenue policy, we 
utilize cross-sectional data from Norwegian and Danish local authorities from the local 
election pe
 
 
PAk = CA + β1A⋅ PARTYPOLk+β2A⋅ CONTROLSAk+eAk
(k = municipality, A = income tax, property tax, user charge), 
 
 
where P is our measure of policy outcome, PARTYPOL denotes 
d
relevant control variables.The dependent variable – tax policy – is, as noted above, measured 
as the income tax rate, property tax rate and rate of user charge. Party ideology is measured as 
socialist share of seats in the local council, socialist control of the local council and socialist 
mayor (cf. the above discussion of this question). 
 
The control variables are the following six sets of variables that have all been demonstrated in 
the literature to influence local tax decisions. First, an unequal income distribution has been 
demonstrated to have an impact on local tax levels and tax structure (Borge & Rattsø 2004). 
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Table 4.4: Basic methodological choices. 
Revenue areas to be 
investigated
Measure of left-right party 
ideology Measure of revenue policy
Local income taxation Proportion of socialist seats 
in local council
Local income tax rate 
(Denmark: actual rate; 
Norway: hypothetical tax 
rate)
Local property taxation Socialist control of local 
council (dummy)
Local property taxation 
(Denmark: property tax rate; 
Norway: probability of 
levying property taxes)
Local user charges in the 
areas of preschool child care 
y) and child 
Socialist mayor (dummy) User charge as percentage of 
costs of running the user-
(Norwa care financed service
arrangements for school 
children (Denmark)
 
 
to capture structural differences across the municipalities (cf. Borge 1995; Allers et al. 2001). 
Third, expenditure needs and the availability of central funds to finance these needs have been 
al tax decisions (Allers et al. 2001; Borge & Rattsø 2004). We 
 variable for exogenous income. Fourth, the tax base is likely to 
influence the choice of tax rate, although the direction of the relationship is theoretically 
rates. The literature has found both types of results (Sørensen 2002; Allers et al. 2001). We 
e a  t sis of income tax and user charges, 
 collective action problems have been 
els 2002; Borge 1995; 2000; 
Allers et al, 2001; Sørensen 2003). Low general taxes may be considered a public good for 
political parties, while increased service to specific voter groups constitutes private goods to 
 
 
demonstrated to influence loc
control for this by including a
indeterminate. A large base requires a lower tax rate to generate a given revenue, but a large 
base may also make it attractive to maintain similar, or slightly higher, tax levels than 
comparable municipalities with smaller tax bases. Such a strategy would have a relatively 
large income effect and may be cheap politically since voters may be expected to focus on 
us  priv te income to control for he tax base in the analy
and property values in the property tax analysis. Fifth,
demonstrated to be present in taxation (Ashworth & Heynd
the parties. According to this reasoning, general taxes resemble common goods and may be 
over-utilized in fragmented party systems.We include a Herfindahl index to control for this 
factor. Finally, the ability to export taxes has been demonstrated to have an upward effect on 
taxation (Allers et al. 2001; Blom-Hansen 2005). For this reason, we include two specific 
property types in the analysis of property taxation (further details on the specification of 
variables are available from the authors). 
If the ‘parties matter’ argument is correct,we expect an empirical pattern as outlined in Table 
5. First, left-right party ideology should matter for revenue levels because leftist governments 
need more income. In the local Scandinavian setting this must, if true, manifest itself in the 
local income tax area. This is by far the most important revenue source for Norwegian and
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Danish local authorities. In both countries, this single income source accounts for almost 60 
per cent of local authorities’ own revenue (i.e., total revenue net of central government grants; 
cf. Table 3). So, if leftist local authorities need more income, their local income tax rates 
should be higher. Consequently,we expect a positive relationship between local socialism and 
local income tax rates (in Norway measured as preferred income tax rates). 
 
 
Table 4.5: Empirical expectations of the 'parties matter' argument (effect of 
socialist strength). 
Norway Denmark
Income tax
– actual tax rate Invariant, not analyzed Positive
– preferred tax rate Positive No data, not analyzed
Property tax rate Positive Positive
User charge (rate) ? Negative
Total revenue effect Positive, very small Positive, substantial
 
 
 
Second, left-right party ideology should matter for the choice of local revenue instruments 
because leftist governments use redistributive revenue instruments more than bourgeois 
overnments do. In the local Scandinavian setting this, if true, must manifest itself in the 
 revenue source in Denmark. Norwegian authorities 
g
relative use of taxes and user charges. Income and property taxes are roughly proportional, 
while user charges are regressive. For leftist local authorities in Denmark, this should make 
the choice of revenue instruments easy: proportional taxes can be used to finance local 
welfare programmes while regressive user charges can be kept low. In the Danish case, we 
thus expect a positive sign between local socialism and income and property taxes, but a 
negative sign between local socialism and user charges. For leftist local authorities in 
Norway, the choice is not so simple. Since local income tax rates cannot be increased beyond 
the maximum rate allowed by the central government, leftist local authorities may be forced 
to rely on user charges for financial purposes to a greater extent than their Danish 
counterparts.This means that the relationship between local socialism and user charges is 
theoretically indeterminate in Norway. Redistribution motives point toward a negative 
relationship, whereas financial motives point toward a positive relationship (see also Borge 
1995: 365, who – contrary to our position – expects the financial motive to be larger than the 
redistributional one). 
 
If the ‘taxation by inertia’ argument is correct (i.e., politicians prefer a non-decision-making 
approach because active tax policies are unpopular), then we would expect no statistically 
significant relationship between socialist strength and tax rates in the two countries. If central 
regulations matter, we would observe larger ideological effects in Denmark than in Norway. 
In contrast to Norwegian municipalities, Danish authorities are allowed to set income tax 
rates. Property taxes are a more important
may employ user fees as tax instruments, perhaps forcing socialist councils to set higher user 
charges than non-socialist councils. Danish municipalities can make an ideological trade-off 
between taxes and user charges, and socialist councils can collect relatively higher taxes and 
lower user fees. 
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4.6 Empirical results 
The results of the empirical analyses are reported in Table 6. It presents comparable 
regression results for income tax rates, property tax rates and user charges. The estimates of 
party ideology are not much affected because of inclusion or exclusion of particular control 
variables.As indicated in the note under the table, alternative specifications of left-right party 
atter’ argument suggests that income and property tax rates are 
higher in socialist municipalities. The coefficient for proportion of socialist seats in local 
councils is positive and strongly significant in both countries for both income and property 
taxes. Note that the Herfindahl index has a negative effect on income taxes, which means that 
a non-fragmented party structure reduces taxes. Since right-wing local councils are somewhat 
more fragmented than left-wing councils (due to the large Social Democratic Party), 
fragmentation tends to dampen the actual revenue impact of party ideology. The second part 
of the ‘parties matter’ argument (i.e., that socialist local authorities rely less on regressive 
revenue instruments) is investigated by comparing the sign of the coefficient measuring left-
right party ideology for taxes and user fees. The coefficient should be positive in the analysis 
of income and property taxation and negative in the analysis of user charges. This is what we 
nd in the Danish case: Left-right party ideology has a positive effect on income and property 
xation, and a negative in relation to user charges. In Norway, local socialism has a positive 
d expenditure needs do not generally contribute much to explaining 
cal revenue choices, but in Denmark an upward effect of expenditure needs is found in 
are important for property taxation. Many studies of party effects on
ideology yield slightly different results for income taxes. 
 
The first part of the ‘parties m
fi
ta
effect in the income and property tax areas, but no statistically significant effect on user 
charges. Despite the fact that socialist authorities have an aversion to user charges due to their 
regressive nature, central regulations of income taxation may lead Norwegian municipalities 
to apply charges as an ordinary tax. 
 
The control variables show varying results. The ratio of median to mean income measures the 
extent of local income inequality. This variable appears not to matter much for the specified 
local revenue choices in Denmark and Norway. Borge and Rattsø (2004) find that local 
income disparities affect the usage of tax instruments. An unequal income distribution 
induces Norwegian municipalities to collect a larger share of revenue as property taxes and 
less by means of user charges in the infrastructure sector. Further analysis should explore 
whether this trade-off is related to party ideology as well. 
 
Population size is a summary variable that captures various conditions for the production of 
local services such as population density and urban-rural characteristics. The precise effect of 
this variable is difficult to hypothesize. Table 6 shows that the effect varies from area to area. 
Exogenous income an
lo
relation to property taxation. In Norway, exogenous income has a dampening effect on user 
charges (Borge 1995, 2000), but no certain influence on income and property taxation. The 
effect of the variables measuring tax base (mean private taxable income; property values) 
varies across areas and countries. The importance of party fragmentation is verified in both 
countries in the income tax area, but not in relation to property taxation and user charges. 
Finally, two special types of property are included in the property tax analysis to control for 
the special incentives they provide. In Norway, hydroelectric power plants constitute a 
considerable property tax incentive, while local authorities in Denmark may use summer 
cottages to export property taxes since these are typically owned by non-residents. These 
property types 
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 Table 4.6: Analysis of local revenue policy. 
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government spending and taxes comment on the statistical significance of parameter estimates 
only. This can be extremely misleading as significance does not imply that estimates are 
sufficiently large to warrant a substantial interpretation (McCloskey & Ziliak 1996). 
Furthermore, the ‘parties matter’ argument not only implies that party ideology has a 
statistically significant impact on taxation, but also that this impact is large enough to be of 
practical interest. In Table 7, we have estimated the actual revenue effect resulting from a 
shift in the socialist share from 0 to 1, measured in Danish and Norwegian Kroner (DKK and 
NOK) per capita. These numbers can be compared to the private taxable incomes in the two 
countries. Since the mean share of socialist representatives and standard deviations are also 
comparable in Denmark and Norway, it makes sense to compare a completely non-socialist 
council with a council consisting of socialists only. 
 
 
Table 4.7: The revenue impact of local party ideology in Denmark and Norway: Estimated 
municipal revenue increase per capita as a result of the socialist share of seats in the local 
council shifting from 0 to 1. 
Denmark Norway
Income tax effect 1418 0
Property tax effect 1730 12
User chage effect -157 -
Effect on total revenue 2991 12
Total revenue effect as percent of mean taxable income*) 1.90 0.01
Hypothetical income tax effect for Norway 1322
Effect on totale revenue, including hypothetical effect 1334
Total revenue effect as percent of mean taxable income*) 0.90
Note:  Norway: NOK, Denmark: DKK.
Source:  Regression estimates in table 4.6.  
 
 
The major observation in Table 7 is that ideology has an important effect on tax revenues in 
Denmark. Both income and property taxes yield substantial public revenues. Greater socialist 
strength only yields a very small reduction in per capita revenue from user charges. Overall, 
we suggest that a socialist council would collect about DKK3,000 per capita more that a non-
socialist council.The actual revenue estimates are considerably smaller in Norway: less than 
NOK100 per capita.As income tax rates are controlled by the central government, socialist 
councils take in more property taxes, but it yields very little money. Neither do user 
charges.We have not analyzed user fees in the infrastructure sector. Based on prior regression 
estimates (Borge 1995, 2000; Sørensen 2003), we find that socialism generates about 
NOK670 per capita in Norwegian municipalities. Though this is of some (substantial) 
significance, we cannot escape the conclusion that party ideology has a considerably larger 
revenue impact in Denmark as compared to Norway.The observed difference could be due to 
the fact that Norway has a large number of small and relatively ideologically homogenous 
municipalities. Additional regression analyses of the Norwegian data suggest that party 
ideology has comparable effects in small and large local governments (less versus more than 
5,000 inhabitants). Furthermore, Table 7 demonstrates a large revenue effect of lifting central 
tax regulations. Overall, our estimates suggest that ideological differences among elected 
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politicians in Norwegian local government would generate revenues similar to those in 
Denmark. More importantly, however: the Danish system of local government involves less 
redistribution than the Norwegian case. Danish local governments are less reliant on 
government grants than Norwegian authorities (cf. Table 3), which means that tax bases are 
relatively small in Norwegian municipalities. A given tax rate increase yields less revenue 
than in Danish municipalities. 
 
Despite so many similarities in political and institutional structures, Denmark and Norway are 
quite different when it comes to local democracy. There is a potential for ideological effects 
on revenue policies in both countries; national constraints explain why local parties have a 
more visible impact in the Danish case.The central government in Norway is more willing to 
limit local tax bases and constrain local tax rates. Though assistance to peripheral 
municipalities has a role in both Denmark and Norway, the latter system includes more grants 
and tax regulations that benefit the rural municipalities (Rattsø & Sørensen 1998). 
Equalization and regional policy plays a lesser role in Norway, while local self-rule is allowed 
to unfold in Denmark to a greater extent. 
4.7 Conclusion 
We have investigated two implications of the ‘parties matter’ argument for revenue policies. 
First, if parties matter, revenue levels should be higher under leftist governments. Second, 
leftist governments should use redistributive revenue instruments to a greater extent than 
rightist governments.Our empirical analysis has focused on local authorities in Norway and 
Denmark. Although alternative specifications of left-right party ideology yield slightly 
different results, the evidence generally supports the two implications of the ‘parties matter’ 
argument. As a result of central regulations, local parties matter considerably more in 
Denmark than in Norway. However, given the opportunity, local parties have no hesitations 
about making active revenue choices. This means that our analyses are troublesome evidence 
for the alternative ‘taxation by inertia’ argument, which holds that the tax policy area is 
characterized by non-decisions. 
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5 Local oppostition to municipal mergers in 
Norway: Efficiency, local political diversity and 
redistribution 
5.1 Introduction: The Norwegian non-reform of local government 
Recently there has been an upsurge in the debate over a reasonable and economically efficient 
local political structure in Norway. Still, the argument is by no means new to Norwegian and 
Nordic protagonists: Both the Schei Commission of the nineteen-fifties and the Christiansen 
Committee of the nineteen-nineties (NOU 1992:15) recommended that the number of 
municipalities in Norway be reduced substantially. An ardent present-day spokeswoman for 
wide-ranging reform has been Erna Solberg, who, when in office as minister for regional and 
local affairs (2001-2005), would suggest that Norway could quite well reduce the number of 
hly a hundred. Municipal mergers nevertheless remain controversial, 
and the Norwegian Parliament (Stortinget) has enacted that no municipality shall be forced 
But, how to explain this local reluctance? And what seems to be the greatest obstacle to wide-
ranging reform? And is reform really warranted? In an attempt to give some answers, the 
remainder of this article proceeds as follows: First, it offers a brief theoretical discussion of 
the problem of municipal mergers as grounded in the perspectives that have been put forth in 
previous research on the topic and in the wider public debate. Specifically, it contrasts a 
political economy view emphasizing gains and losses from mergers seen as local political 
outputs, on the one hand, with a more input-oriented view that associates opposition to 
mergers with inferior conditions for efficient local democratic processes in larger localities, 
on the other.122 Also, a short review of previous and relevant research into the issue of local 
decisions to merge is given, with particular reference to the Nordic experiences in the field. 
The ensuing section lays out the research design and presents the data put to use in the 
empirical analyses, while the subsequent section presents results from the analyses of 
Norwegian local politicians’ responses to questions on merging one’s own municipality with 
                                                
municipalities by roug
into a merger with neighboring localities: Local councils and constituents should decide for 
themselves whether they would want unification with their neighbors or not.120
 
Despite centrally launched initiatives for facilitating local revisions of existing jurisdictional 
borders – specifically the “Future of the local political structure” project running from 2003 to 
2005121 - there is no revolutionary change in sight. While the number of municipalities was 
substantially reduced from around 750 to 450 in the nineteen-sixties, one still faces today a 
local political structure comprised of a total of 431 municipalities. Moreover, Norwegian 
municipalities are of the smaller sort: Over half of the municipalities have less than 4,500 
inhabitants, a fact that would add to the overall concern over the misfit between developments 
in demographics and infrastructure and a static structure of local government. 
 
 
120 The so-called policy of local voluntarism (frivillighetslinjen). 
121 That is, the “Framtidens kommunestruktur” project. See the Norwegian Ministry of Local Government and 
Regional Development’s web site at http://odin.dep.no/krd/komsam/. 
122 The input-output distinction is suggested by Easton’s (1965) framework for analysis of democratic political 
systems. 
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neighboring localities: As very few actual mergers have occurred, this would seem a 
practicable road to take in order to gain some understanding of the subject matter. 
Furthermore, as economic and political data (Statistics Norway) from proposed merger 
projects (Langørgen et al. 2002) are combined with the said responses (from a survey 
conducted by the Norwegian School of Management), this allows for multilevel analysis of 
individual responses as encountered within relevant socio-geographical localities. Next 
follows a section that exploits results from the foregoing analysis of individual preferences in 
an attempt to answer an interesting question: What are the greatest obstacles to local 
government structural reform? A final section sums up results from the analysis and offers 
some broad concluding remarks. 
5.2 The politics of municipal mergers 
While the main arguments in favor of structural reform have largely centered on prospects for 
efficiency gains, one may argue that grounding reform on such prospects makes little sense as 
seen from the viewpoint of Norwegian society at large: Over the merger projects proposed in 
Langørgen et al. (2002), estimated gains lie in the region of 3 to 4 billion NOK in total. 
Viewed up against total expenditures in the range of 200 billion NOK in the municipal sector 
at large, such savings wouldn’t seem to amount to much in the wider picture (Baldershiem et 
al. 2003:155).123
 
If these meager prospects for overall savings should make feasible structural reform less 
attractive for some (the central government, say), that would nevertheless not preclude that 
some localities themselves would view efficiency prospects as significantly sizeable. In fact, 
since most municipalities in Norway have less than 5,000 inhabitants, and since scale effects 
in selected areas likely exist for population sizes of less than 5,000 (e.g. in administration and 
the care for the disabled and the elderly area; Langørgen et al. 2002:15), there should be 
savings for smaller municipalities. In figure 1 is presented savings form mergers as estimated 
in Langørgen et al. (2002) and as seen up against the population size in each municipality. 
Although these estimations have been criticized for not taking fully into account all aspects of 
gains and losses associated with a potential merger, they are presented here as reasonable 
measures of efficiency gains from plausible merger projects.124   
                                                 
123 With municipalities in Norway charged with important welfare services - such as care for the elderly and 
education – much municipal activity would anyway require some degree of decentralization in administering 
(face-to-face) services: Since geo-demographic patterns will likely stay much the same after a merger, 
economies of scale exist primarily in the smaller administration and infrastructure sectors (Langørgen et al. 
2002:72-73; Bukve 1999; NOU 1992:15; Myrvold and Toresen 2003; Kalseth and Rattsø 1997). While this 
would explain the small overall gains from wide-ranging reform, gains in least some merger projects could be 
more substantial as viewed from the merging partners themselves. 
124 Estimations in Langørgen et al. (2002) are based on a series of simultaneous service sector specific 
regressions of disposable expenditure on a number of independent determinants, among which is municipality 
population. Based on manipulations of the latter variable new localities are simulated so as to leave no locality 
with less than 5,000 inhabitants and predicted disposable expenditure for new localities is recorded. The 
efficiency gain is thus the added total disposable expenditure divided by the new locality’s population. 
Importantly, estimations take into account a reasonable centralization effect (from changes in the area-population 
ratio) as travel times might increase significantly in new localities. For a rebuttal of criticisms against the 
operationalizations of centralization costs see Langørgen and Aaberge (2003). 
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vertheless that 
fficiency gains should spur merger efforts for a large number of smaller municipalities in 
 
igure 5.1: Estimated efficiency gains (Statistics Norway) by municiplaity size. F
 
 
The figure shows quite clearly that many smaller municipalities will plausibly stand to win in 
terms of efficiency gains form scale effects, with localities with populations between 1,000 
and 10,000 typically gaining around NOK 2,000 per capita or even double that in the extreme 
cases.125 As expected, gains are slimmer with rising populations (above 10,000), and a few 
(smaller) municipalities will also lose heavily or at the very least not gain very much from 
merging with plausible neighboring partners.126 The broad picture is ne
e
Norway. 
 
As was mentioned above, the structure of local government in Norway has remained basically 
the same since the mid nineteen-sixties. Moreover, as is also documented in the present 
article, recent studies have found that opposition to local municipal mergers is strongest in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
The procedure, furthermore, generates 117 merger projects involving 335 neighboring and road linked 
municipalities within the same economic region (Langørgen et al. 2002:16), thus reducing the number of 
municipalities from 435 (the 1998 figure) to 217. Another more radical alternative (yet based on the same 
methodology) has the total number of municipalities reduced to cover the 90 Norwegian economic regions 
(ibid.:17), thereby also drawing attention to prospects of gains from coordination within clusters of economic 
activity/across larger municipalities. This article focuses on potential outcomes from the first alternative since 
scale effects (for the smaller municipalities) seem to be the most important economic effect (additional savings 
with the radical alternative running at 50 per cent) and since it may be viewed as the more realistic of the two, 
ect. 
argely due to their thinly populated large land areas. 
involving, as it does, fewer potential partners in each merger proj
125 In comparison the overall per capita gains from a NOK 3 billion saving would amount to NOK 780 (over a 
Norwegian total population of 4.5 million).  
126 The two municipalities with extreme losses of NOK 5,500 are Måsøy and Nordkapp, potential losses form 
merging l
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smaller localities.127 In other words, opposition to local mergers is strongest where prospects 
for much discussed gains are the largest.128 Accordingly, there must be other obstacles to 
local government structural reform and we discuss below various perspectives that might shed 
some light on this issue. 
 
A general and basic point is that this overtly economic focus in the public debate has largely 
also downplayed other important aspects of the process of municipal mergers. Municipal 
mergers are likely quite different from the common business merger: They will typically 
touch upon central issues of democratic politics and political economy. For one thing, 
inasmuch as the usual merger between firms will benefit from well-defined property rights 
(Coase 1960), any synergetic effects from cooperation need not involve redistribution of firm 
resources. As ex ante bargains on the distributive state of affairs are usually and ideally 
ic benefits form mergers without fear of 
cipal mergers things are easier and trickier at 
the same time: While firms need to negotiate beforehand on distributive gains, they 
ake into account strong pressures for redistribution within merger projects. 
ity (or differentiation in the 
case of a split-up), political differences across localities is very much the hallmark of a 
functional local democratic system: Localities should be allowed to differ in salient policy 
fields in order to ensure a reasonable level of allocative efficiency (Oates 1972), i.e. local 
subpopulations should to some extent be rendered capable of organizing service-tax packages 
guaranteed by law, firms may reap synerget
redistribution after the fact. In the case of muni
nevertheless enjoy full legal protection of own resources throughout. Municipalities, on the 
other hand, are democratic political institutions, the assembly collectively the ‘owner’ of the 
entire ‘enterprise’. Nearly any ex ante deal on the distribution of resources will be 
implausible, as the post-merger assembly will likely redistribute resources according to the 
new de facto power configurations – i.e. according to the allocation of seats in the new local 
assembly. The basic point is that prospects for decentralized local democratic structural 
reform needs to t
 
The political economy focus of the preceding paragraph is highly visible in recent theoretical 
and empirical work in the field. Both Alesina and Spolaore (1997) and Bolton and Roland 
(1997) seek to relate local (and national) decisions on whether or not to merge with one’s 
neighboring locality (or country) to prospects for efficiency gains or losses due to changes in 
jurisdictional size and to economic and political redistributive issues. From a broader societal 
perspective, moreover, the distinction between the two latter issues is important in the context 
of local democracy. Whereas pure redistribution of tangible resources resulting from mergers 
would not enhance the overall performance of the local democratic system, potential changes 
in the pattern of inter-locality political differences is more of an issue. While the logic of 
redistributive pressures (as pointed to in the preceding paragraph) will likely also come into 
effect in terms of a harmonization of policies in a merged local
for themselves according to their own preferences. 
 
In an extension of this logic – stressing the value of inter-locality differences and intra-
locality homogeneity – like-minded voters will migrate to localities that offer certain 
preferred policy packages (Tiebout 1956), this perspective much retained in theoretical and 
                                                 
127 See Baldersheim et al. (2003:26-28) for the relationship between municipality size and public opinion, 
Thompson (2003:16) for the relationship between mayors’ opinions and municipal urban-rural status and 
Jacobsen (2004:186-187) and Monkerud (2003:16, table 4.1) for municipal councilors views as mediated by 
municipality size (the latter publication documenting the entire survey from which the present study gets its 
responses). 
128 In addition, others have pointed to problems in smaller municipalities (of less than 5,000 inhabitants) with 
securing stable professional bases for local services - i.e. to the apparent drain of educated staff in smaller 
municipalities (Langørgen et al. 2002:16; Aftenposten 2002). 
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empirical analyses of municipal mergers: For all practical purposes, the process of deciding 
whether or not to merge localities may be considered a substitute for real Tiebout migration 
(Young 2002:4; Bolton and Roland 1997). A recent empirical study within this tradition is 
Brink’s (2004) study of Swedish municipality break-ups in the 1980-2001 period. She finds 
that local decisions to split municipalities are informed by differences in tax bases between 
different parts of the locality: Richer parts will more likely opt for secession. On the other 
hand, prospects of efficiency losses or altered tax policies do not seem to explain much of the 
variation in secession propensity (Brink 2004:133). In isolation, and from the broad societal 
point of view, this would not seem to be in accordance with the ideal motivations for local 
decisions to merge or secede with neighboring localities, redistribution apparently the sole 
driving force.129 The overall perspective in this strand of literature, then, is this: Localities and 
voter groups within them decide rationally on the merger question with clear reference to 
prospects for efficiency gains, potential economic distributive gains and opportunities for 
altered local policies. 
 
Quite another strand of research relates local decisions to merge to the quality of the local 
political process, thus stressing the importance of input side aspects (Easton 1965) of the 
political systems analysis. Much of the rationale of this research originates from the insights 
in Dahl and Tufte (1973) relating locality size to voters’ prospects for holding local politicians 
accountable for enacted policy and for generally providing a better overview of the policy 
process: For instance, as smaller localities are more transparent, the local civil service there 
will likely find it harder to pursue purely ‘bureaucratic interests’ and politicians will be able 
t is not 
ecessary to link such processual qualities directly to local opinions on municipal mergers,130 
ne may argue that the quality of local services that should result from such processual 
indeterminate. Multivariate analysis of opinions – as will be attempted here - with simul-
                                                
to gauge public opinion with greater ease (Baldersheim et al. 2003:4-7). While i
n
o
advantages should also make voters in smaller localities more content with local services and 
therefore more skeptical towards potential boundary changes: In Baldershiem et al.’s 
(2003:ch. 4) study of local opinion in Norway, there is indeed indication that service 
satisfaction is greatest in the smaller municipalities. And, plausibly this can be related to “the 
greater transparency and political precision of smaller municipalities” (Baldersheim et al. 
2003:116).131  Moreover, such an interpretation of results is directly in accordance with the 
observation of greater local opposition to mergers in the smaller municipalities (see note 
127).132  
 
There are nevertheless some specific problems with the above account. First, as the 
mentioned studies of opinions on mergers and service satisfaction do not offer control for 
municipal service levels or, related, local resources generally, the conclusion is quite 
 
129 As Brink’s (2004) study has only 24 observations (outcomes in local referenda), some indeterminacy is likely 
due to in
 local identities, which might then explain 
 figure directly in the minds of voters as a processual advantage 
adequate sample size. 
130 In fact, in a study of Norwegian local opinions (Pettersen and Rose 1997:112) voters seem to rate their role as 
‘citizen’ (rated number one by 18 per cent) as quite inferior to their role as ‘tax payer’ (32 per cent) and ‘service 
consumer’ (50 per cent). 
131 My translation and emphasis. Even so, Lolle (2003a:189-192) finds in controlled analyses of Danish public 
opinion that service satisfaction levels are but moderately lower in larger localities (Danish municipalities). Also, 
the stronger effect of locality size when locality responsibilities such as that for ‘security/integration’ is 
evaluated either way has more to do with factors other than size in itself (e.g. crime rates in urban areas) (ibid.). 
132 Also, smaller localities are possibly more closely knit in terms of
the greater opposition to border reviews. Indirectly, the greater social capital of smaller municipalities might in 
its turn provide for better tuned services or also
of small size to be reckoned with. However, see the ensuing points on small locality citizen efficacy, identity, 
local political knowledge and information surplus. 
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taneous control for local resources and locality size would make for the stronger conclusion. 
Indeed, in his study of politicians’ and top civil servants’ attitudes in thirty Norwegian 
municipalities, Jacobsen (2004) finds poor local economic conditions to spur inclinations for 
reforming the local democratic system – indicating that richer localities will be less disposed 
wards merging, even though service levels might be raised in the effort. And, since smaller 
r 
anish municipalities report that they are better informed than do citizens of larger 
to
municipalities on average are richer than their larger counterparts,133 the impact of size is 
likely overrated in the case where such economic conditions are not duly controlled for.134 
Also, in a study of processes leading up to actual merger decisions in eight Norwegian 
municipalities, Klausen (2004a) finds that public opinion is informed much more by 
“materialistic” motivations or output considerations such as potential effects on the local 
economy or local service levels than by “softer” input considerations such as altered prospects 
for contacts with the political level or for voters’ capability to influence politicians directly.135
 
Second, while citizens of smaller Norwegian municipalities report significantly higher rates of 
subjective efficacy than do citizens in larger municipalities, the difference is by and large 
insubstantial (Hansen 2003:40-41). Also, in series of studies of Danish locality size effects, 
Kjær (2003:82-83) finds no controlled effect of municipality size on self reported local 
identities, Levinsen (2003a:93) finds scant evidence of stronger interest in local political 
affairs in smaller localities, Levinsen (2003b:159-160) finds that levels of trust and 
confidence in local political systems or actors is but somewhat lower in larger localities and 
Strømbæk Pedersen (2003) finds that citizens in large localities are quite as knowledgeable as 
their counterparts in smaller localities. It does however transpire that citizens in smalle
D
municipalities (Lolle 2003b:170-171).136
 
In any circumstance, and in summing up, there is also a strand of theorizing that concentrates 
on effects from different political processual opportunities in different localities - commonly 
characterized by size – and that relates opinions on municipal mergers either directly to 
opportunities for superior types of participatory democracy or else to the results that might 
follow from or with such systems in terms of greater administrative transparency, higher 
service satisfaction and/or stronger local identities.137
                                                 
133 See e.g. Monkerud (2003:8, table 3.4). 
134 A potentially troubling aspect of the design found in Jacobsen (2004) is that the dependent variable records 
whether respondents would see mergers in general as acceptable, i.e. the question does not ask specifically of 
attitudes towards mergers involving respondents’ own localities. 
5 This is not to say, of course, that the normative arguments from perspectives that advocate smaller size 
still the question of whether the extra information is needed. Certainly, the cited study of Strømbæk Pedersen 
acy on the part of the individual voter is really necessary: In models of competitive democracy it is 
13
localities are necessarily wrong. The argument in Klausen (2004a) and here is simply that decisions are 
positively made without much regard to them. 
136 All of the cited studies report locality size effects after control for other relevant locality or individual level 
variables (e.g. tax bases, gender, age etc.). While citizens may be better informed in smaller localities, there is 
(2003) – insofar as it gauges relevant knowledge – would suggest that it is not. Even so, there are also more 
general arguments to the effect that very little day-to-day knowledge of local politics is needed: Voters may 
make reasoned and sensible choices anyway (see note 137).  
137 On participatory democracy versus competitive democracy, see Rose (2000:77-81). A related question is 
whether effic
(ideally) assumed that competition among contending parties will see to it that the optimal and efficient (median) 
policy is enacted, and other theoretical results would have voters only sufficiently informed so as to be able to 
make the right choices (see Lupia and McCubbins 1998). 
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5.3 Analysis design, hypotheses and data 
In line with the foregoing discussion on the shortcomings of previous research, the present 
empirical analysis will attempt to disentangle some quite specific aspects surrounding the 
decision of whether or not to merge with neighboring localities. Specifically, those decision 
criteria that have to do with locality size in itself – as they plausibly will indicate the salience 
of the arguments found within the input oriented strand of research – will need to be separated 
from whatever potential and positive gains in outputs that may result from a merger. In 
addition it is of interest to disentangle distributive economic considerations from potential 
political ramifications and also from potential efficiency consequences from mergers. The 
general model to be estimated, the operative variables and the data put to use is presented and 
discussed below. 
 
First of all, in terms of modeling the probability P that respondent i will want to merge his or 
obability of wanting to merge one’s own locality that is modeled, a logistic 
ansformation of the dependent variable is suitable, since this will keep (probability) 
log[Pij/(1-Pij)] = γ + β1·ECDGj + β2·POLGj + β3·EFFGj + β4·SIZEj + uj, 
her own locality j with neighboring localities, one may in conceptual terms generally write 
that 
 
Pij = f(ECDGj, POLGj, EFFGj, SIZEj), 
 
where ECDG is a vector of potential economic distributive gains resulting from locality j in 
an actual merger having to pool its economic resources (or liabilities) with that of other 
merging partners and then dividing again it between partners according to the ensuing power 
configuration (the characteristic distribution of seats between the formerly autonomous parts 
of the municipality in the new assembly). Parsimoniously, and in terms of sheer assembly seat 
ratios, the latter may be viewed in terms of municipal population sizes, since Norwegian local 
electoral systems are of the proportional representation type; POLG are potential changes in 
local policies resulting from a merger, respondents from locality j having to consider an 
adjustment of policies in the direction of those of other partners, again according to the former 
locality’s standing in the new assembly; EFFG is the potential synergetic efficiency gain from 
a favorable increase in locality size, also to be shared  according to former localities’ power in 
the consolidated assembly; and SIZE is the number of inhabitants in locality j. Moreover, as it 
is the pr
tr
predictions within the sensible [0,1] interval. Specifically, applying the common logit link 
function and expressing the transformed preference for merging in terms of a linear 
combination of the mentioned decision criteria we get 
 
 
where betas (β) are (vectors of) parameters to be estimated. Note that uj term is an error term 
that varies randomly across localities.138 Since the implied test is concerned with evaluating 
                                                 
138 This not to be confused with the traditional observation specific e term that one will find in the untransformed 
OLS formulation (i.e. where probabilities are modeled directly through the “identity link”). As is common when 
the response is binary, the assumption is that data is binomially distributed, and so the variance of the observed 
response is exclusively dependent on the population proportion (Goldstein 1999:2; Hox 1995:78). While one 
commonly assumes unity variance (σ2=1), as is also done here for ease of comparability over various models, 
serious deviation from this assumption should nevertheless be tested for: For all estimated models σ2 is never 
less than 0.9 and parameter estimates remain essentially the same whether or not such under- or overdispersion is 
accounted for. 
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the typical response from typical local respondents as it is informed by relevant contextual 
aspects (gains and losses specific to the locality), this multilevel specification of the model 
will allow for an assessment of overall clustering of responses within the said contextual 
setting (the locality) and also provide for correct significance tests for effects from 
independent variables as they vary exclusively between contexts. In addition to pure locality 
level variables the models will also include important individual specific variables. 
Specifically, models will also include the party affiliation of individual respondents, 
categorizations of which to be described in more operational detail below as the study’s 
respondents are characterized. Suffice at this point to say that whereas contextual variables 
would potentially inform a typical decision in a reasonably conceptualized political system 
(most commonly the decision of the local median voter), individual or sub-systemic criteria 
would nevertheless likely inform the preferences of different groups within localities.139 
oreover, one would expect such tendencies to apply in the political dimension specifically: 
rrent tax policy is much an established and adequate 
ocal) status quo. 
less troublesome than will respondents 
affiliated with rightist parties, the former parties traditionally favoring a large public sector 
(Peters 1991:3). Second, tax policy is potentially redistributive policy and is thus an obvious 
arena for ideological positioning (Boyne 1996:132–135). Since leftist parties are traditionally 
associated with inclinations for more redistribution, respondents affiliated with such parties 
 increases in more (less) progressive tax instruments as less (more) troublesome 
lity effects. Summing up now, and 
M
 
Whereas one may argue that pure distributive gains in economic resources (a larger tax base, 
say) or efficiency gains would be sought after by all types of respondents (be they voters or 
politicians), different groups will have different preferences for different gains in the political 
dimension. As this study will explore the local tax policy area specifically, two broad 
perspectives may be summoned up. First of all one might suspect that voters are generally 
opposed to high tax levels, and that politicians will shy away from initiatives to raise them 
even further. As revenue routinely streams from well-established tax regimes there is less 
need for any immediate change in policies, and voters and politicians will thus generally 
oppose mergers that will plausibly involve large tax raises. This is the “tax policy inertia” 
argument of e.g. Rose (1985), in which cu
(l
 
Alternatively, a merger will present to different groups within a given locality a significant 
opportunity for altered tax rates. This plays straight into a conventional conception of left-
right politics on two counts: First, since tax policy is traditionally connected to different 
preferences for (local) public sector size, on may argue that respondents affiliated with leftist 
parties will, in the very least, view tax increases as 
should view
than should respondents from rightist parties. The tax instruments in question are described in 
greater operational detail below, and we leave for the ensuing analysis section the technical 
and specificational issues of the mentioned within-loca
retaining the possibility that municipality size in itself will impact on preferences for merging, 
the following general hypotheses may be delineated: 
 
 
                                                 
139 For instance, while Brink’s model (2004:121) is predicated on the tax preferences of the decisive median 
voter being honored or not in the case of secession – secession going through only if the median (seceding) voter 
gains - tax rates may change to the worse or the better for other voters. In addition, since surveyed respondents 
lly oppose mergers). 
are local politicians, responses may also be informed by fears of possibly losing an acquired top institutional 
position in the case of a merger (see e.g. Johnsen in NRK (2003) on this in the Norwegian case) or respondents 
may also generally identify strongly with municipal producer groups, the latter presumably running the higher 
risk of unemployment in the event of a merger (although Baldersheim et al. (2003:31) find scant evidence that 
voters with a municipal employment background specifica
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H1: The larger one’s own municipality, the greater the willingness to merge  
 
H2: The larger the potential redistributive economic gains from a merging one’s own 
boring municipalities, the greater the willingness to merge for leftist than 
for rightist respondents 
own municipality with neighboring municipalities, the greater the willingness to 
merge for leftist than for rightist respondents 
 operational terms the contextual variables mentioned so far are based in measurements of 
urning now to operationalizations of political “resources”, the present study relies on 
nomous taxation. For 
one thing, taxation is very likely the most sensitive issue in Western politics, and Norwegian 
municipality with neighboring municipalities, the greater the willingness to merge  
 
H3:  The larger the potential efficiency gains from a merging one’s own municipality with 
neighboring municipalities, the greater the willingness to merge 
 
H4a: The larger the potential tax increases associated with merging one’s own municipality 
with neighboring municipalities, the slighter the willingness to merge 
 
H4b: The larger the potential tax increases associated with merging one’s own municipality 
with neigh
 
H4c: The larger the potential increases in progressive taxes associated with merging one’s 
 
In
the following: Measures of economic resources are of two types. First, there is the taxes and 
grants component of municipal income. In Norway roughly 35 per cent of municipal income 
is accounted for by central government grants (Statistics Norway, 2001) while local income 
and wealth taxes account for another 40 per cent. Since all Norwegian municipalities levy 
both wealth and income taxes at the maximum rate allowed, the income and wealth tax and 
block grants components are summed to constitute one single exogenous resource 
component.140 Second, Norwegian municipalities may levy property taxes,141 and a common 
motivation for this in many smaller municipalities is the presence of considerable 
hydroelectric power resources. Not only are hydroelectric power plants highly immobile tax 
objects, in electoral terms they are also quite insignificant: Taxing of power plants does not 
involve reallocating masses of voters’ private incomes (as opposed to the taxing of 
households; see below). In addition to taxing hydroelectric power plants, municipalities are 
entitled to retain up to 10 per cent of produced power for own use, this adding considerably to 
smaller municipalities incomes should they choose to sell power on the market. The sum of 
property taxes and income from municipal power sales is accordingly the second measure of 
local economic resources.142
 
T
measurements in a quite salient policy field, namely that of local auto
municipalities are to some extent fiscally self-reliant. Even though only roughly one per cent 
                                                 
140 In 2000 mean municipal per capita income from income and wealth taxes and central block grants was NOK 
,320, with minimum and maximum levels NOK 17,044 and NOK 57,466 respectively. 25
141 Property taxes may be levied within certain limits only, with floor and roof 0.2 and 0.7 per cent of property 
values respectively and increases in rates may only be moderately increased from one year to the next. Property 
taxes need not be levied in all parts of the municipality. See Loven om eigedomsskatt (Law on property taxes) (at  
http://www.lovdata.no/) for details. In 2000 49 per cent of Norwegian municipalities levied property taxes. The 
highest recorded per capita income from property taxes and municipal power sales in 2000 is NOK 33,024.   
142 Figures are available in Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development (2002a: Appendix 9). As 
can be seen from table A5.2, differences in this area between neighboring municipalities (in terms of typical 
deviations from the overall per capita mean) may be quite substantial.    
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of overall municipal income is accounted for by property taxes (Statistics Norway, 2001), 
policies vary considerably from one municipality to the next. First of all, then, the present 
study lays to ground the level of household property taxes for a standard household as 
reported by municipal officials in Norsk Familieøkonomi’s most recent municipal survey 
(1999).143 A second measure of local tax policies is that of local fee levels in the 
infrastructure area (water supply, sewerage, refuse collection and chimney sweeping), this 
also retrieved from the mentioned municipal survey. Roughly 16 percent of overall municipal 
income is from user fees, and since services in the mentioned areas are mandatory, fees here 
resemble pure taxes, albeit of the more regressive poll-tax sort as fees are not nearly directly 
linked to household values. Moreover, infrastructure fee levels vary considerably across 
localities even though they are required not to exceed the costs of providing services, a pattern 
that prevails even after control for local production costs (Borge  2000).144 In addition, Borge 
(2000) finds that infrastructure fee levels rise in the event that exogenous income declines 
ncome and wealth taxes and block grants), suggesting that fees are indeed considered to be a 
 in a position to reap more than others, say because of a dominant 
opulation size, this assumption is reasonable in that it is parsimonious and also figures as an 
(i
(or perhaps the) feasible tax instrument in Norwegian local politics. In sum, local policies are 
gauged through reported household property taxes and infrastructure fee levels, and indicate 
local preferences for more (property taxes) or less (infrastructure fees) progressive tax 
policies respectively. 
 
The efficiency gain in its turn is simply the estimated per capita gain from merging reported in 
the preceding section: As this gain (or loss) is specific to the respective merger project, it is 
assumed that municipalities in the project share the per capita gain equally. This is also the 
assumption with other resources that are pooled in the event of a merger – that is, resources 
are pooled and then redistributed according to partners’ population sizes. While it may be that 
some partners are
p
expectation of a fair distribution of resources. Besides, in a study of partisan budgetary 
influence in Norwegian local assemblies, Borge and Sørensen (2001) find that party size 
rather than dominance (in the form a majority or median position) is the best predictor of 
influence. In the case of tax policies, tax levels are analogously harmonized. Technically, if Z 
is a resource (income and wealth taxes and block grants or income from hydroelectric power 
activity) or a policy level (household tax or fee levels) then   
 
N
1
N
1
(POP Z )
Z  = Z
POP
j j
j
j j
j
j
=
=
⋅
Δ −
∑
∑
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where ΔZj is the potential locality specific (j) gain of either the economic distributive (ECDG) 
or the political (POLG) sort in a merger project involving N localities, Zj is the resource or 
policy level in locality j and POPj is the population size of locality j. In addition, since the 
measure of the second economic resource component – i.e. (total) property tax and power 
sales income – contains a portion of income from household property taxation, the ΔZj for this 
raw variable (resulting from applying the above simple procedure) is prudently adjusted by 
subtracting from it a quarter of the ΔZj for household property tax levels (since household tax 
                                                 
143 As mentioned, many municipalities do not levy property taxes at all, while the highest reported household 
property tax level in Norsk Familieøkonomi’s survey is NOK 5,250. See table A5.1 in the appendix for further 
documentation of reported household property tax levels. 
144 In the survey total infrastructure fees (for a standard household) vary from NOK 13,588 to NOK 2,872. 
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levels are reported in per household (four persons) terms. See table A5.1 in the Appendix). 
Moreover, all figures are harmonized so as to reflect price levels in the year 2000.145 
in the A
 
a liabil m respondents (local 
voters) that would normally make the final decision on municipal mergers (in referenda that 
that the rences still give 
som  clues as to actual decision settings? For one thing, one may assume that politicians are 
potenti
of actu s that voters and politicians are by and large in line when it 
com s to relevant decision criteria.146 Given that the present study analyzes mere preferences, 
politici
 
The important question presented to respondents in the present study is the following: 
7
                                                
Descriptive statistics for ΔZj variables (of the ECDG and POLG sort) are given in table A5.2 
ppendix. 
Respondents in the present study are local municipal councilors. Potentially, this would seem 
ity in the present setting: Responses, one may argue, are not fro
are nevertheless not formally mandatory nor binding). The overarching concern is nonetheless 
 present study does not analyze actual mergers. Might analysis of prefe
e
much better informed than voters about local economic and political conditions that would 
ally influence public preferences for merging or not. Besides, Klausen’s (2004a) study 
al merger processes show
e
it is likely an advantage that respondents are (more or less) experienced and informed 
ans rather than voters. 
 
Do you feel that your municipality should merge with the neighboring 
municipality/municipalities? 
 
Since respondents do not specify which neighboring municipalities they have in mind when 
answering the question, grouping of municipalities into merger projects is to some extent 
flexible. Even so, the present study groups municipalities in the merger projects proposed by 
Langørgen et al. (2002), and motivates this on the following grounds: First, the proposed 
merger projects are deemed plausible in that they involve municipalities with road 
connections within the same economic region. Second, Moisio (2003) shows positively (in the 
Finnish case) that distance between municipalities is a strong and significant determinant for 
merging propensity. Third, as mergers are by and large off the Norwegian local political 
agenda, one may argue that the merger projects proposed by Langørgen et al. (2002) are to 
some extent hypothetical fait accomplis to be taken seriously by respondents. Fourth, to the 
extent that the applied merger projects do not systematically run counter to projects grounded 
in greater local familiarity and knowledge, empirical results should reveal plausible, albeit 
possibly vague, tendencies.14
 
Finally, a few comments as to the sample of surveyed municipal councilors are in order. First 
of all, the survey recording responses to the question on municipal mergers was carried out by 
the Norwegian School of Management/the Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional 
Research in the fall of 2002. The response rate was generally acceptable (58 per cent) and 
 
rnment and Regional 
he 
145 That is, efficiency gains (1998 figures) and household fees and property taxes (1999 figures) are deflated 
according to the municipal consumption price index. See Ministry of Local Gove
Development (2002b: Appendix 5).  
146 Voters and politicians being clearly in line in terms of relevant arguments for or against merging in six out of 
totally eight municipalities (ibid.). 
147 In addition, when a simple model (specifically, specification I in table 1 below) is estimated exclusively with 
surveyed municipalities that do figure in Langørgen et als. (2002) projects, on the one hand, and then with t
addition of those surveyed municipalities that do not, on the other, the former sample gives the clearer effects 
and the better fit. To some degree this is an indication that the proposed merger project are plausible (for an 
illustration of this effect, see Monkerud (2004:43)). 
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there are no serious biases in response tendencies along potentially relevant categories 
(partisanship, membership on the executive board, gender; for additional documentation see 
Monkerud (2003)). The survey also records responses to questions on the following: Party 
affiliation, this the basis for differentiating political gains effects along the lines of hypotheses 
H4b and H4c (see above); membership on the executive board, as may be taken as an 
indication of a vested local position; and municipal employment background, as may be seen 
as an indication of strong identification with municipal producer groups (see note 139). All 
the mentioned individual level variables are further documented in table A5.1 and A5.2 in the 
Appendix. The survey contains 121 randomly sampled municipalities, although large 
localities (more than 10,000 inhabitants) are (deliberately) overrepresented so as to reflect 
conditions where most people live (Monkerud 2003:6). When crossed with Langørgen et als. 
(2002) sample of 335 municipalities the final analysis sample counts 80 municipalities,148 and 
within municipality sample sizes vary from 5 to 39. 
5.4 Analysis: The determinants of merger propensity 
As was mentioned above, previous research on Norwegian local eagerness for municipal 
 addition, the variable tapping local economic conditions is a Statistics Norway index 
measuring block grants and local taxes per capita adjusted for expenditure need.152 First of 
all, this will exclude from the relevant comparison criteria any earmarked grants that would 
                                                
mergers has found that politicians and administrators in richer municipalities tend to go 
against mergers (Jacobsen 2004)149 and that the local citizenry in smaller municipalities are 
more opposed to mergers than are their counterparts in larger municipalities (Baldersheim et 
al. 2003:26-28). For ease of comparison with these results, below (table 1) is estimated a 
simple model where local councilors’ preferences for merging one’s own municipality with 
neighboring municipalities (=1) is determined by municipality size, local economic conditions 
and partisan affiliation.150 In line with Baldersheim et al. (2003:27) municipality size is 
categorized, with the construction of dummy variables for population sizes ‘3,000 to 6,000’, 
‘6,000 to 12,000’ and ‘more than 12,000’ (municipalities with less than 3,000 inhabitants the 
reference category). This procedure will split the sample in near equal sized categories, and 
will allow for inspection of non-linear relationships between municipality size and 
opinions.151  
 
In
 
148 The municipalities of Våle and Ramnes were merged into one (Re municipality) in 2002 and Ølen 
uncicipality is from the same year part of Rogaland county rather than Hordaland. The mentioned 
unicipalities, as well as the two municipalities that are grouped for merging with Ølen (Sveio and Etne) in 
152 Importantly, the measure includes income from property taxes and local power sales, both sizeable sources of 
 deviation from the mean adjusted income (=100). See 
m
m
Langørgen et al. (2002), are excluded from the analysis. 
149 Assuming that the general question asking whether “there should be fewer municipalities in Norway” 
(Jacobsen 2004:181) is a valid proxy for opinions on mergers that involve one’s own municipality (see note 
134).     
150 All models are of the logistic regression type and are estimated by use of the GLIMMIX macro in the 
MIXED procedure in SAS version 9.1. 
151 See table A5.2 in the Appendix on size categories. Baldersheim et al. (2003:27) find (in the case of public 
opinion) that there is a clear negative and linear relationship in their 1996 survey, while the relationship is still 
negative but not nearly as linear in their 2003 survey. 
revenue for many smaller municipalities. Figures are available in St.prp. 82 (2000-2001) (government white 
paper). See Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development (2003:Appedix 9) for definitions. The 
index is standardized and centered so as to reflect per cent
table A5.2 for descriptive statistics. 
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presumably stay much the same in the event of an actual merger. Next, the index will 
importantly better gauge local disposable income after any minimum spending needs have 
been taken into consideration.153
 
Finally, on the individual level, variables tapping partisan affiliation are constructed with one 
f municipality size and economic 
conditions. Logit-regressions of positive response (t-values). 
1.47 ***
(7.62)
1445.35
dummy variable coded one for respondents from traditional socialist parties (the Red 
Electoral Alliance, the Socialist Left Party and the Labor Party; zero otherwise) and another 
coded one for rightist parties (the Conservative Party, the Progress Party; zero otherwise. The 
reference category is accordingly center parties: the Center Party, the Liberal Party and the 
Christian People’s Party). While a simple dichotomous specification would in principle have 
sufficed as viewed up against the simple socialist-rightist distinction of hypotheses H4b and 
H4c, the trichotomy applied here will in itself be more informative and will also tap possible 
ideological and intrinsic stances on the question of local mergers.  
  
 
Table 5.1: Politicians' attitudes towards merging own municipality 
with neighbor(s). The impact o
-1.60
(-1.23)
Rightist party affiliation
Constant
0.51 ***
(3.31)
-0.09
(-0.02)
1.17 ***
(2.75)
1.29 ***
(3.13)
0.01
(0.72)
Socialist party affiliation
3000-6000 inhab. (=1) 
N (municipalities)
Deviance
80
6000-12000 inhab. (=1) 
More than 12000 inhab. (=1) 
τ
Adjusted exogenous income
0.92
N (representatives) 1374
***) p<0,01, **) p<0,05, *) p<0,10.  
 
 
Whereas there seems to be some controversy as to where exactly in the political landscape 
fault lines run,154 the lesser disagreement is over center parties’ positions of relative 
skepticism
national party positions to the effect that parliamentary representatives from center parties 
                                                
 towards local mergers.This is also in line with previous characterizations of 
 
153 As one may reason that minimum spending needs too will stay much the same in the event of a merger. The 
local economic conditions variable may thus be contrasted to Jacobsen’s (2004:182) measure of total unadjusted 
nter party opinions (and even more so for radical leftists).  
municipal income. 
154 In the case of public opinion Baldersheim et al. (2003:30-33) suggest that rightist and moderate left party 
preferences should be contrasted to center party and radical left attitudes. While they do find a tendency that the 
former group significantly favors mergers more than do the latter, Jacobsen (2004:184) suggests a finer analysis 
and finds that attitudes of leftists are quite close to ce
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will rely more strongly on conceptions of “allocative efficiency through proximity” (Bukve 
2002:278).155
 
The results corroborate those found in earlier research: First, municipality size is clearly 
decisive and substantial in this specification. For instance, in comparison to a municipality 
with less than 3,000 inhabitants where, say, 25 per cent of councilors are in favor of merging 
(an odds of 0.33), the model would predict that in a large municipality (more than 12,000 
inhabitants) the share would grow to (0.33· e1.3)/(1+(0,33· e1.3))·100 = 55 per cent. The 
comparable effect of a size of between 6,000 and 12,000 inhabitants is also significant and 
only somewhat smaller while municipalities with between 3,000 and 6,000 inhabitants do not 
differ significantly from the smallest of municipalities (less than 3,000 inhabitants). Second, 
partisanship matters: Typically, if 25 per cent of center party representatives are pro merger 
(an odds of 0.33), the prediction is that as much as 1.5 1.5 (0.33· e )/(1+(0,33· e ))·100 = 60 per 
cent of rightist party representatives will be so. The effect of socialist party affiliation is also 
positive and significant, but slighter nevertheless than that form rightist party affiliation. 
t 
s.156 One 
reason for this is likely that size is strongly correlated with economic conditions, and 
t of relevant levels in data may in many circumstances yield misleading results 
Third, even though the effect of the economic condition variable is positive (which is agains
expectations), it is nevertheless not significant and it is also weak in substantive term
additional analysis (not reported) with size variables omitted has the effect come out negative, 
albeit insignificant and not very substantial (β = -0.01, p=0.18). 
 
The table also reports the estimated variance in responses (on the logit scale) between 
localities (τ). While preliminary analysis suggests that specifications in which responses are 
assumed to vary across localities provide better fits than does that which assumes responses 
not to systematically vary from one locality to the next,157 the estimated τ is also suggestive: 
First of all, in terms of the portion of variance explained by between locality variation, one 
may as an approximation lay to ground the logistic distribution variance of π2/3 = 3.29 along 
with a τ of around 1.0 and estimate the intraclass variation to be near the 1.0/(1.0 + 3.29)·100 
= 23 per cent level. This is substantially greater than the rule-of-thumb 5 per cent or less 
criterion for rejecting a two-level structure (as is assumed in the present models), and failure 
to take accoun
(Singer 1998:329-330). Second, as the estimated τ is reduced to 0.92 (from the 1.04-1.19 
level) there is indication that the entered variables explain some of the variance between 
responses in different localities.158
                                                 
155 My translation. In addition to the fixed (mean) party effects reported in the tables, models are also specified 
with a random party effect (i.e. the effect of partisanship is assumed to vary across localities). More detail on this 
is given in connection with the testing of hypotheses H4b and H4c below. Importantly, though, results do not 
change when the random effect is not specified. 
156 As viewed up against the standard deviation of 14.6 or even the difference between maximum and minimum 
values (see table A5.2).  
157 That is, as evaluated by significant reductions in the appropriate log-likelihood statistics. See Monkerud 
(2004:37) for an illustration of this effect and the accompanying τ estimates. 
158 In terms of model fit, the reported deviance (of 1445.35 with p=0.07 on df=n-b=1374-6=1368 in a 
χ2distribution, where n is the number of respondents and b the number of independent (fixed) effects) indicates 
that the simplified model does not have a significantly worse fit than the saturated model with all combinations 
of entered variables, although this is with a lenient α of less than 0.07. The more interesting measure, however, 
is of improved fit from the one model to another: Since all models are nested, the difference in deviance may be 
evaluated against a χ2distribution on df=b (where b is the number of additional fixed effects in the richer model), 
a significant reduction indicating that additional variables explain some of the variance in responses. 
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Although economic conditions are likely important in deciding whether or not to merge with 
neighboring municipalities – with mere needs for improving one’s situation less pressing as 
conditions are fair – one may also ask of the specific gains or losses that might result from 
pecific mergers. Accordingly, the next step in the analysis (table 2) enters into models the 
 
In m ne sees that effects from entered gains variables (save the 
st are also significant at 
tential revenue from personal 
ta would raise the odds of favoring 
a merger by a factor of e  = e  = 1.12. Only the latter of these effects is significant at 
conventional levels, though. Possibly, efficiency gains are viewed by respondents as much 
more of a guess of a future state of affairs, whereas current revenue levels are more easily 
grasped as given. An interesting question pertaining to the distributive gains variable is 
nevertheless whether respondents view different components as more or less likely to 
materialize in the event of an actual merger. Specifically, since particular grants are 
deliberately fashioned to compensate for diseconomies of scale in smaller municipalities, 
respondents may fear that such components would disappear along with the original rationale 
in the event of (many) mergers going through. Accordingly, the distributive gains variable is 
potentially invalid as an indicator of a realistic decision criterion. And, even though the 
official national policy is that municipalities will in effect keep any such gains in the event of 
a merger,159 there is still the issue of how credible such central assurances are in real terms. 
 
This problem is analyzed in Sørensen (2006): In analyses of the same data that is put to use 
here, he finds that there is somewhat greater effect from distributive gains when compensating 
grants do not enter into gains calculations, but also that models that include such grants in the 
gains measure make for the better fit to the data. Presumably, respondents may view central 
assurances as credible and perceive the status quo of the current central transfers regime as 
sufficiently robust. 
 
s
suggested gains variables (ΔZj): Potential efficiency gains, economic redistributive gains or 
losses in the income and wealth taxes and block grants area and in revenues from 
hydroelectric power activity and potential political changes in the household property taxes 
and fees area. The presented models also include another locality specific gains measure that 
would potentially be of some importance: As an indicator of municipal debt increase resulting 
from a merger, annual net interest payments per capita is recorded for each municipality and 
then contrasted to levels in the entire merger project by way of the same procedure as was 
applied to reach the other ΔZj variables. The expectation is that rising debt levels will dampen 
local enthusiasm for merging with neighboring municipalities. 
odel specification I in table 2 o
debt change indicator) all have the expected signs and mo
conventional levels: An increase in efficiency gains or in po
taxes and block grants in the order of NOK 1,000 per capi
β 0.11
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
159 Technically, grants that are geared towards compensating for diseconomies of scale are replaced by a 
structural grant for a 10-15 year period (see e.g. Langørgen et al. (2002:3)). 
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Table 5.2: Politicians' attitudes towards merging own municipality with neighboring 
municipalities. The impact of prospects for efficiency gains, redistributive consequences and 
olitical differences. Logit-regressions of positive response (t-values). 
-0.39 -0.39 -0.37
(-1.44) (-1.43) (-1.37)
0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.00
(0.01) (-0.01) (-0.03) (0.00)
p
-1.76 -1.77 -1.67 -1.69
(-1.25) (-1.26) (-1.18) (-1.20)
1.49 *** 1.44 *** 1.44 *** 1.41 ***
(7.62) (7.10) (7.10) (7.00)
0.53 *** 0.49 *** 0.49 *** 0.50 ***
(3.37) (3.00) (2.99) (3.08)
-0.57 -0.59 -0.61 -0.62
(-1.41) (-1.45) (-1.50) (-1.52)
0.48 0.48 0.45 0.45
(0.96) (0.95) (0.88) (0.90)
0.80 0.79 0.78 0.78
(1.60) (1.58) (1.54) (1.55)
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(1.03) (1.03) (1.02) (1.08)
0.11 * 0.11 * 0.11 ** 0.11
(1.70) (1.67Distributive tax and grants gain
3000-6000 inhab. (=1) 
More than 12000  inhab. (=1)
Constant
Rightist party affiliation (R )
Socialist party affiliation (S )
6000-12000  inhab (=1) 
IVI IIIII
Adjusted exogenous income
) (1.70) (1.66)
0.28 ** 0.28 ** 0.28 ** 0.28 **
(2.27) (2.27) (2.27) (2.28)
0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12
(0.95) (1.00) (1.01) (1.00)
-0.53 ** -0.53 ** -0.52 ** -0.53 **
(-2.18) (-2.12) (-2.12) (-2.13)
-0.36 * -0.38 * -0.39 * -0.38 *
(-1.85) (-1.95) (-1.96) (-1.94)
-0.04 -0.02 -0.02
(-0.01) (-0.05) (-0.05)
0.12 0.13 0.16
(0.37) (0.37) (0.47)
-0.44 -0.44 -0.45
(-1.21) (-1.23) (-1.26)
Change in technical sector fee levels (TFL )
Efficiency gain
Change in household property taxes (HPT )
nge in revenue from hydroelectric industry
Interaction: S·TFL
Interaction: R·TFL
Interaction: S·HPT
Interaction: R·HPT
Cha
-0.22 -0.21
(-1.58) (-1.51)
-0.41 **
(-2.19)
Deviance
τ
Indicator for increase in municipal debt
0.69 0.69 0.690.69
Executive board member (=1)
Municipal employee background (=1)
***) p<0,01, **) p<0,05, *) p<0,10.
1430.70
8080
1445.29 1435.71 1432.17
N (municipalities)
N (representatives) 13741374 1374 1374
8080
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Effects for the other economic distributive gains variable is even more substantial: Potential 
changes in tax and sales revenues from the local hydroelectric power industry in the order of 
NOK 1,000 per capita will typically raise the odds for favoring a merger by a factor of e0.28 = 
1.32.160 While effects from gains in the personal tax and grants area and from efficiency gains 
are roughly of the same order – presumably because these revenue sources are in a basic sense 
equivalent – the effect from gains in hydroelectric industry related revenues is much larger. 
One possible explanation for the latter gains source to be viewed differently is that 
hydroelectric power resources stand out (to politicians and voters) as more visible and 
tangible signs of local wealth.161 All in all, with reference to the hypothesized relationships, 
results seem to clearly support the hypothesis that distributive gains matter (H2) while they 
also give credence, albeit vaguely, to the hypothesis that efficiency gains are important (H3).  
 
Turning now to the variables tapping potential political changes, one sees that effects are even 
ore substantial still. Since measures in the household property taxes and fees area are in 
e 
onclusion is fairly clear: With respondents evidently opposing mergers as fee and tax levels 
reas municipalities with between 3000 and 6,000 inhabitants are now 
                                              
m
NOK 1,000 per household, comparing effects directly with those from other variables is 
difficult. Even so, if multiplied by a factor of four (as the standard household consists of four 
persons) an approximate per capita increase in household property taxes of NOK 1,000 would 
change the odds of favoring a merger by a factor of e4·(-0.53) = 0.12. In probability terms this 
would reduce an initial propensity for merging of P=0.25 to a mere P=0.04. The effect from 
potential changes in the household fees area is also much larger scale than those from 
distributive changes, although it is somewhat smaller than the household property taxes effect. 
The strong sensitivity in the household taxes and fees area (shifts possible in the event of a 
merger) is in line with the cited research documenting that citizens’ role as tax payer is 
important (Pettersen and Rose 1997; see note 130). Also, the visibility of local taxes will 
likely add to the effect: Presumably, tax levels are easily observed within and across 
(neighboring) municipalities. Finally, locally as well as nationally, tax policy simply is a 
controversial issue, as may be seen from various journalistic accounts of local political 
processes.162 In terms of model fit, furthermore, the drop in the intraclass correlation measure 
(τ) from 0.92 to 0.69 suggests that the addition of the gains variables helps explain a 
substantial portion of the between municipality variance.163 So far in the analysis th
c
would rise in the event, hypothesis H4a is clearly supported by empirical results. 
 
A final observation from patterns in model I is that the size variables lose much of their 
thump: From the simple model where patterns were much clearer (table 1), effects for the two 
larger size categorical variables are now reduced to between two thirds and one half of the 
original effect, whe
   
0 In probability terms this is equivalent to a rise from P=0.25 to P=0.30. 
1 Earlier analysis (Monkerud 2004) included instead of the present measure of property taxes and power sales a 
ariable tapping membership in the national organization for municipalities endowed with hydroelectric 
 changes in the latter variable harder to interpret, it nevertheless comes out 
ositive, albeit insignificant. 
 For instance, the Labor Party’s proposal to reintroduce property taxation in the capital of Oslo spurred among 
arties strong and traditional left-right positioning (see Aftenposten 2003). Also, tax and fee issues figure 
irectly in public debates over mergers, as in the case of the Hobøl-Spydeberg project where one observer 
ned of consequences in a previous merger to the effect that “fee levels have risen, and even people in the way 
out in the countryside have to pay property taxes” (see Smaalenenes Avis 2003). 
163 Also, the deviance measure falls only slightly (from table 1 to model I in table 2). However, the correct 
procedure for evaluating improved model fit with additional fixed effects is to estimate models using Maximum 
nificant on df=6 (see note 157). 
16
16
v
resources (LVK). The effect from
p
162
p
d
war
Likelihood (ML), and not Restricted Maximum Likelihood as is used here (REML) (Singer 1998:352). In ML-
estimations the deviance drops from 1454.26 to 1404.19, which is highly sig
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found to be the most skeptic towards mergers (β = -0.57). Effects are on the whole
and none are significant at conventional levels (although the effect for the largest category
β = 0.80 is not without some substance nor is it very insignificant)
 moderate 
 of 
. A likely explanation for 
this is the combination of block grants that overcompensate for diseconomies of scale and the 
existence of large hydroelectric power resources in particular small sized municipalities, these 
effects rendering smaller municipalities quite vulnerable in mergers either with larger and 
poorer municipalities or even with smaller and merely half rich neighbors. At any rate, 
hypothesis H1 does seem to gain very clear support in the data: The clear positive relationship 
between locality size and opinions towards mergers that has previously been documented 
(Baldersheim et al. 2003) is very likely due to confounding resource disparities between small 
and large localities.164
 
Models II through IV include interaction terms for the political gains variables crossed with 
partisanship variables so as to test hypotheses H4b and H4c. For ease of interpretation 
partisan variables (R and S in the table) have been centered around the locality mean: 
 
X D DRjR R= −  
X D DSjS S= − , 
 
where D. is the original dummy variable (indexed R for rightist parties and S for socialist 
parties). For instance, respondents from rightist parties in locality j are coded with an XR 
value of one minus the share of rightist representatives in municipality j, and with an XS value 
of minus the share of socialist representatives in the same municipality. Interaction effects are 
not significant at conventional levels, although there is some indication that both socialist and 
rightist representatives are more sensitive in the fee area than are center party representatives 
(as seen from the effects of S·TFL and R·TFL respectively): Presumably, rightist respondents 
are opposed to tax and fee rises however they are assembled, as is also indicated by their 
relative level of opposition to household property tax increases (i.e. it does not deviate 
substantially from the mean and fairly large opposition of βHPT = -0.53). Socialists are in their 
turn somewhat less sensitive than average towards increases in property taxes. Whereas the 
overall typical opposition is βHPT = -0.53, typical socialist opposition is βHPT + βS·HPT = -0.53 
+ 0.12 = -0.41. In terms of typical differences between partisan responses, the (logit scale) 
deviance of rightist opinions from the typical socialist response of  βR - βS = 1.44 - 0.49 = 
0.95 is narrowed by -(βR·HPT - βS·HPT) = -(-0.04 -0.12) = 0.16 for every NOK 1,000 increase in 
potential property tax change. With an increase in household property tax changes of one 
standard deviation (NOK 490; see table A5.2 in the appendix), the typical difference is 
reduced by a mere 0.08 in logit terms. Thus, the effect is not very substantive: For any 
reasonable manipulation of the property tax change variable, rightist respondents will all the 
same favor mergers much more than will their socialist counterparts. All in all, since effects 
are not all to clear in terms of significance or substance, hypotheses H4b and H4c are not 
supported by empirical results, the first of these gaining relatively little support since 
socialists are among those that oppose opportunities for revenue raising policies the most (in 
the fees area), the second hypothesis also discredited as they are (in isolation) neither very 
                                                 
4 This is also in line with the weak effect found in Jacobsen’s (2004:186) study of local politicians’ and 
dministrators’ attitudes: The (linear) effect of municipality size is found to be β = 0.014 points per 1,000 
inhabitants on a 0-4 “agree”-“disagree” scale dependent variable, yielding a mere 0.14 increase in preferences 
for merging for every 10,000 increase in local population. 
16
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keen on acting substantively on opportunities for redistribution through potential changes in 
more progressive taxes (household property taxes).165
 
Finally, models III and IV include in the analysis two control variables that have previously 
been considered to have some effect (NRK 2003; Jacobsen 2004; Baldersheim et al. 2003). 
First, in model III a variable recording membership on the executive board is included, and its 
effect is not without substance: Executive board members are on average more skeptic 
towards mergers than are ordinary council members. In odds ratio terms the effect is e-0.22 = 
0.80, which would reduce an ordinary representative’s propensity of, say, P=0.25 for being in 
favor of a merger to P=0.21 in the case that he or she became a member on the executive 
board (the effect not very insignificant, with p=0.12). This is in accordance with the 
roposition that vested positions are also at stake when respondents consider the 
s other than 
ose socialized with at the actual work place, families and networks of friends and 
may not be too surprising: In smaller localities the local public and administrative sector is 
quite logically large,167 and, since polities are smaller, networks and groups will tend to be 
p
consequences of mergers. Also, the variable recording whether the respondent has a 
municipal employee background (introduced in model IV) has a substantial effect and it is 
also highly significant: Politicians that have previously been or currently are municipal 
employees are on average more reluctant towards mergers than are those with no such 
background, the effect in odds ratio terms e-0.41 = 0.66 (equivalent to a drop in propensity 
from P=0.25 to P=0.18). While earlier research has found no connection between local public 
sector or private sector association and willingness to merge, these results seem to go against 
such conclusions and instead support the proposition that employment consequences from 
mergers do seem to matter. 
 
One likely explanation for these discrepancies is this: First, it is likely that elite politicians to 
a greater extent than ordinary voters will tend to (have been or) be employed in administrative 
positions rather than hands-on service producing positions, the latter group less exposed in 
terms of job risks since mergers will most likely involve cuts in the administrative areas. This 
is in essence the specific explanation offered by Jacobsen (2004:178) for the lack of voter 
sectoral employment effects in Baldersheim et al.’s (2003:31-33) study, and most likely this is 
also the general mechanism behind the pattern detected here. Still, Jacobsen (2004:186) does 
not find any substantial employment background effects in his study of local politicians’ and 
administrators’ preferences. Why is this so? More than being simply a question of personal 
sectoral background, individuals will presumably identify strongly with group
th
acquaintances the sets that come naturally to mind. 
 
Second, then, since Jacobsen’s (2004) study might be burdened with responses from 
particularly small localities,166 the finding of no effect from personal sectoral background 
                                                 
165 Also, in terms of improved model fit from specification I to II, the ML-deviance drops insignificantly from 
1404.19 to 1401.79 on df=4. In addition, as models are estimated with random partisan effects (not reported), 
inspection of changes in the variance components - i.e. the variance of partisan variables R and S, the covariance 
rway (Jacobsen 2004:177). The 
between them, the covariance between the partisan variables and the random locality term and, finally, the 
variance of the locality term (τ) - will give further information as to possible variation explained by added 
interaction variables. However, none of the variance components change substantively over models II through 
IV. 
166 With a small municipality sample size (N=30) from the southern region of No
present study, moreover, is benignly biased in this respect, with responses from large localities even 
overrepresented. See p. 90. 
167 This, of course, is very much the motivation for advocating mergers among small localities (i.e. the existence 
of economies of scale in administrative services). 
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more inclusive of the entire polity in question. Thus, since there is a tendency in smaller 
municipalities that “everybody knows somebody in the municipal administration”, personal 
ackground from the local public sector is less a prerequisite for developing the relatively 
strong and general public sector identity that would persist in smaller localities. The above 
reflections on the more personal sides of merger preference formation (vested institutional 
positions and sectoral identities) very much auxiliary in the present analysis,
b
 to Norwegian local government reform 
ions on 
merging with neighboring municipalities. While theory would have one predict that efficiency 
gains from mergers should also matter, this study nevertheless finds no significant effect from 
potential gains of this sort. In addition, party affiliation in itself seems to be important, with 
center party representatives on average opposing mergers much more than do representatives 
from socialist and rightist parties, a result tha  is in line with previous characterizations of 
economic resources, richer localities standing to lose in the redistributive rearrangement of 
resources ex post? Or has the observed widespread opposition more to do with political 
differences, the smaller and politically eccentric localities deservingly opposed to merging 
168 we 
nonetheless note that none of the effects of economic and political factors change 
considerably as such aspects are controlled for (from model II to models III and IV). 
5.5 The obstacles
The foregoing analysis has shown that individuals (politicians) will consider potential 
redistributive gains and also possible political ramifications when they form opin
t
partisan positions on this question. Finally, it seems that politicians also take into 
consideration their institutional positions and their sectoral identities when forming 
preferences for merging with neighboring localities.  
 
The result with regards to the redistributive gains effect is in accordance with Brink’s (2004) 
finding that municipal secessions are more likely as income disparities between municipality 
parts rise. In contrast to Brink (2004), however, the present study also finds that political 
differences between municipalities is a crucial issue. Specifically, such differences matter in 
the following important ways: First, individuals seem to be more sensitive towards changes in 
local tax policies than towards changes in municipal economic resources. This is theoretically 
reassuring inasmuch as previous and traditional accounts have tax policy a particularly 
controversial policy area. Secondly, the fact that tax policy ramifications from mergers do 
seem to matter is normatively important because it conforms to the ideal of local political 
organization: The land should be partitioned into localities of different political standpoints so 
as to enhance system-wide allocative efficiency (Oates 1972). That politicians and voters 
oppose mergers on the grounds that neighboring localities pursue different policies is merely 
a logical consequence of such a viewpoint. 
 
Still, the foregoing analysis is merely an illustration of how typical respondents would 
reasonably react to different given prospects from mergers, however the latter might be 
characterized (as economic gains, efficiency gains or political changes). In other words, 
respondents might be overtly sensitive towards tax increases, but seldom get to react to 
pending opportunities for changes in tax policies. The question is this: Is overall local 
opposition towards mergers due to the fact that neighbors are differently endowed with 
                                                 
168 Also, in terms of improved model fit, executive board membership and municipal employment background 
seem to make a difference: ML-deviances drop from 1401.79 in model II to 1397.85 in model III, and from this 
again to 1395.93 in model IV, the first drop with p-value 0.05, the second with 0.16 (both on df=1).   
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with larger neighbors? What is the typical configuration of type of locality and contextual 
situation? 
 
To get at an answer to this question, below is presented results from simulations in data in 
which estimated parameters from the previous analysis are applied. Specifically, estimated 
effects parameters (β) from model III in table 2169 are used, first, to predict the probability Pij 
for favoring a merger for each individual i in municipality j. Second, individual probabilities 
for merging are aggregated170 within each municipality to reach the expected share of council 
representatives in favor of merging: Ej=ΣPij/nj, where nj is the actual number of 
representatives in municipality j. Third, since any successful merger project needs compliance 
from the partner with the least enthusiasm for merging, Ej predictions are recorded for least 
enthusiastic partners in the 115 merger projects found in Langørgen et al. (2002).171 Fourth, 
this procedure is applied to the following situations: 
 
• original observed variable values remain unchanged, 
• efficiency gains are set to zero, 
• economic distributive gains (changes in income and wealth taxes and block grants and 
changes in property taxes and local power sales revenue) are set to zero, 
• political changes (changes in household property taxes and fees) are set to zero. 
 
Figure 2 presents results form the simulations in terms of illustrating the cumulative 
istribution of merger projects on least enthusiastic council shares in favor of merging with d
neighboring municipalities. With the plain solid line representing predictions from observed 
values and estimated parameters, one observes, first, that efficiency gains seem to play a role: 
When efficiency gains are set to zero, least enthusiastic partners will typically become even 
less enthusiastic – as can be seen from the shift in the cumulative distribution (the dotted line) 
to the left: Relatively larger parts of the distribution will consist of projects with extremely 
low preference least enthusiastic partners. 
 
 
                                                 
169 Since no complete and locality specific figures on local politicians’ sectoral backgrounds are available, this 
will preclude out-of-sample predictions from model IV. 
ata Services (NSD)). 
170 With individual predicted probabilities aggregated to actual council shares of categories (partisanship crossed 
with executive board membership/non-membership) rather than sample shares (the former as retrieved from the 
Norwegian Social Science D
171 That is, from the total of 117 projects (Langørgen et al. 2002:15), the two projects mentioned in note 148 are 
excluded from the analysis. 
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olicies in the household taxes and fees area. In any case, and to the extent that any 
 
Figure 5.2: Simulated share of council in favor of merger in project's least enthusiastic 
unicipality. Effects of prospects for efficiency gains, political m
(N=115). 
 
 
When political changes do not need to be considered, i.e. when values for political change 
variables are set to zero, the distribution shifts to the right (the solid square markered line): 
Relatively fewer projects will be burdened with extremely low preference least enthusiastic 
partners. The principal barrier to greater overall merger rates seems nevertheless to be local 
disparities in economic resources: As can be seen from the shift in the cumulative distribution 
(from the plain to the diamond markered solid line), when changes in economic resources are 
made irrelevant to local merger decisions, relatively fewer projects still will be characterized 
by very low preference most unenthusiastic partners. Additional analysis reveals that total per 
capita revenue from household taxes and fees varies regionally to a considerable extent.172 In 
other words there is a tendency for neigh
p
operational and specificational shortcomings in the present analysis is not too serious, it 
seems that, in Norway, local opposition to municipal mergers generally has more to do with 
economic differences between localities than with the purposeful voicing of political 
diversity. 
                                                 
172 That is, in analyses of variance with total per capita household taxes and fees the dependent variable and with 
independents dummy variables for the merger project groups as applied here, the adjusted R-square comes out at 
0.35. No such patterns prevail in analogous analyses with per capita exogenous economic resources as dependent 
variable. 
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5.6 Conclusions 
The present study has sought to delineate the determinants of local decisions to consolidate 
the Norwegian local democratic system. In analyses of municipal councilors’ preferences for 
merging their own municipality with those of their neighbors, it is found that the greatest 
sensitivity is of a political character: Differing tax and fee policies from the one locality to the 
next seems to be the most controversial issue when local decisions are to be made. Moreover, 
local preferences seem to be informed very much by general opposition to prospects for rising 
tax and fee levels in the wake of potential mergers: Analyses do not detect patterns of 
different views on impending tax increases for different groups within localities (i.e. different 
partisan groups). Possibly, this has also to do with methodological issues: As tax policies tend 
to be similar in neighboring localities, estimation of 
difficult. The wider upshot of general political diversity taken up below, we note at this point 
finer subdivisions of reaction patterns is 
 numerous accounts of tax policy as 
ea. 
The ortant because it 
rmatively 
benevolent mechanism of geographically diversified political stances is in full operation. If 
mes to important policies, they are certainly not 
quals in terms of resources. What are the implications of these findings for the future of 
orwegian local government? Specifically, is reform really warranted? In other words, what 
are the wider normative consequences flowing from the present study, besides it being a 
positive analysis of likely (low) merger rates?  
 
First of all, and from a pure societal economic point of view, it seems that the overall 
synergetic gains that may obtain from sensible mergers in Norway are not very large in any 
case: Mergers that are rational in this sense will, per definition, involve only tiny parts of the 
total population, most of which will live in large and efficient localities anyway. Pushing the 
matter with a view to very large overall gains seems a dead end. Second, mergers may still be 
viewed as sensible on the margin. If so, there is little need to see current opposition as much 
else than the voicing of local fears of redistributive effects. As such, a wider reform that is 
economically sensible on the margin and that does not seem to go much against local political 
diversity is hampered by mere bickering over existing resources. 
 
that the observed pattern is in any case in agreement with
a particularly controversial policy ar
 
 general finding of inter-locality political sensitivity is nonetheless imp
conforms to the ideal of local democracy. Specifically, it shows that the no
allocative efficiency is any guide, such differing stances should to a considerable extent 
inform the (re)structuring of local government. Still, while political differences are found to 
be important, and while neither potential efficiency gains nor municipality size in itself is 
found to be very decisive, the study also finds that disparities in economic resources are 
essential for decisions on whether or not to merge with neighboring localities. What’s more, 
additional analysis suggests that general opposition to boundary reform has much more to do 
with current resource disparities than with real political differences: While neighboring 
municipalities are likeminded when it co
e
N
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Appendix: Data sources, descriptive statistics and 
variable definitions 
4.40
5.03 3.79
1993 11 4.67 0.38 5.14 4.15
1997 11 4.63 0.30 5.03 4.15
2001 11 4.91 0.35 5.41 4.20
Kilde : NSD/SSB.
Tabell A2.1: Regionbefolkningens gjennomsnittlige selvplassering på høyre-venstre-
aksen (HVkt) (0=helt til venstre, 9=helt til høyre). Etter valgperiode. 
Stortingsvalg N Gjennomsnitt Standardavvik Maksimum Minimum
1977 11 4.86 0.26 5.18 4.40
1981 11 4.69 0.19 5.09
1985 11 4.55 0.33 5.07 4.06
1989 11 4.50 0.38
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Tabell A2.2: Regionbefolkningens gjennomsnittlige selvplassering på høyre-venstre-aksen 
(HVkt) (0=helt til venstre, 9=helt til høyre). Etter region. 
N Gjennomsnitt Standardavvik Maksimum Minimum
Akershus 7 4.89 0.17 5.14 4.66
Oslo 7 4.87 0.20 5.18 4.68
Hedmark og 
Oppland
7 4.25 0.32 4.74 3.79
Østfold og Vestfold 7 4.93 0.28 5.41 4.56
Buskerud og 
Telemark
7 4.71 0.13 4.91 4.56
Aust-Agder, Vest-
Agder og Rogaland
7 5.06 0.11 5.19 4.90
Hordaland og Sogn 
og Fjordane
7 4.81 0.22 5.08 4.55
Møre og Romsdal 7 4.71 0.32 5.15 4.36
Nord-Trøndelag og 
Sør-Trøndelag
7 4.43 0.23 4.74 4.15
Nordland 7 4.39 0.33 4.86 4.06
Troms og Finnmark 7 4.51 0.29 5.14 4.31
Kilde : NSD/SSB.
Region
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Tabell A2.3: Partienes oppslutning i fylkestingsvalg i opptellingskretser (VPikt) 
(kommuner). Etter valgperiode. 
SV DNA Sp V KrF H Frp
N 403 404 404 404 404 404 401
Gjennomsnitt 0.04 0.35 0.16 0.06 0.13 0.22 0.02
Standardavvik 0.03 0.13 0.09 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.01
Maksimum 0.19 0.70 0.48 0.40 0.38
1979
0.58 0.10
Minimum 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.00
N 404 404 404 404 404 404 403
Gjennomsnitt 0.05 0.39 0.14 0.05 0.11 0.20 0.04
Standardavvik 0.03 0.13 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.03
Maksimum 0.20 0.73 0.41 0.34 0.38 0.52 0.16
Minimum 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.00
N 404 404 404 333 404 404 404
Gjennomsnitt 0.05 0.38 0.13 0.05 0.11 0.18 0.08
Standardavvik 0.03 0.12 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.04
Maksimum 0.29 0.72 0.43 0.30 0.36 0.45 0.22
Minimum 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.01
N 404 404 404 404 404 404 404
Gjennomsnitt 0.11 0.31 0.20 0.04 0.10 0.16 0.05
Standardavvik 0.05 0.11 0.11 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.03
Maksimum 0.33 0.69 0.61 0.34 0.53 0.48 0.16
Minimum 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00
N 404 404 404 403 404 404 404
Gjennomsnitt 0.06 0.32 0.22 0.05 0.10 0.14 0.07
Standardavvik 0.03 0.10 0.11 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.04
Maksimum 0.28 0.66 0.58 0.52 0.35 0.49 0.23
Minimum 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01
N 404 404 404 403 404 404 404
Gjennomsnitt 0.07 0.29 0.17 0.05 0.12 0.15 0.10
Standardavvik 0.04 0.10 0.10 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.05
Maksimum 0.33 0.69 0.55 0.39 0.39 0.49 0.32
Minimum 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02
N 404 404 403 403 404 404 404
Gjennomsnitt 0.10 0.28 0.17 0.04 0.09 0.12 0.15
Standardavvik 0.05 0.10 0.11 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.07
Maksimum 0.31 0.70 0.61 0.47 0.48 0.39 0.51
Minimum 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04
1991
1983
1987
Kilde:  NSD/SSB.
1995
1999
2003
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Tabell A2.4: Partienes oppslutning i kommunestyrevalg i opptellingskretser (VPikt) 
(kommuner). Etter valgperiode. 
SV DNA Sp V KrF H Frp
N 213 399 358 266 364 381 82
Gjennomsnitt 0.05 0.35 0.17 0.08 0.13 0.21 0.03
Standardavvik 0.03 0.13 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.02
Maksimum 0.21 0.71 0.45 0.25 0.33 0.57 0.07
Minimum 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 241 403 363 298 358 390 138
Gjennomsnitt 0.06 0.39 0.15 0.07 0.11 0.19 0.06
Standardavvik 0.03 0.13 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.03
Maksimum 0.21 0.73 0.47 0.34 0.31 0.51 0.20
Minimum 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 256 403 355 277 342 381 155
Gjennomsnitt 0.07 0.37 0.15 0.07 0.11 0.19 0.11
Standardavvik 0.03 0.12 0.10 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.05
Maksimum 0.20 0.72 0.48 0.28 0.35 0.45 0.24
Minimum 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00
N 308 403 351 280 332 377 221
Gjennomsnitt 0.12 0.31 0.21 0.06 0.11 0.16 0.06
Standardavvik 0.05 0.11 0.11 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.03
Maksimum 0.31 0.66 0.57 0.48 0.34 0.47 0.19
Minimum 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.00
N 294 400 373 279 313 363 180
Gjennomsnitt 0.07 0.31 0.23 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.09
Standardavvik 0.04 0.11 0.12 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.04
Maksimum 0.27 0.71 0.61 0.43 0.36 0.47 0.20
Minimum 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01
N 252 400 358 272 309 348 240
Gjennomsnitt 0.09 0.30 0.18 0.07 0.13 0.18 0.11
Standardavvik 0.04 0.11 0.11 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.05
Maksimum 0.32 0.73 0.51 0.36 0.51 0.51 0.37
Minimum 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02
N 309 400 359 268 308 350 302
Gjennomsnitt 0.11 0.29 0.18 0.06 0.10 0.15 0.15
Standardavvik 0.05 0.12 0.12 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.07
Maksimum 0.38 0.70 0.55 0.40 0.40 0.50 0.46
Minimum 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.02
1991
1979
1983
1987
Kilde:  NSD/SSB.
1995
1999
2003
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Tabell A2.5: Fylkenes og kommunenes frie inntekter per innbygger.at (1000 NOK) 1980-2003.1
N N
1980 18 6.97 0.64 453 12.25 3.13
1981 18 7.30 0.73 453 13.28 4.42
1982 18 7.45 0.80 453 13.78 6.01
1983 18 7.19 0.82 453 13.76 6.15
1984 18 7.32 0.85 453 14.16 7.56
1985 18 7.78 0.90 453 15.35 8.96
1986 18 15.73 2.37 453 19.74 8.73
1987 18 15.80 2.41 453 20.02 10.00
1988 18 13.29 2.14 447 23.94 10.92
1989 18 13.76 2.26 447 24.50 10.32
1990 18 13.94 2.38 447 25.03 11.04
1991 18 12.70 2.37 447 23.53 7.40
1992 18 12.82 2.37 438 24.21 7.42
1993 18 12.60 2.11 438 23.85 7.10
1994 18 13.16 1.77 434 23.74 6.57
1995 18 13.20 1.77 434 23.23 6.46
1996 18 13.21 1.73 434 23.28 6.30
1997 18 12.89 1.62 434 24.72 6.78
1998 18 11.87 1.77 434 25.10 6.80
1999 18 11.76 1.98 434 25.59 7.08
2000 18 11.68 1.94 434 25.30 6.71
2001 18 11.88 1.92 434 25.48 6.80
2002 18 6.41 1.14 433 26.05 6.71
2003 18 6.31 1.11 433 25.89 6.58
1) Alle beløp er i 2000-kroner.
Kilde : NSD/SSB.
År
Fylker Kommuner
Gjennomsnitt GjennomsnittStandardavvik Standardavvik
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Tabell A2.6: Deskriptiv statistikk for variabler brukt i analyser av fylkestingsvalg. 
Perioden 1979-2003 samlet. 
N Gjennomsnitt Standardavvik Maksimum Minimum
ΔLijt 2418 -0.108 0.275 1.027 -1.404
NEDGjt 108 0.194 0.398 1.000 0.000
STYRjt 108 0.041 1.407 3.800 -1.200
ΔHVBkBt 73 -0.037 0.459 0.738 -0.738
INNTjt 108 1.000 0.142 1.452 0.820  
 
 
 
Tabell A2.7: Deskriptiv statistikk for variabler brukt i analyser av kommunestyrevalg. 
Perioden 1979-2003 samlet. 
N Gjennomsnitt Standardavvik Maksimum Minimum
ΔLijt 2213 -0.100 0.341 1.425 -1.536
NEDGijt 2379 0.121 0.326 1.000 0.000
VLISTijt 2201 0.033 0.178 1.000 0.000
STYRijt 2283 -0.002 1.794 2.800 -2.200
ΔHVBkBt 118 -0.003 0.285 0.738 -0.738
INNTijt 2379 0.981 0.314 5.489 0.385  
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Table A3.1: Local councilors' preferences for budget changes in primary schools, care for the 
elderly and the disabled, high schools and somatic hospitals 1995-1999. Frequencies 
(percentages). 
28 (0.75) 14 (0.37) 7 (0.69) 16 (1.60)
254 (6.77) 133 (3.54) 155 (15.33) 105 (10.48)
1187 (31.63) 1311 (34.93) 406 (40.16) 325 (32.44)
1805 (48.09) 1808 (48.17) 378 (37.39) 416 (41.52)
479 (12.76) 487 (12.98) 65 (6.43) 140 (13.97)
3753 (100.00) 3753 (99.99) 1011 (100.00) 1002 (100.01)
Primary schools
Elderly and the 
disabled High Schools
Municipalities Counties
Somatic 
hospitals
Reductions in excess of 
five per cent
Same resources as this 
year
Increases in the range of 
one to five per cent
Total:
Increases in excess of 
five per cent
Reductions in the range 
of one to five per cent
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Table A3.2: Descriptive statistics for variables used in analyses in table 3.1 and 3.2. 
deviato Max. Min. N
0.17 0.38 1.00 0.00 3013 0.17 0.37 1.00 0.00 941
0.16 0.37 1.00 0.00 3013 0.20 0.40 1.00 0.00 941
0.30 0.46 1.00 0.00 3758 0.28 0.45 1.00 0.00 1059
0.17 0.12 0.67 0.01 1034 0.14 0.10 0.47 0.01 244
Note:  N for party share of seats refers to number of local parties in the sample.
Municipalities ounties
Member of committe 
responsible for 
education (=1)
Member on execuive 
board (=1)
Party share of seats
Member of committe 
responsible for health 
and social policy (=1)
Mean
Standard 
deviaton Max. Min. N Mean
Standard 
n
C
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Table A4.1: Descriptive statistics for variables used in regression analyses in table 4.6. 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Max. Min. N Comments and sources
Proportion of socialist seats:
Norway 0.36 0.14 0.85 0.00 434 Norwegian Social Science 
Data Services
Denmark 0.41 0.13 0.82 0.06 273 Statistics Denmark
Socialist control:
Norway 0.17 0.38 1.00 0.00 435 Norwegian Social Science 
Data Services
Denmark 0.23 0.42 1.00 0.00 273 Statistics Denmark
Socialist mayor:
Norway 0.38 0.49 1.00 0.00 435 Norwegian Social Science 
Data Services
Denmark 0.39 0.49 1.00 0.00 273 Statistics Denmark
Norway 0.31 0.14 0.60 0.00 113 Norwegian School of 
Management questionaire 
surveys to local politicians 
(2002)1)
Income tax :
Norway (hypothetical tax 
rate; tax preference in per 
cent)
12.82 0.42 14.53 11.75 113 Norwegian School of 
Management questionaire 
surveys to local politicians 
(2002)
Denmark (actual tax rate 
in per cent)
20.9 0.9 23.2 15.5 273 Statistics Denmark
Property tax:
Norway (levies property 
taxes=1)
0.50 0.50 1.00 0.00 434 Dummy. Based on non-zero 
income from property taxes. 
Statistics Norway.
Denmark (tax rate in per 
thousand)
13.1 5.2 24.0 6.0 273 Statistics Denmark
1) Responses aggregated to shares with weighting for local party representativeness. 
Share of representatives in favour of 
increase in income tax rate:
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Table A4.1 continued. 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Max. Min. N Comments and sources
User charge:
Norway 26.70 6.10 40.60 0.00 275 Charge for municipal pre-
school child care. 
Percentage of costs. 
Satistics Norway.
Denmark 39.60 9.20 107.80 1.20 249 Charge for municipal child 
care  for school children. 
Percentage of costs. 
Statistics Denmark.
Norway 0.85 0.04 1.00 0.59 434 Statistics Norway
Denmark 0.91 0.03 0.96 0.74 273 Statistics Denmark
Population size:
Norway 10 445 29 981 512 589 233 433 Statistics Norway
Denmark 17 432 25 186 286 668 2 266 273 Statistics Denmark
Norway 23 284 315 38 648 19 998 435 Exogenous income adjusted 
for expenditure need. NOK 
per capita. Statistics 
Norway.
Denmark 27 641 652 30 586 26 126 273 Local expenditure need + 
(distance to national average 
x equalization level). DKK 
per capita. Danish Ministry 
of the Interior and Health.
Norway 154 271 21 608 271 000 111 700 434 NOK. Statistics Norway
Denmark 158 465 20 432 267 439 128 729 273 DKK. Statistics Denmark
Mean private ble income:
Ratio of median to mean taxable 
income:
Exogenous income and expenditure 
need:
taxa
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Table A4.1 continued. 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Max. Min. N Comments and sources
Party fragmentation:
Norway 0.27 0.09 1.00 0.14 434 Herfindahl index          
(Σpi
2, where pi is party i 's 
share of council 
represenatives). Norwegian 
Social Science Data 
Services.
Denmark 0.32 0.07 0.58 0.16 273 Herfindahl index          
(Σpi
2, where pi is party i 's 
share of council 
represenatives). Statistics 
Denmark.
Property values:
Norway: Mean appraised 
residence value (NOK)
58 573 15 895 131 399 22 565 434 Statistics Norway
Denmark: Land values 
(DKK per capita)
92 667 38 532 319 273 44 179 273 Danish Ministry of Interior.
Norway: Hydroelectric 
power production
0.35 0.48 1 0 434 Measures membership in 
hydroelectric power 
municipalities’ national 
organization (LVK). 
Membership list.
Denmark: Summer 
cottages
0.08 0.17 1.14 0 273 Measured per capita. 
Statistics Denmark.
Specific property types (controls in 
property tax analyses):
All data are from 2001 unless otherwise indicated.  
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Table A5.1: Definitions and sources of variables used in analyses in tables 5.1 and 5.2 
Source Coding, definitions
 NSM/NIBR (2002)1) Question: "Do you feel that your municipality should merge 
with the neighboring municipality/municipalities?. Coding: 
"yes"=1; "no"=0.
NSM/NIBR (2002)1) Rightist party=1 if respondent represents the Progress Party or 
the Conservative Party, 0 otherwise; Socialist party=1 if 
respondent represents the Labor Party, the Socialist Left Party 
or the Red electoral Alliance, 0 otherwise.
NSM/NIBR (2002)1) Membership=1 if respondent reprorts to be regular member, 0 
otherwise.
NSM/NIBR (2002)1) Question: "Are you or have you been employed in one of the 
following". Coding: "in a municipal body"=1, 0 otherwise.
St.prp. 82 (2000-
2001) (government 
white paper)
Per capita revenues from personal income and wealth taxes, 
block grants, property taxes and local power sales, adjusted for 
spending needs
NSD/Statistics 
Norway (2000)2)
Local income and wealth taxes and central government block 
grants per capita.
NSD/Norsk 
Familieøkonomi 
(1999)2)
Both measures are taxes and fees for a standard household as 
reported by municipality officials: A house for four residents 
with a dwelling area of 150 m 2 and a basement area of 75 m 2 . 
The house has two toilets, one bathroom, water consumption 
200 m 3 , electricity consumption 25000 kWh and one chimney. 
The house has a net value of NOK 750 000,- and the total 
household personal income is NOK 400 000,-
Langørgen et al. 
(2002)
Inrease in freely disposable municipal expenditure per capita. 
NSD/Statistics 
Norway (2000)
Net municipal interests on debt per capita.
Ministry of Local 
Government and 
Regional 
Development 
(Rundskriv H-2/02 ) 
(2002a)
Total income from property taxes and local power sales per 
capita.
NSD/Statistics 
Norway (2000)2)
Number of inhabitants
1) NSM: BI Norwegian School of Management; NIBR: Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research.
 NSD: Norwegian Social Science Data Services; Norsk Familieøkonomi  is a Norwegian conumer periodical.
Hydroelectric power 
resources
Municipal debt indicator
Estimated efficiency 
gains
Municipality size
Household property 
taxes and technical 
sector fees (water 
supply, sewerage, refuse 
collection and chimney 
sweeping).
Attitude towards merger
Partisanship
Municipal employee 
background
Membership on 
executive board
Respondent level variables:
Municipal level variables:
Personal taxes and block 
grants 
Adjusted disposable 
income
2)
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Table A5.2: Descriptive statistics for 80 municipalities used in analyses in tables 5.1 and 5.2. 
 NOK 1,000 per inhabitant, 2) NOK 1,000 per huosehold (4 persons).
Distributive tax and grants gain1)
Efficiency gain1)
3000-6000 inhab. (=1) 
6000-12000  inhab (=1) 
More than 12000  inhab. (=1)
Adjusted exogenous income1)
hare of respondents with municipal 
polyment background
Share of respondents affiliated with 
rightist party
Share of respondents affiliated with 
socialist party
Share of respondents on the executive 
board
Change in revenue from hydroelectric 
industry1)
Indicator for increase in municipal 
debt1)
Change in infrastructure fee levels2)
Share of respondents in favor of 
merger
Change in household property taxes2)
N Mean
Standard 
deviation Min. Max.
1374 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
1374 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00
1374 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00
80 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
80 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
80 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
80 101.58 14.55 87 162
80 -0.33 3.02 -9.30 5.10
80 0.03 1.07 -4.87 4.27
80 1.45 1.14 -1.93 3.85
80 0.02 0.49 -1.50 1.88
80 -0.12 0.69 -1.99 1.44
80 -0.07 0.49 -3.69 0.49
1374 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00
1374 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00
S
em
1)  
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